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ABSTRACT 
Inner Experience During Golf Performance
by
Yani L. Dickens
Dr. Russell T. Hurlburt, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Psychology 
University of Nevada Las Vegas
Sport performance is widely believed to depend on internal processes that occur during 
performance. Studies examining these processes have relied on retrospective self-reports 
obtained long after performance, a method limited by athletes’ abilities to compete and 
recall. Our study circumvented these problems by obtaining contemporaneous non­
retrospective reports of inner experience using Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES). 
DES uses a device that emits a random beep via an earpiece. Participants record ongoing 
inner experience immediately after the beep in a notebook. Within 24 hours participants 
are interviewed about these momentary experiences. Five highly-skilled (handicaps of 
between 2 and 7) and five moderately-skilled (handicaps between 13 and 26) golfers 
competed in an experimental tournament. DES was used to examine inner experience 
during golf. Golf inner experiences consisted o f golf-related content, mental preparation 
strategies, perceptual awareness, and inner speech most prominently. Unsymbolized 
thinking, sensory awareness, feeling, and speaking aloud were also present. Inner 
experience during golf was also found to be individually different. Golf-related content 
and mental preparation strategies may be positively related to performance.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
Sport Psychology Literature Review 
That golf is a mental game is widely recognized but only partially understood. 
Conventional lore suggests that successful performance in sport is determined both by 
physical and mental factors; in golf, success is thought to be determined even more by 
mental processes than in other sports. As the prominent sport psychologist Bob Rotella 
(1995) puts it, “at least half the battle occurs inside the golfer’s mind” (p. II).
Professional golfer Tom Kite speculates “the game is 80 percent or 90 percent mental” 
(Rotella, 1995, p. 15). The fundamental assumption of what it takes to be successful in 
golf is clear. As golfer Sam Snead puts it “Golf is a game played on a six inch course -  
the space between your ears!” (Kirshenbaum, Owens, & O ’Connor, 1998, p. 271). Thus it 
is commonly held in sport in general and golf in particular that successful performance 
depends on mental processes.
The notion that successful performance depends on mental processes is pervasive 
throughout the field of sport psychology with one notable addendum: Sport psychology 
focuses on emotional (e.g. arousal and anxiety, stress and coping) as well as on mental 
processes. The presence o f emotions in sport is exemplified by the cliché o f the athlete 
who “chokes” under the pressure of a competitive situation due to excessive arousal and 
anxiety. Thus the regulation of internal processes including emotions (Hanin, 2000;
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Hardy, 1996a; Lazarus, 2000; Meyers, Whelan, & Murphy, 1996) and cognitions (Hardy, 
1996a; Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996; Meyers, Whelan, & Murphy, 1996; Williams & 
Leffingwell, 2002) is a need recognized by researchers and laypeople alike.
Our understanding of what it takes to be successful in athletic performance, and golf 
for that matter, is far from thorough. One reason for this is the fact that studies examining 
internal processes have strongly relied on methodologies with two main sources of 
potential error: (1) they use retrospective self-report obtained after performance; and (2) 
they rely on athletes’ abilities to compete and, simultaneously, to attend, process, encode, 
store, and later retrieve inner experiential phenomena. Competing effectively and 
simultaneously remembering aspects of inner experience is a difficult combined task. 
These potential sources of error coupled with the demands required by retrospective self- 
report about remote processes that occur in the midst of complex task performance call 
into question hundreds of sport psychology studies that suggest an understanding of 
internal processes and threaten the effectiveness of performance enhancement 
interventions. As Meyers and colleagues (1996) cautioned, “the failure to engage in 
assessment or the poor fit between assessment strategies and intervention raises serious 
concerns about this applied work” (p. 157).
Equally troubling is the fact that many basic scientific questions about the 
relationship between internal processes and sport performance remain unanswered 
largely because they are seldom directly and explicitly examined. For instance, what 
internal processes or inner experiences occur during golf? Are inner experiences during 
golf emotional, cognitive, motivational, sensory, perceptual, directed toward behavior, 
directed toward emotional regulation, directed toward others, directed toward self,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
simple, complex, organized, disorganized, present, or absent? How consistent are inner 
experiences during golf? Do they vary within individuals? Do they vary across 
individuals? Are they related to external experiences? Are they independent of external 
experiences? Are they related to the individual’s behavior? Are inner experiences related 
to quality o f performance? In those rare instances where these questions have been 
addressed, they have been examined deductively by quantitative approaches aimed at 
assembling support for pre-existing theories by using narrow measures o f discrete 
phenomena assumed to exist during performance. Inductive qualitative explorations that 
suspend pre-existing theoretical assumptions have seldom been conducted on internal 
processes in natural performance environments.
Methods are available that largely circumvent the inherent limitations of retrospective 
self-report. These methods may provide answers to basic scientific questions about the 
relationship between internal processes and sport performance. One of these methods is 
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES).
The current study seeks to provide preliminary answers to basic questions about inner 
experience in sport and to provide directions for further study in sport performance by 
circumventing many of the problems inherent within retrospective and theory-driven self- 
reports obtained well after performance. DES provides this by 1) obtaining 
contemporaneous non-retrospective reports o f inner experience and 2) training 
participants extensively to attend to, process, encode, store, and later retrieve and report 
the phenomena of their inner experience. The current study thus proposed a direct 
approach to exploring internal processes during performance, consistent with the 
recommendations of Burton and Naylor (1997), which will subsequently be discussed.
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The purpose of this study is to understand these processes more completely and to begin 
to address the aforementioned basic questions.
Prior to discussing the course of action used for this study, two topics will be 
addressed. First, the empirical basis for the existing assumptions in the field o f sport 
psychology, such as that of the connection between particular internal processes and 
optimal performance, will be summarized with an emphasis on work conducted in golf. 
Next, we will summarize the rationale behind proposing a qualitative exploration o f 
internal processes during sport performance using DES by describing methods that have 
been widely used to sample inner experience. Once these topics have been examined, we 
will describe the methods used in the current study to explore the internal processes that 
occur during golf performance.
Internal Processes and Athletic Performance
Qualitative and, most frequently, quantitative methods have been used to investigate 
the relationship between internal processes and athletic performance. Research has 
sought to understand the relationship between sport performance and cognitive processes 
such as self-talk, attentional focus, imagery, as well as self-confidence and self efficacy. 
Research has also examined the relationship between sport performance and emotional 
processes such as anxiety and arousal, stress and coping, anger and aggression, mood 
states, and additional emotions. In both cases, hardly any research has explored internal 
phenomena without relying on retrospective self-reports focusing entirely on expected 
phenomena. This may shape our sense of which inner experiences occur in sport, how 
frequently they occur, and how they influence performance. Thus existing research has 
assessed phenomena in sport indirectly, retrospectively, casually, and deductively, so
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
existing knowledge about these phenomena may be tenuous. To illustrate this, existing 
research on cognitive and emotional processes in sport will be critically reviewed. 
Research on emotion in sport will be reviewed first, followed by research on cognition in 
sport, and finally recommendations for future research examining the internal processes 
that occur during performance will be provided.
Emotion & Sport Performance 
“Brad had begun to fear his driver.... In stressful situations, on narrow driving holes, 
he tightened up and lost his rhythm. If he mishit a driver..., all the energy left his body” 
(Rotella, 1995, pp. 133-134). As this depiction o f a struggling professional golfer 
illustrates, emotional phenomena have been thought to have considerable influence on 
sport performance. Considerable empirical attention has been devoted to the relationship 
between anxiety and/or arousal and sport performance; stress and coping have also been 
examined by sport psychology researchers, as have anger and aggression, mood states, 
and several additional emotions. These domains o f emotional phenomena related to sport 
performance will be reviewed with a general emphasis on major findings and specific 
emphasis on findings in the sport of golf. It will become evident from this review that 
almost no studies have been conducted that directly assessed emotional phenomena, 
despite the existence o f methods that can accomplish this. Instead, empirical 
investigations of emotion in sport have generally avoided the direct assessment of 
emotional phenomena in favor of casual retrospective self-report measures.
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Anxiety & Arousal
Conventional wisdom and sport lore have posited two contradictory notions of 
anxiety and arousal. Excessive anxiety is believed to cause athletes to “choke” under 
pressure. The contrary is illustrated by the athlete or team whose overconfidence and 
minimal arousal allows the underdog to pull off an upset. Thus conventional speculations 
leave one with the notion that anxiety and arousal may be excessively low or high but 
debilitating either way.
Within the field of support psychology, empirical attempts have been made to 
understand the anxiety and arousal-performance relationship and to manage anxiety and 
arousal prior to and during performance. An optimal level of arousal is assumed to be one 
of the fundamental preconditions to successful athletic performance. Nonetheless, 
theoretical models of arousal have not consistently attained empirical support.
Conceptual vagueness, complexity, and heterogeneity have plagued explanations of 
arousal. Although optimal levels of arousal have been posited, research findings have 
failed to support several explanations of arousal consistently (Whelan, Epkins, & Meyers, 
1990).
Research on the anxiety and arousal-performance relationship has used several 
definitions for these constructs. Gould and Krane (1992) defined arousal as physiological 
and psychological activation which exist on a continuum from deep sleep to extreme 
excitement. The term anxiety was used to refer to the cognitive and emotional aspects of 
arousal (Gould & Krane, 1992). Hanin (2000) specified several subtypes o f anxiety in 
sport performance. Cognitive anxiety was used to refer to negative thoughts about 
performance, whereas somatic anxiety included the bodily symptoms of autonomic
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reactivity associated with nervousness. Anxiety has also been viewed along a social 
dimension. Vallerand and Blanchard (2000) suggested that emotions such as anxiety may 
involve intrapersonal and interpersonal consequences. Interpersonal consequences 
included emotional impact on thoughts (e.g., worry), motivations (e.g., approach or 
avoidance), health (e.g., immune system seems to mediate the stress and illness 
relationship), and sport performance (e.g., may depend on state anxiety level). Anxiety 
was seen as interpersonal, when it influences the relationship between two specific group 
members (e.g., an emotional display catches on). Thus in the context of a team, the 
individual may experience interpersonal state anxiety. Finally, Spielberger’s state-trait 
conceptualization (see Spielberger & Diaz-Guerrero, 1986) was extended to performance 
anxiety to differentiate situational from characterological anxiety, respectively. Thus 
competitive state anxiety was used to refer to the specific state of anxiety in a given 
competition (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996).
Zaichkowsky and Takenaka (1993) advocated the use of the term intensity as a 
multidimensional construct for the physiological, cognitive, and behavioral processes that 
perform an energizing function. Taylor and Wilson (2002) preferred the term intensity to 
avoid the pathological connotations o f anxiety and the sexual connotations of arousal. 
There are two problems with this label. First, arousal and anxiety have been more 
commonly used. Second, intensity may potentially be confused with severity.
The most recent definitional trends in arousal and anxiety research are; 1)
Researchers have more recently used arousal as a multidimensional construct that 
includes both psychological and physiological components (Gould & Udry, 1994; Gould 
& Krane, 1992) with either facilitative and debilitative connotations. 2) Intensity is a
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recently recommended term that is nonetheless seldom used among researchers. Taylor & 
Wilson (2002) recommended that practitioners and researchers use the term intensity with 
athletes and coaches to avoid misunderstanding. When used by researchers, intensity has 
had connotations more similar to those of arousal than anxiety. 3) Anxiety related to 
performance has been seen as a multidimensional construct with several subtypes (e.g., 
state-trait) and manifestations (e.g, cognitive, somatic, performance, interpersonal) with 
debilitative connotations. Thus anxiety, arousal, and intensity have all been proposed as 
multidimensional constructs related to the emotion and energy level in sport performance. 
4) Researchers have advocated better distinction among these constructs but have failed 
to provide consistent and mutually exclusive definitions. Hardy and colleagues (1996) 
defined arousal as “cognitive and physiological activity which takes place in response to 
some new input to the system” (p. 118). Anxiety was defined as “a meta-cognitive 
emotion” (p. 119). For instance Hardy and colleagues believed that “doubts about one’s 
ability to cope with a given stressor are likely to be reflected in feelings of anxiety” (p. 
141). More simply, arousal was seen as a mental and bodily process, whereas anxiety 
was seen as a mental and emotional process. Both contain cognitive elements, but 
arousal was seen as more physiological whereas anxiety was seen as more emotional. 
Raglin & Hanin (2000) used a similar definitional strategy. Anxiety was used to refer to 
an emotional reaction to stress, whereas arousal was used with more physiological 
connotations.
Due to the conceptual similarity between arousal and intensity, only one term will be 
used in the present study. Because arousal was more traditionally and frequently used 
within the sport psychology literature, intensity will be abandoned in favor of using
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arousal. Thus for the purposes o f the present study, anxiety’ and arousal will be used as 
multidimensional constructs with physiological, cognitive, and emotional manifestations. 
The only difference that will be evident is that arousal will have a slightly greater 
physiological emphasis, whereas anxiety will have a slightly greater emotional emphasis, 
consistent with the work of others (Hardy et al., 1996; Raglin & Hanin, 2000).
Theories. Sport psychology has a rich theoretical tradition. In no area is this more 
evident than with the continual development and refinement o f theories regarding the 
anxiety and arousal-performance relationship. Several theories and conceptual models 
have emerged to explain the relationship between arousal and athletic performance. 
Descriptive models include drive theory, the Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis, optimal zones of 
functioning, multiple dimensional anxiety theory, reversal theory, and catastrophe theory. 
Historically, the anxiety and arousal-performance relationship was evaluated by single 
physiological or self-report measures. More recently however, the relationship has been 
examined along multidimensional lines with multiple measures targeting state-trait 
anxiety, cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and physiological arousal. Drive Theory, the 
Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis, the State-Trait perspective. Optimal Zones o f Functioning 
Theory, Multidimensional Anxiety Theory, Catastrophe Theory, and Reversal Theory 
will be reviewed to discuss how arousal and anxiety have been studied in relation to sport 
performance. From this review, it will become evident that studies that have examined 
arousal and anxiety have relied on self-reported ratings of arousal and anxiety rather than 
samples of immediate inner experience. Since no studies could be found that have 
examined immediate inner experience during sport performance, little is known about the 
actual experience o f anxiety and arousal during sport performance. Thus the existing
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knowledge about the relationship between anxiety/arousal and performance will be 
reviewed.
Drive Theory. Drive theory (Hull, 1943; Spence & Spence, 1966) is one of the earlier 
and simplest approaches to the study of the relationship between arousal and 
performance. Drive theory hypothesized that the quality of performance increases along 
with increasing levels of arousal. This simple positive linear relationship was later 
contradicted by research findings. For instance, as arousal increases beyond a moderate 
level, quality of performance decreases (Robazza, Bortoli & Nougier, 1998). Drive 
theory has long since been rejected because o f a lack supporting evidence (Raglin & 
Hanin, 2000) and its failure to account for the dynamics of arousal related to the 
performance o f complex motor tasks (Gould & Krane, 1992).
Yerkes -Dodson Hypothesis. The Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis, sometimes referred to as 
the Yerkes-Dodson law, is the most widely recognized explanation of the arousal- 
performance relationship (Taylor & Wilson, 2002; Weinberg, 1990). Yerkes and Dodson 
hypothesized an inverted-U relationship between arousal and performance in 1908. At 
low levels o f physiological arousal, performance typically suffers. As levels of arousal 
increase however, improved performance follows. This increase in the quality of 
performance begins to decline as arousal levels become exceedingly high. Oxedine 
(1970) applied the Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis to sport performance and suggested that 
the level o f optimal arousal, although usually moderate, was different for different motor 
tasks (e.g., fine or gross). In the 1970s this relationship was extensively studied with 
initially supportive results. Several later failures to demonstrate its predictive validity 
however relegated the Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis to a well known historical artifact, and
10
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it is more typically used as a general descriptive model (Gould & Krane, 1992). 
Exceptions to the model emerged as studies found that as arousal increases, performance 
declines dramatically in an irreversible manner, where as the inverted-U hypothesis 
suggests that simply decreasing arousal would improve performance. Further criticisms 
o f the Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis include the lack of support for its premise (Fazey & 
Hardy, 1988; Gould & Krane, 1992), lack o f support for Oxendine’s (1970) distinction 
between different arousal levels for different tasks (Krane & Williams, 1994), and the 
failure to take into account individual differences in coping with competitive stress 
(Fazey & Hardy, 1988; Raglin & Hanin, 2000; Raglin & Turner, 1993; Taylor & Wilson, 
2002). Thus, however logically appealing it may be, the Yerkes-Dodson hypothesis has 
failed to receive consistent empirical support for its application to athletic performance 
(Gould & Krane, 1992; Taylor & Wilson, 2002).
State-Trait Perspective. Spielberger applied a state-trait theory to anxiety, which has 
been extended to arousal (Spielberger & Diaz-Guerrero, 1986). State anxiety refers to 
transitory levels o f arousal which vary across the contextual situations an individual 
encounters. Trait anxiety is the predisposition for perceiving situations as threatening. 
Thus anxiety can be described as both a mood-like state and a personality trait. Several 
self-report anxiety inventories have been widely used in the study of arousal, including 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), the Sport Competition Anxiety Test (SCAT), 
which measures trait anxiety, and the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory (CSAI), 
which measures state anxiety (Gould & Krane, 1992).
Optimal Zones o f  Functioning Theory. The Soviet sport psychologist Yuri Hanin 
posited the optimal zones o f functioning theory in 1980. Based on Hanin’s observations
1 1
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that regardless o f sport, some athletes performed best at very low levels of anxiety and 
others at very high levels (Taylor & Wilson, 2002), this theory suggests that no single 
optimal level of state anxiety leads to optimal performance for all. Anxiety appeared to 
be a more important factor on the individual level than the group level (Raglin & Hanin, 
2000). Hanin’s method uses observations o f performance and assesses individual state 
anxiety using instruments such as the STAI and the CSAI (see Pons, Balaguer, & Garcia- 
Merita, 2001) to facilitate the identification of an individual zone of optimal functioning 
(IZOF).
According to Gould and Krane ( 1992), the high degree of individual variability in 
state anxiety scores commonly found in studies with different athletic subgroups makes it 
unlikely that a simple (e.g., moderate) universal level of arousal exists. In addition to 
differences among individuals within a sport for the same task, the level of arousal 
required for successful performance across tasks such as golf and football may be quite 
different. For instance, Boutcher and Zinsser (1993) found that both elite and beginning 
golfers exhibited significantly decelerated heart rate, a sign of physiological relaxation 
(Raglin & Hanin, 2000), during short and long putting performance, whereas elite golfers 
showed significantly more deceleration than beginning golfers. By contrast, Secunda, 
Blau, and McGuire (1986) found that aggressiveness in football, among other factors, 
predicted ability, which seems consistent with higher physiological arousal. Indeed, 
interventions aimed at elevating arousal have enhanced performance significantly more 
on strength tasks (Tynes & McFatter, 1987), endurance, and sprinting compared to tasks 
requiring more technical skill, timing, speed, and balance (Gould & Udry, 1994; Meyers 
et al., 1996).
12
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In any event, IZOF theory suggests that individual differences should be taken into 
account and assessed prior to interventions that manage arousal (Raglin & Turner, 1993). 
The benefits o f this model are evident by the process o f establishing the IZOF using 
multiple sources o f data from both recall and direct observational methods. Objective 
(e.g., golf scores) and subjective (e.g., satisfaction with score) measures of performance 
can also be used. In addition, Hanin’s method is widely used and has recently being 
improved. This approach was modified slightly by Pons and colleagues (2001) to 
improve accounting for individual differences by using a graphical method of 
establishing IZOFs with highly skilled (handicap under 8) junior golfers. Although the 
sample was small (N = 6), results indicated more golfers performed better using the 
graphical method o f establishing IZOFs when compared to Hanin’s previous (direct and 
recall) methods.
Several studies have supported the optimal zones of functioning theory by showing 
that athletes have performed more effectively within respective pre-established IZOFs 
when compared with athletes whose arousal levels fall outside of the IZOF (Gould & 
Krane, 1992; Raglin & Turner, 1993). Nevertheless, the IZOF theory has been criticized 
for failing to explain the etiology o f individually different levels of anxiety and arousal 
(Gould & Tuffey, 1996; Jones, 1995), for its obsolete narrow and one dimensional view 
o f anxiety and arousal (Jones, 1995; Taylor & Wilson, 2002), for reliance on 
retrospective report (Taylor & Wilson, 2002), for significant results but small effect size 
(Russell & Cox, 2000), and for over-reliance on the STAI, which is not sport specific 
(Jones, 1995). Many of these issues have been addressed by using revised and sport 
specific anxiety measures (Jones, 1995) and by showing memory concerns related to
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retrospective report may be exaggerated (Taylor & Wilson, 2002). Recent studies appear 
to reflect a broader view o f the IZOF as it has been extended to additional emotional 
phenomena. Unfortunately, this extension has been extremely indirect. For instance, Ruiz 
and Hanin (2004) examined the use of symbolic metaphors used to prepare karate 
athletes for competition, which were similar to additional emotional phenomena (e.g., 
happiness, pride, relief, anger, anxiety, fright, sadness, and shame). Metaphors that 
reflected high readiness to perform were associated with best performance, whereas 
metaphors reflecting low readiness to perform lead to worst performance. Thus, evidence 
suggests that an individual optimal level of arousal, as measured by anxiety 
questionnaires, is plausibly related to optimal athletic performance, although these 
phenomena have been measured quite indirectly. The current study attempted to measure 
the actual inner experience of processes such as these more directly by interrupting 
participants during performance.
Multidimensional Anxiety Theory. Multidimensional anxiety theory emphasizes the 
importance of the physical and mental elements of anxiety. Davidson and Schwartz 
(1976) proposed two subcomponents o f anxiety -  cognitive and somatic anxiety. 
Cognitive anxiety is conceptualized as awareness of unpleasant feeling whereas somatic 
anxiety refers to physiological arousal. Somatic anxiety has been measured via 
biofeedback (e.g., heart rate, galvanic skin response, cortisol) and even by self-report, 
although the validity and reliability of the latter has been criticized because responses 
may be distorted by social desirability, demand characteristics, social and experimental 
expectations, reactivity (Hackfort & Schwenkmezger, 1989; Hackfort &
Schwenkmezger, 1993; Raglin & Hanin, 2000). Cognitive anxiety is typically
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characterized by negative concerns, inability to concentrate, and disrupted attention, 
whereas somatic anxiety includes directly assessed or perceived bodily symptoms of 
anxiety or perceived autonomic arousal (Krane & Williams, 1992). Thus excessive 
cognitive anxiety is thought to be distractive and therefore should interfere with 
performance. Martens, Burton, Vealey, Bump, and Smith (1982, 1990) applied the 
multidimensional theory to athletic performance by suggesting that cognitive and somatic 
anxiety were related to athletic performance. The multidimensional theory suggested that 
cognitive anxiety is negatively related to performance whereas somatic anxiety forms an 
inverted-U relationship with performance (Jones, 1995). One of outgrowth o f this theory 
was the development o f the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2) and its 
short form (Cox, Russell, & Robb, 1998). The CSAI-2 measures cognitive anxiety, 
perceived somatic anxiety, and state confidence with sport performance.
Research in the multidimensional tradition has supported several factors that may 
influence the cognitive-somatic anxiety and performance relationship. Competitive 
experience was associated with increased cognitive anxiety, and trait anxiety was 
correlated with increased somatic anxiety for wrestlers (Gould, Petlichkoff, & Weinberg, 
1984). Examining these factors in golf, Krane and Williams (1986) found competitive 
trait anxiety predicted both cognitive and somatic anxiety, whereas how well an athlete 
performed in the past predicted somatic anxiety. Unfortunately, evidence of moderating 
variables has excessively relied on indirect measures, which extend even beyond 
limitations o f self-report. For instance, cognitive and somatic anxiety was found to be 
greater for individual than team figure skaters and lower for those later in birth order 
(Martin & Hall, 1997). Birth order was taken as indirect evidence of differential parental
15
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expectations and socialization processes for first bom versus later bom children, which 
might lead to differing anxiety levels. Results indicated that later bom athletes had less 
cognitive and somatic anxiety in the team event relative to the individual event, but the 
interpretation that this is due different contextual developmental factors (e.g., parental 
expectations, socialization processes) seems to extend well beyond what was directly 
measured (birth order).
Studies examining the relative influence of cognitive and somatic anxiety on athletic 
performance have yielded extremely mixed results. One the one hand, studies have 
demonstrated that, compared to cognitive anxiety and confidence, somatic anxiety was a 
better predictor of athletic performance. For instance, Gould, Petlichkoff, Simons, and 
Vevera (1987) examined pistol-shooting performance and anxiety using the CSAI-2. 
Cognitive anxiety was unrelated to performance, confidence was negatively related to 
performance, and somatic anxiety was related to performance in a curvilinear (inverted- 
U) fashion. By contrast, Barnes, Sime, Dienstbier, and Plake (1986) found the opposite 
with male college swimmers; that is, cognitive anxiety was a significant performance 
predictor whereas somatic anxiety was not. Further mixed evidence was found as state 
confidence was the strongest predictor of female collegiate golf performance (Krane & 
Williams, 1987). On the other hand, a meta-anlaysis of 29 studies using the CSAI-2 by 
Craft, Magyar, and Becker, (2003) indicated weak support for the relationship among 
performance and the CSAI-2 subcomponents cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and 
confidence. In addition, several studies failed to find any relationship between the CSAI- 
2 subcomponents and performance (Craft et al., 2003).
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Krane, Williams, and Feltz (1992) administered the CSAI-2 to 100 female college 
golfers prior to first-round and prior to second-round competition at a golf tournament. 
The purpose of this study was to test a multidimensional theoretical model that suggested 
that competitive trait anxiety and precompetitive cognitive anxiety significantly 
influenced pre-first round state confidence. Results o f a path analysis indicated, not 
surprisingly, that past performance was the best predictor of actual performance.
However competitive trait anxiety and precompetitive cognitive anxiety influenced 
baseline state confidence. First round cognitive anxiety predicted pre-first round state 
confidence. In addition, first round state confidence predicted pre-second round cognitive 
and somatic anxiety, both of which in turn predicted pre-second round state confidence. 
Thus the authors suggested that reciprocal relationships were found between state- 
confidence and cognitive and somatic anxiety; however none of these processes 
influenced first-round performance expectations whereas past average score did. 
Performance expectations predicted cognitive anxiety, providing partial support for the 
multidimensional model.
In summary, the dynamics o f anxiety and arousal during sport performance have been 
examined by studies from the multidimensional theory perspective. Although consistent 
empirical support for the multidimensional model has been lacking, a few studies have 
provided supportive findings for this theory (Gould & Krane, 1992; Krane & Williams, 
1992), two of which used golfers (Krane & Williams, 1986; 1992). The continued used of 
the CSAI-2 and efforts to improve it may strengthen this theoretical model. Furthermore 
as Baron and Kenny (1986) noted, “most areas of psychology... treat phenomena that
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have multiple causes” (p. 1176). As such, multidimensional models such as this one are 
logically appealing, albeit in need of much improvement.
Less optimistically speaking, multidimensional theory studies appear to be more 
invested in testing theoretical models by asking for ratings of bodily and cognitive 
anxiety before and after but never during performance. This is problematic for many 
reasons that will later be discussed. But a major problem arises from asking participants 
to report retrospectively about anxiety and arousal because this assumes that; 1) 
participants had an inner experience related to anxiety and arousal; 2) they were aware of 
it; 3) they encoded in their memory; and 4) they later retrieved it without problem despite 
the possibility that participating in sport performance and simultaneously remembering 
inner experience for future self-report is a difficult combined task. Rather than focusing 
on the actual experience of arousal and anxiety related to sport performance, these studies 
are subject to the limitations of retrospective self-report. To overcome these problems, 
the current study attempted to measure the actual inner experience o f processes such as 
these by interrupting participants during performance.
Catastrophe Theory. Catastrophe theory is a multidimensional nonlinear approaeh to 
conceptualizing sport performance with roots in systems theory. This theory was applied 
to sport performance to account for apparently contradictory findings. For instance, one 
study found that performance improved in cognitively anxious individuals before 
competition when both somatic anxiety (e.g., reported) and physiological anxiety (e.g., 
directly measured) were low (Parfitt & Hardy, 1994). Several studies have shown mixed 
positive and negative effects with somewhat higher somatic and physiological arousal 
when cognitive anxiety was high (see Parfitt, Jones, & Hardy, 1990). Catastrophe theory
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accounts for these findings by applying a nonlinear model that explains the dynamics of 
three factors: 1) physiological arousal, which can be measured directly instead of via self- 
report; 2) cognitive anxiety, which is measured via self-report; 3) and performance, 
which can be measured by objective observation (Hardy, 1996a; Hardy et al., 1996). 
Cognitive anxiety is thought to mediate the relationship between physiological arousal 
and performance: 1) The Yerkes-Dodson relationship between physiological arousal and 
performance is thought to exist when cognitive anxiety is low. Thus a moderate level of 
arousal facilitates performance; 2) When cognitive anxiety and physiological arousal both 
reach a moderate point called the critical threshold, bifurcation point, or cusp, two 
opposite levels of performance are possible -  optimally high or drastically low. At the 
bifurcation point, the path that performance takes is analogous to the pitchfork, which is 
determined by the exact level of physiological arousal (Hardy et al., 1996). As cognitive 
anxiety (or physiological arousal) surpasses this critical point, performance descends 
catastrophically. Once this point has been reached, “it can only be reversed by a 
considerable reduction in physiological arousal beyond the point where the original 
decrement in performance occurred” (Hardy et al., 1996, p. 152). This is not predicted by 
continuous theories, which suggest the immediate reversal o f performance from positive 
to negative would occur with decreased cognitive anxiety and/or physiological arousal; 3) 
When physiological arousal is already high, a simple negative correlation between 
cognitive anxiety and performance is predicted to exist, indicating that cognitive anxiety 
interferes with performance; 4) Finally, when physiological arousal is low, a positive 
correlation is expected to occur between cognitive anxiety and performance (see Biddle, 
1995; Hardy, et al., 1996).
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Hardy ( 1996a) compared two slightly different multidimensional models, one without 
and one with self-confidence, to three similar versions of catastrophe theory in eight 
experienced golfers. Cognitive and somatic anxiety were measured using the CSAI-2, 
and physiological arousal was measured using heart rate during golf putting performance 
in a tournament. Using multiple regression, the proportion of variance in putting 
performance accounted for by the first respective multidimensional anxiety theory model 
was 5%, which was not statistically significant. When self-confidence was added to the 
second multidimensional model, 7% of the variance in performance was accounted for, 
which was significant. The three catastrophe models accounted for 57%, 57%, and 58% 
of the variance in performance, and self-confidence did not add to the proportion of 
variance accounted for. Confidence was found to be at least partially independent o f 
cognitive anxiety. In any event, support was found for both models, and results strongly 
favored catastrophe models. In 2004, Hardy, Woodman, and Carrington found evidence 
supporting a moderating role for self-confidence in a catastrophe model o f anxiety using 
male golfers. In a low self-confidence condition when somatic anxiety was low (i.e., “my 
body is relaxed), cognitive anxiety (i.e., “worry”) was negatively related to performance 
as predicted. In a high self-confidence condition, an interaction resulted between 
cognitive and somatic anxiety -  cognitive anxiety (i.e., “worry”) was more positively 
associated with performance when somatic anxiety was high than when low. The worst 
performance, however, resulted from the high self-confidence, high cognitive, and low 
somatic anxiety condition (i.e., “confident and worried” but “body is relaxed”), an 
unpredicted finding logically difficult to interpret. Nonetheless, emerging evidence 
suggests self-confidence may moderate the anxiety and performance relationship.
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A critical response to Hardy’s anxiety theory and the use of the CSAI-2 in general 
was presented by Burton and Naylor (1997), who suggested that current theories and 
related measures confound anxiety with “positive affective states, such as challenge, 
excitement, or self-confidence” and may have mislabeled these phenomena as facilitative 
anxiety. In fact. Hale and Whitehouse (1998) attempted to induce either “challenge” (i.e., 
positive appraisal) or “pressure” (i.e., negative appraisal) reactions in soccer players via a 
combined relaxation video and imagery audiotape intervention. The challenge condition 
produced significantly more self-confidence and significantly less somatic anxiety. In 
addition. Burton and Naylor (1997) stated that competitive anxiety theory overlooks the 
temporal patterns of anxiety, particularly the notion that anxiety prior to performance 
may be necessary for preparation, whereas anxiety during performance may not be 
facilitative. Furthermore, current anxiety theories may overlook athletes’ interpretation of 
anxiety symptoms, which “is more predictive of performance than the intensity of the 
symptoms experienced” (Burton & Naylor, 1997, p. 299). The authors’ final 
recommendations included “measuring anxiety during breaks in competition with field 
measures o f state anxiety” (p. 301).
In summary, the catastrophe model accounts for different relationships found between 
arousal and performance. According to Hardy (1996a) and Hardy and colleagues (2004), 
the anxiety and performance relationship may be moderated by self-confidence; the 
arousal and performance relationship may be mediated by cognitive anxiety according to 
Biddle (1995). These relationships are best represented graphically in three dimensions as 
demonstrated by Biddle (1995) and Gould and Krane (1992). The drawbacks to 
catastrophe theory may be its inherent complexity and relative difficulty testing its
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predictions. Although the model has been supported via modeling (e.g., Hardy, 1996a; 
Hardy et al., 2004), catastrophe theory constructs and processes have been criticized for 
being excessively difficulty to measure (Hardy, 1996b) and can be tailored to meet the 
theoretical or empirical needs of models (Hardy et al., 2004). Furthermore, dynamic 
systems are thought to exhibit sensitive dependence on initial conditions and are thought 
to be quite unstable (Gleick, 1987; Masterpasqua, 2004). Thus, measuring dynamic 
processes may alter the processes themselves (e.g., reactivity). Evidence for nonlinear, 
ehaotic, dynamic processes exhibiting sensitive dependence on initial conditions has been 
found by Kelly, Heath, and Longstaff (2001) and Prorokovic and Gregov (2004) in 
psychomotor processes (reaction time). Thus catastrophe theory has increasing empirical 
support (Biddle, 1995; Prorokovic & Gregov, 2004; Kelly, Heath, & Longstaff, 2001) in 
golf performance (Hardy, 1996a; Hardy et al., 2004), and scientific examination of 
complexity in the anxiety and arousal-performance relationship appear inevitable.
The dynamics of anxiety and arousal during sport performance has been examined by 
studies from the catastrophe theory perspective. Rather than focusing on the actual 
experience of arousal and anxiety related to sport performance, these studies appear to be 
more invested in testing theoretical models by asking for ratings of bodily and cognitive 
anxiety before and after but never during performance. This is problematic for many 
reasons that will later be discussed, but the current study attempted to measure the actual 
inner experience of processes such as these by interrupting participants during 
performance.
Reversal Theory. According to reversal theory (RT) (Apter, 1992), polar opposite 
“metamotivational” states exist in four pairs: 1) a telic (characterized by low arousal.
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planning, and goal directed behavior) and paratelic (e.g., high arousal, lack o f planning, 
and nongoal directed behavior) pair, 2) a negativist (e.g., autonomous and rebelling 
against norms) and conformist (to norms) pair, 3) an autic (e.g., focus on self) and alloic 
(e.g. focus others) pair, and finally 4) a mastery (e.g., desire to dominate over competition 
and compete with others) and sympathy (e.g., desire to be nurtured by and cooperate with 
others) pair. The relationship between anxiety/arousal and affect is thought to depend on 
cognitive appraisals of the individual’s level of anxiety/arousal, which is typically 
indirectly measured. This model predicts that if  anxiety/arousal and stress are high, the 
individual is over-stimulated. If anxiety/arousal and stress are low, the individual is closer 
to a state of sleep. If the level of anxiety/arousal is high and stress is low, the individual is 
excited or “psyched-up,” a state predicted to yield optimal performance. Finally, under 
conditions o f low anxiety/arousal and low stress, boredom is experienced. Until recently, 
little empirical evidence supported this theory (Gould & Krane, 1992; Biddle, 1995).
In 2002, Hudson and Walker conducted one of the few qualitative investigations of 
internal processes in golf. Because this study attempted to examine inner experience 
related to sport performance in golf, which the current study was designed to examine, 
and because it did so qualitatively, this study will be extensively reviewed. The strengths 
and weaknesses o f the study will be discussed, and it will become apparent that 
improvements to studies such as this are warranted. Methods to improve the study of 
inner experience in sport performance will be discussed in the next chapter.
Hudson and Walker (2002) sought to examine RT in golf. Their interpretation of RT 
related to sport performance suggested that individuals can experience reversals between 
opposite states within a given pair due to: 1) frustration that the needs of current state
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aren’t being met, 2) satiation (e.g., where time dictates reversal), or 3) a contingent event 
or environmental stimulus (e.g. cue) demanding a switch between metamotivational 
states. Metamotivational states and reversals were examined among five competitive 
golfers who participated in a round robin tournament for the study. The authors used a 
modified version o f the Metamotivational State Coding Schedule (MSGS) structured 
interview (Potocky, Cook, & O ’Connell, 1993) with participants within 24 hours, a 
measure aimed at reducing memory problems associated with retrospective self-report. 
Reversals in state occurred when participants reported a change from one state to another. 
A total of 17 reversals in states were reported, with a range of one to five reversals, and 
65% were attributed to contingent events, 29% to frustration, and 6% to satiation. 
Reversals were not associated with winning (53%) or losing (47%), and all but one 
reversal occurred between the 5'*' and 16*’’ holes. The most frequent states reported were 
paratelic conformity (29%), telic conformity (27%), and autic state (27%).
The authors indicated more similarities than differences in metamotivational state 
profiles. The major similarity was in the frequently-experienced paratelic conformity 
combination, followed closely by telic conformity and the autic state. Qualitative 
descriptions o f participants’ metamotivational states during performance were also 
provided by the authors. For instance, the winner o f the tournament displayed a 
consistent pattern of telic conformity (e.g., low arousal, planning, goal directed behavior), 
and autic states. According to the authors, this player experienced a reversal from the 
paratelic to the telic state that was attributed to a contingent event, saying “on the last 
hole I tried to veer it round the com er.. .tried something different.... I think if it was 
closer I wouldn’t have tried it, I would have hit it straight” (p. 208). In contrast, the last
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place player had a higher incidence of the paratelic state. One of the strengths of this 
study was the collection of data from a naturalistic sport context, which may enhance 
ecological validity. Although this study collected data within 24 of competition, which 
may have somewhat reduced o f memory problems, it is likely that forgetting and 
reconstruction would have occurred at a higher rate that if  participants were interrupted 
during performance and asked to briefly report about inner experience for later 
interviews. Studies such as Hudson and Walker’s (2002) contained several weaknesses 
that should be considered for the development o f improved qualitative research; 1) 
Although authors speculated that telic conformity “is likely to facilitate attentional focus 
on factors associated with performance success” and may “attenuate” the “focus on 
factors that may be detrimental to performance,” this interpretation is based on an 
extremely small homogeneous sample with regard to skill (handicap 1.5 to 6). This 
interpretation may have been better tested by including a comparison group of novice 
golfers. 2) Although authors present an appealing and sensible theory, the use of a 
deductive approach with a priori predictions may have led to experimenter expectancies, 
influencing results in unanticipated ways. 3) The authors described the MSCS as a 
“powerful, reliable tool for assessing metamotivational states,” but they failed to provide 
evidence of this from past studies of their interview process or from measurements 
obtained from their study. 4) The interview schedule was provided in their publication, 
and many of the items were open-ended questions. Unfortunately, questions like “did this 
make you feel uncomfortable or was the feeling unpleasant?” are leading. This question 
reveals the researchers’ assumptions that a) participants were aware of some type of inner 
experience, b) this phenomenon caused them to experience an emotion that can
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accurately be labeled either as discomfort or unpleasantness and not c) some other 
emotion, thought, behavior, or nothing at all. Furthermore, an affirmative answer to the 
question above leads to a misunderstanding about experience even if all o f the 
assumptions above are valid because answering “yes” could actually suggest the presence 
of either discomfort or unpleasantness or both. Without adequate follow-up questions, 
there is no way o f determining the actual nature o f inner experience. Several additional 
questions may have been nearly as leading. For example, “would you say you were 
feeling generally serious or light hearted” a) assumes and emotion occurred, b) suggests 
only two possible expressions o f the emotion, c) assumes participants were aware o f the 
emotion or should have been, and d) fails to allow or at least limits the expression of 
other possible phenomena. Dichotomous questions such as this (e.g., “did it feel like the 
match was a job you had to do or were you simply going to enjoy it because it was fun” 
italics added) were delivered a minimum of four times and in many cases repeated 
throughout the interview. The leading nature of many o f these items and the exclusion of 
alternative experiential phenomena constitute a significant threat to the construct validity 
of this study. 5) Interview responses were coded by the two sport psychologists, and “in 
the majority o f cases, the two analysts agreed on the metamotivational states, timing and 
nature of reversals reported, and the factors affecting these reversals.” According to the 
authors, the majority o f cases reflected agreement, “however, some discrepancies were 
apparent in the independent analyses o f these data.... [and] no pattern could be discerned 
in the observed discrepancies.” Unfortunately, the authors failed to report how frequently 
disagreements occurred, calling into question the reliability of results and subsequent 
interpretations. 6) Finally, three of the 17 interviews were not completed, and authors
26
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
failed to explain why. Although the authors minimized this 15% loss of data, they did not 
address the possibility of a systematic cause for mortality, a significant threat to the 
internal validity of the study.
In conclusion, although Hudson and Walker’s (2002) study may have partially 
reduced problems associated with retrospective report, but further measures could easily 
be taken to further reduce memory problems. Although this study produced more 
descriptive data about inner experience during golf performance, this study contained 
many limitations such as the use of leading questions. Fortunately, many o f these 
limitations can be easily corrected. The current idiographic investigation provided 
measures to addresses each o f the limitations of Hudson and Walker’s (2002) study. 
Specific methods to improve the study of inner experience in golf performance will be 
discussed in the next chapter, but first we will summarize this section on anxiety and 
arousal theories, then we will briefly discuss anxiety and arousal interventions, and then 
we will continue the review o f emotions in sport.
Anxiety & Arousal Theories: Summary. Conceptualizations o f the arousal- 
performance relationship have generally improved in terms of descriptive, explanatory, 
and predictive ability. However as empirical inconsistencies have emerged, the general 
trend has been toward increasing consideration o f multidimensional and complex 
relationships between proliferating numbers of factors. The relationships among these 
factors on performance have only begun to be studied. Additional factors that may 
mediate the dynamics of the arousal-performance relationship include self-confidence 
(Hardy, 1996a; Hardy et al., 2004), attentional focus (Backman & Molander, 1986), task 
type (Gould & Udry, 1994; Meyers et al., 1996; Tynes & McFatter, 1987), task
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complexity, task familiarity, skill level, perceptions of the anxiety-arousal context, 
previous experience with arousal changes, perceived ability to mange or control arousal, 
experience with the task, presence of observers or competitors, importance of 
performance in the context, and coping skills (Meyers et al., 1996). Anxiety and arousal 
studies typically focused on anxiety, arousal, and self-confidence perhaps because the 
CSAI-2 is one of the most popular self-report measures. These studies have failed to 
examine the possible presence of other possible inner experiential phenomena, only a few 
of which have been mentioned as potential mediators o f the anxiety/arousal and sport 
performance relationship. As we shall see, the current study openly examined whatever 
inner experience occurred during performance in golf. As such, the presence or absence 
of anxiety/arousal experiences and other potential mediators were equally explored.
Arousal and anxiety researeh in sport psychology has been limited by the 
overwhelming reliance on retrospective self-report and indirect measurement of these 
phenomena. Definitional problems may weaken the support for anxiety and arousal 
theories and weaken our understanding of these phenomena. Future research could more 
aceurately and consistently examine emotional phenomena by using direct and immediate 
methods of measurement. Despite the existence of methods that interrupt participants in 
the midst of an activity to more directly and immediately assess inner experience, as we 
will continue to see, very few studies have used them.
Anxiety & Arousal Management Interventions. Despite theoretical and 
methodological problems of anxiety and arousal research, anxiety and arousal 
management interventions have proliferated. These strategies can been divided between 
interventions that attempt to reduce anxiety and arousal, relaxation techniques, and those
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that attempt to intensify arousal, “psyching-up” approaches. Although conceptual models 
may not receive empirical support, both “psyching-up” interventions (Whelan et al., 
1990) and relaxation interventions (Kendall, Hrycaiko, & Martin, 1990) have been 
effective for particular athletes on specific tasks. “Psyching-up” and relaxation 
interventions will be briefly described, example studies will be provided, and the 
effectiveness of these interventions will be discussed.
Psyching-up: Increasing Anxiety/Arousal. “Psyching-up” interventions attempt to 
increase arousal prior to performance. Without formal sport psychology interventions, 
athletes may use their own strategies to increase arousal prior to performance. Gould and 
colleagues (1980) examined the particular strategies used during non-standardized 
“psych-up” interventions. Strategies that were reported as most frequently-used were 
attentional focus (se lf administered instructions to narrow attention to task relevant 
movements and skills), imagery (visualizing optimal task performance), and preparatory 
arousal (“emotionally charging-up”) during the “psyching-up” period.
Gould and colleagues (1980) subsequently examined the relative effectiveness of 
these strategies in 15 male and 15 female undergraduate students. A Latin square design 
was used to examine the effects of five different mental preparatory conditions (i.e., 
attentional focus, preparatory arousal, imagery, counting backwards control, rest) on a 
leg-strength task. Of the mental preparatory conditions, preparatory arousal and imagery 
techniques led to significantly greater output than the other conditions. Performance in 
the arousal and imagery groups were not significantly different with regard to leg- 
strength.
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Meta-analysis by Meyers and colleagues (1996) reported a large effect size {d=  1.23, 
SD = .73) for arousal elevation interventions, but this was based on only 5 studies. 
Although it is far too early to conclude that strategies for increasing arousal are effective, 
and the generalizability of these results across different performance tasks and contexts 
remains tentative (Meyers et al., 1996) several patterns have emerged.
One key research finding has been that mental preparation involving arousal elevation 
techniques are more effective on motor tasks requiring strength (Tynes & McFatter,
1987), endurance, and sprinting than on tasks requiring more technical skill, timing, 
speed, and balance when compared to attentional focus, imagery, distraction tasks, and 
controls (Gould & Udry, 1994; Meyers et al., 1996). Nevertheless, it is not apparent 
whether arousal elevation techniques typically increase states of arousal or athletes’ 
perceptions of arousal (Meyers et al., 1996; Whelan et al., 1990). Several factors that may 
mediate the arousal-performance relationship have been cited, including the nature o f the 
task, individual experience or task familiarity, and cognitive aspects of the task including 
attentional focus (Whelan et al., 1990). In summary, with the possible exceptions of tasks 
requiring strength, endurance, and sprinting, interventions seeking to increase levels of 
arousal alone have been insufficient for enhancing performance.
Relaxation: Decreasing Anxiety/Arousal. Several techniques have been implemented 
to moderate the debilitating effects of excessive anxiety and arousal on performance. 
These strategies parallel developments in cognitive-behavioral approaches to reduce 
anxiety. Relaxation is associated with parasympathetic dimensions of physiological 
arousal such as decreased heart rate, breathing, muscle activity, and brain activity. 
Through cognitive behavioral relaxation strategies, physiological arousal may be
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attenuated. Relaxation strategies have been more rigorously evaluated empirically and 
more widely used in performance enhancement than psyching-up approaches, although 
both have actually been used in combination.
Progressive muscle relaxation interventions have been used to decrease anxiety and 
arousal. Progressive muscle relaxation employs several exercises involving brief 
instrueted muscular tension followed by relaxation of systematically targeted muscle 
groups. Because relaxation is incompatible with tension, retraining the muscles to relax is 
thought to reduce involuntary and inefficient muscular activation associated with 
excessive arousal or anxiety. Similar to several performance enhancement approaehes, 
self-regulation and external instructions may be provided. It is typical for relaxation 
techniques to move from initial instruction by a coach or sport psychologist to self­
regulation that encourage athlete self-efficacy (Singer, Murphey, & Tennant 1993).
Patrick and Hrycaiko (1998) demonstrated the effectiveness o f a mental training 
package including progressive relaxation on endurance performance (1600-m) for four 
runners using a multiple baseline design across individuals. Social validation results 
indicated positive reactions from athletes and coaches concerning the enjoyment and 
significance o f the results, respectively. A review by Greenspan and Feltz (1989) reported 
positive effects of relaxation training on performance in two of nine interventions, 
whereas under less stringent criteria (e.g., when causality was disputable), all the 
interventions demonstrated positive effects on performance, suggesting that relaxation 
strategies are generally effective in enhancing performance. Meta-analysis by Meyers and 
colleagues (1996) reported a moderate effect size (d=  .73, SD = 1.64) for relaxation 
interventions based on 25 studies.
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Anxiety & Arousal Management Interventions: Summary
Both psyching-up (Gould & Udry, 1994, Meyers et al., 1996; Tynes & McFatter, 
1987) and relaxation strategies (Greenspan & Feltz, 1989, Patrick & Hrycaiko, 1998) 
have tentatively demonstrated effectiveness, although the effectiveness o f the former 
seems confined to a narrower set of performance tasks than the latter (Gould & Udry, 
1994; Meyers et al., 1996; Tynes & McFatter, 1987). Research on psyching-up 
interventions, however, demonstrated a large effect size, whereas a moderate effect size 
was found for relaxation strategies (Meyers et al., 1996). Several suggestions for future 
research expressed throughout the literature on the arousal-performance relationship call 
for increased methodological thoroughness, examination of the processes through which 
interventions operate, the extension of outcome studies to the field, the need to consider 
multidimensional mediating individual factors (Hardy et al., 2004), and the effective 
mechanisms o f instructing athlete populations in arousal management (Gould & Udry, 
1994). Clearly further evaluation of the conditions under which specific interventions 
may be indicated is echoed throughout the literature, and studies in performance profiling 
and treatment matching have emerged in response (Jones, 1993; Doyle & Gaynor, 1997). 
Anxiety & Arousal Summary
Anxiety and arousal are widely thought to be related to performance. These 
phenomena are likely to be related to other psychological phenomena as well. Anxiety 
and arousal management interventions may interact with increases in task mastery, self- 
efficacy, and other cognitive and affective variables (Gould & Udry, 1994). Several 
studies have shown relationships between anxiety, arousal, and self confidence (Hardy, 
1996a; Hardy et al., 2004). While optimal arousal and even anxiety at times appear to be
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necessary conditions for performance, an athletes’ perceptions of anxiety and his or her 
ability to mange it may be more significantly related to performance according to Meyers 
et al. (1996). This notion invokes the distinction between the measurement of arousal and 
anxiety as phenomena and athletes’ understanding of arousal and anxiety. The 
concordance between retrospective self-reports of arousal and anxiety and the actual 
phenomena in performance has been largely unexamined. As we shall see however, a 
lack of concordance has been found between retrospective self-reports and daily reports 
of coping (Ptacek, Smith, Espe, & Rafferty, 1994). Furthermore, Raglin and Hanin 
(2000) stated that self-report measures are limited because their validity and reliability 
may be influeneed by participants’ verbal ability and self-awareness (Hackfort & 
Schwenkmezger, 1989), social desirability, demand characteristics, social and 
experimental expectations, and reactivity due to repeated assessments. Although optimal 
levels of anxiety and arousal have been suggested, research findings have failed to 
support several explanations o f these processes consistently (Whelan, Epkins, & Meyers, 
1990). It seems plausible that the limitations o f retrospective self-report measures may 
explain the prevalence of inconsistent findings in sport psychology research. Despite 
these criticisms, “most researchers agree that appropriately used, validated self-report 
measures provide accurate assessments of anxiety” (Raglin and Hanin, 2000, p. 94). It 
seems clear that the limitations of retrospective self-report have been conveniently 
dismissed with little consideration of alternative methods. Alternative methods of 
examining internal processes such as directly investigating emotional experience during 
sport performance may illuminate athletes’ experiences o f arousal and anxiety processes 
and overcome the inherent limitations associated with retrospective self-report.
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Stress & Coping
The majority of research examining emotional processes has been directed at the 
relationship among anxiety, arousal, and performance. Relatively less attention has been 
devoted to other emotions and processes such as stress and coping, which is problematic 
(Anshel & Anderson, 2002) because the capacity to respond effectively with stress 
associated with athletic performance is thought to be essential to performance success 
(Hardy et al., 1996). Conversely, ineffective coping strategies can be deleterious in terms 
o f performance outcome (Anshel, Brown, & Brown, 1993). According to Hardy and 
colleagues ( 1996), the progress of stress and coping research has been hindered “by the 
failure of researchers to make a clear distinction between the basic constructs of stress, 
anxiety, [and] arousal...” (p. 141).
Jones (1990) and Hardy and colleagues (1996) operationalized stress as a state 
involving the introduction of a demand placed on the individual who must cope with the 
situation. For the purposes of this review, stress will be viewed as relatively orthogonal 
from arousal and anxiety with the recognition that the distinction among these constructs 
is not completely established and understood. Nonetheless, stress will be seen as an initial 
general reaction to a stimulus. Coping has been viewed as a general strategy to respond to 
stress. Together, stress and coping are considered bidirectional processes in which coping 
mediates emotional states depending on the individual’s appraisal of the stressor 
(Folkman & Lazarus, 1988).
Lazarus (2000) provided theoretical recommendations for research in sport 
performance that emphasized stress and emotion as well as appraisal, coping, and 
relational meaning. In addition, Lazarus (2000) suggested that, although process and
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structure are necessary in research, process should be considered more essential in stress 
and emotion research. Thus, stress as well as other emotional phenomena should be 
considered. Lazarus (2000) suggested that discrete emotional categories should be used, 
and appraisal, coping, and relational meaning are essential theoretical constructs for 
stress and emotion.
Anshel and colleagues (1993) found that an acute stressor (i.e., negative verbal 
feedback) impeded performance in dart-throwing, increased muscle tension, and 
increased negative affect, whereas an effective coping skills intervention enhanced 
performance and increased positive affeet compared to controls. Anshel and Anderson 
(2002) found significant correlations between coping styles, a trait-like conception of 
coping tendency, and state-like coping strategies used during table tennis performance. 
Coping style was dichotomized as approach (e.g., positive preparation, engagement, 
vigilance, attention) or avoidance (e.g., negative avoidance, distraction, ignoring, 
disengagement). Stress was induced by standardized negative feedback delivered to all 
players and pressure from coaches. Anshel and Anderson (2002) found that negative 
affect increased significantly after stress inducements. Individual coping style, measured 
initially, predicted self-reported coping strategy after stress inducements and 
performance, suggesting that players used strategies selectively as a function of coping 
style and situational factors. In addition, approach coping styles predieted performance in 
preliminary task tasks, whereas a combination o f positive affect, avoidance coping, and 
negative affect best predicted performance in later task trials. The latter finding was 
particularly unexpected and difficult for the authors to interpret. The authors speculated 
that since better performance resulted from a change from initial approach to later
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avoidance strategies, this suggested that athletes may have changed strategies “rapidly 
following an unpleasant experience” (p. 206). This suggests that coping styles may have 
some influence on performance outcome, although it is not apparent exactly how coping 
is related to performance.
Anshel and Wells (2000) examined coping strategies in 147 basketball players asked 
to reconstruct their experiences of coping immediately after a basketball game. All 
players experienced at least one occurrence o f four events predicted to invoke coping 
strategies —  missing an easy basket, receiving physical abuse from an opponent, losing 
the ball to an opponent, and receiving a perceived bad call from the referee. Approach 
strategies were reported at a higher more rate than avoidance strategies in situations 
where rough physical play occurred, an easy basket was missed, and the player lost the 
ball. Participants did however report using avoidance in coping with a bad call from the 
referee. Results indicated that personal and situational variables predicted coping with 
acute stress in basketball. Cognitive appraisals and perceived stress intensity also strongly 
influenced the participants' reported use of coping strategies, both of which accounted for 
34% of the variance. Finally, competitive basketball players’ coping strategies were 
consistent with cognitive appraisals in response to stressful situations.
Studies have been recently conducted on stress and coping in golf. A qualitative, 
descriptive study was performed using semi-structured interviews with 11 golfers by 
Giacobbi, Foore, and Weinberg (2004) to examine sources of stress as well as coping 
responses. Skilled and moderately skilled golfers reported using coping strategies and 
emotional management techniques related to stress including cognitive strategies, 
relaxation attempts, efforts on the golf course and off the course, avoidance coping, and
36
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
emotion-focused coping strategies. Nicholls, Holt, and Polman (2005) conducted semi­
structured interviews with 18 male Irish golfers and phenomenological analysis of coping 
effectiveness during golf competition. Data were analyzed using the Interpretive 
Phenomenological Analysis (Smith & Osborn, 2003). Golfers reported that competition 
involved stressors “relating to outcome, mistakes, score, evaluation and opponents” (p. 
121). Coping strategies perceived and self-reported by athletes to be effective included 
“rationalizing, reappraising, blocking, positive self-talk, following a routine, breathing 
exercises, physical relaxation, and seeking on-course social support” (p. 111). Ineffective 
self-reported strategies included “trying too hard, speeding up, routine changes, negative 
thoughts, [and] lack of coping” (p. 111).
One of the greatest limitations of the majority of sport psychology studies described 
here is their reliance on retrospective self-report. Ptacek and colleagues (1994) examined 
the accuracy of self reports about coping compared with more immediate daily eoping 
reports. The correspondence between daily coping reports and retrospective report of 
coping as the was moderate at best, as “daily reports obtained during the stressful event 
revealed only a moderate degree o f correspondence, sharing at best only 34% common 
variance in correlational analyses” (p. 46). Thus Ptacek et al. (1994) criticized the 
accuracy of self-reports o f subjective experiences related to actual coping strategies 
because o f “potential contaminating influences of defensive processes and response 
biases such as social desirability, acquiescence, and extreme responding” (p. 42). 
Furthermore, they argued that ability to accurately recall coping efforts is reduced over 
time, and long retrospective self-reports should be avoided.
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Another limitation o f self-report methods in examining internal phenomena includes 
the possibility social desirable responding. Krane and Williams (1992) conducted a study 
with 112 competitive female golfers study to determine the influence o f social desirable 
responding on anxiety, stress, and coping. The authors measured anxiety (Sport 
Competition Anxiety Test) and socially desirable responding (Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale), which led to four categories of responding styles: true anxious 
consisted of low-anxious (LA)/low-social-desirability (LSD) reports, defensive reports 
were high-anxious (HA)/high-social-desirability (HSD), HA/LSD reports were 
considered truly high-anxious, and LA/HSD reports were labeled the repressor style of 
responding. Results indicated that biased responding on the CSAl-2 occurred only for 
those with the repressor style. Confidence was higher among golfers with the repressor 
style compared to the low-anxious style, whereas high-anxious and defensive high- 
anxious golfers reported the lowest levels o f self-confidence and highest cognitive 
anxiety. The authors suggested that “future researchers examine whether or not athletes 
classified as repressors present themselves favorably when responding to anxiety and 
confidence questions” (p. 134). Thus researchers have acknowledged some of the 
inherent limitations of self-report methods in sport psychology but have generally 
proceeded to conduct studies without addressing these problems to any extensive degree.
Much like studies that have been conducted on anxiety and arousal, few stress and 
coping studies have been conducted on performance in golf. In addition, most studies 
have strongly relied on methods using retrospective self-report, despite limitations that 
have even occasionally been acknowledged. No studies could be found that directly 
assessed stress and coping phenomena by training participants in observing and reporting
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inner experience, interrupting performance, and examining whether these processes occur 
by directly questioning about internal phenomena.
Additional Emotions in Sport Performance
The majority o f sport psychology research on emotion has been directed at the 
relationship among anxiety, arousal and performance, although stress and coping research 
has grown considerably in the last decade (Giacobbi et al., 2004). Compared to the 
extensive research on anxiety, arousal, stress related to sport performance, considerably 
less attention has been devoted to a wider array of emotions. Beyond anxiety, arousal, 
and stress, there are other emotions that have been studied with respect to sport 
performance. The research that has been conducted on additional emotions related to 
sport performance has focused on mostly on anger, hostility, and aggression; however, a 
few studies have examined mood states and additional positive emotions independent 
from anxiety, arousal, and stress. Research examining these additional emotions will be 
briefly reviewed, with an emphasis on studies examining emotion in golf performance.
Anger, Hostility, & Aggression. Examples of behavior typically associated with 
anger, hostility, and aggression occur with some degree of frequency in sport, although 
the most dramatic displays take the form of aggressive behaviors as evidenced by the 
recent Detroit Pistons vs. Indian Pacers professional basketball brawl between players of 
both teams and even fans (Associated Press, 2005a).
Isberg (2000) provided a multidimensional definition of anger as a psychobiosocial 
state including cognitive and motivational, affective, bodily-somatic (i.e., increases in 
heart rate and blood pressure), and behavioral components (e.g., aggressive behavior). 
Isberg (2000) proposed that stress, arousal, context, and personality factors may lead to
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anger, hostility, and aggression in sport, which he conceptualizes and overlapping 
phenomena that may be facilitative or debilitative with respect to performance.
According to Isberg (2000), it is not apparent how components o f anger, hostility, and 
aggression interrelate with behavioral components of these phenomena, and whether an 
optimal level of anger intensity exists is undetermined. Future research including the 
current study may illustrate how frequently emotional, cognitive, and behavioral 
components occur and to what extent they may co-occur.
Several non-sport specific assessment measures of anger, hostility, and aggressive 
behavior have been available for decades, and sport-specific measures have emerged 
more reeently. O f the seven sport-specific instruments described by Isberg (2000), only 
five reported reliability, four o f these focused on adult populations, and three examined 
anger, hostility, and aggression in athletes as opposed to spectators -  the Bredemeier 
Athletic Aggression Inventory (Bredemeier, 1975), the Rice Reactive Aggression 
Measure for Baseball (RRAMB) (Rice, Ostrow, Ramsburg, & Brooks, 1989), and the 
Sport Aggression Questionnaire (SAQ) (Thompson, 1989). Two o f these three were 
general sport measures, the RAAGI and the SAQ, and one was intended for use in 
specific sports, the RRAMB for baseball. O f the remaining three emotional measures, 
none were published in peer-reviewed journals, and no empirical studies examining these 
measures could be found in published peer-reviewed journals. Thus it appears that little 
attention has been given to the assessment o f anger, hostility, and aggression in sport.
In 1978, McCarthy and Kelly found that ice hockey players who self-reported higher 
levels of aggression scored significantly more goals and shots on goal than did those with 
lower levels. No significant differences were found for assists. McCarthy and Kelly
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(1978) suggested that anger may be associated with higher energy output and efficiency, 
leading to enhanced performance in ice hockey. Consistent with this, McGowan and 
Miller (1989) found that successful karate athletes had significantly higher anger than did 
less successful athletes. In addition, aggressiveness predicted of football ability (Secunda 
et al., 1986).
Of the studies that have been conducted regarding anger, hostility, and aggression, 
many have been examined these phenomena in youth sport. Stephens and Bredemeier- 
Light (1996) found that female soccer players' aggressive behaviors were related the 
teams’ moral context (i.e., aggressive norms, perceptions of team norms, coaches’ 
characteristics, and players' moral motives for behavior), consistent with Isberg’s (2000) 
conceptualization of contextual influences. A replication of this study with male and 
female youth soccer players found players' perceptions of pro-aggressive team norms was 
the primary predictor of likelihood to aggress for both genders, and moral motivation and 
perceived ability also contributed to the prediction equation for the boys whereas 
perception o f coach's ego orientation predict girls aggression (Stephens, 2000).
Guivemau and Duda (2002) examined the relationship between the sport context and 
athletes' self-reported tendencies toward aggression in adolescent soccer players.
Athletes' perceptions o f pro-aggressive team norms were predictive of self-reported 
tendencies toward aggression. Both genders reported higher likelihood to aggression 
when behavior was perceived to be supported by coaches.
Maxwell (2004) applied the concept of anger rumination defined as “the propensity to 
think almost obsessively over past experiences that have provoked negative affect in the 
form of anger” (p. 279) to sport behavior. High levels of anger rumination are thought to
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be associated with an increased propensity toward aggressive behavior. Although no 
differenees were found between males and females or between competitive levels on 
anger rumination, aggressive behavior was higher in males compared to females, and 
anger rumination was significantly correlated with athletes' reported aggressive behavior. 
In addition, athletes who participated in individual sports reported lower levels of 
aggression than did those participating in team sports. Although this study relied on 
retrospective self-report, this study appears consistent with the multidimensional 
conceptualization o f anger because relationships were found among context (i.e., type of 
sport), affect, and self-reported behavior.
Although examples of anger, hostility, and aggression seem evident and accessible, 
these phenomena have not been examined extensively in athletes. Research that has been 
conducted reveals tentative relationships between anger and aggression and performance 
suggest for ice hockey and karate (McCarthy & Kelly, 1978; McGowan & Miller, 1989). 
Much like the research on anxiety, arousal, and stress, few studies have explored these 
phenomena without relying on retrospective self-report questionnaires focusing entirely 
on specific phenomena. Thus equal weight is typically not given to the possible presence 
o f other similar phenomena. Unfortunately this leaves much of the research open to 
internal validity threats including experimenter expectancies, demand characteristics, and 
construct validity problems. Thus it is difficult to accurately infer the presence, 
frequency, and individual experience of these phenomena based on existing research.
Mood & Sport Performance. Research examining mood related to sport performance 
has focused on positive as well as negative states. Mood states have been investigated 
mainly by methods incorporating retrospective self-report and correlational designs.
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although some patterns may have emerged. Stevens and Lane (2001) examined strategies 
athletes used to self-regulate mood dimensions assessed by the Profile of Mood States 
(POMS), which evaluates anger, confusion, depression, fatigue, tension, and vigor. The 
most common general emotional regulation strategies were changing location, exercising, 
and listening to music, whereas unique strategies included trying to be alone for anger, 
analyzing the situation for confusion, engaging in pleasant activities for depression, and 
relaxation for tension. Thus athletes appear to use general and emotion-specific 
regulation strategies to regulate mood.
Terry, Carron, and Pink (2000) examined group cohesion among netball, rowing, and 
rugby teams after administration o f the Group Environment Questionnaire and the 
POMS. Results indicated that participants’ high level attraction to the group predicted 
low tension and anger. High group integration predicted low depression. High attraction 
to the group predicted low tension, low depression, and high vigor. Thus it is plausible 
that group affiliation and cohesion attenuate negative emotions such as tension, anger, 
and depression, and vigor may be enhanced as well, although more research is needed to 
demonstrate the connection among the reduction of negative emotions and the increase of 
positive emotions in groups.
Alcohol use may have a negative influence on emotion with athletes (Green, Burke,
& Nix, 1995), although the direction of this relationship is tenuous. Athletes who used 
alcohol scored significantly higher on the anger subscale of the POMS than the alcohol 
nonusers. Alcohol nonusers also scored significantly higher on state anxiety about 
receiving a scholarship to college than did alcohol users. In addition, males felt more 
pressure to win than did females. The POMS did not predict successful performance.
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McGowan and Shultz (1989) examined differences in preseason measures o f affect 
with college football players. Vigor scores on the POMS were significantly higher for 
defensive than offensive players, and linemen scores were higher than others’ as well. 
Authors suggested that participants appeared to use anger as a pre-event motivating 
strategy for simple tasks.
In 1985, Miller and Miller developed an anxiety and emotional state instrument. The 
Scale of Eight Emotions was validated with 27 female high school gymnasts before and 
minutes after performance. Significant correlations resulted between the overall 8 
emotion predictors (enjoyment, fear, depression, anxiety, surprise, anger, shame/guilt, 
and attentiveness/interest) and motor performance (0.72). State anxiety was negatively 
correlated with performance (-0.58).
Performance outcome appears to have a considerable effect on athlete moods. Using 
the Profile of Mood States (POMS), Hassmén and Blomstrand (1995) assessed female 
soccer players’ mood immediately and two hours after the games. Results indicated 
playing soccer, “especially if  the game ended in a tie or a loss, had a massive influence 
on the mood states o f the team” (p. 297). Participants reported significantly less tension, 
depression, anger, and confusion after wins than losses or ties.
Rowley, Landers, and Kyllo (1995) performed a meta-analysis of 33 studies utilizing 
the POMS to determine the extent to which mood profiles discriminate between 
successful and unsuccessful athletes. This study sought to test the iceberg profile, which 
states that athletes exhibiting low tension, confusion, anger, and fatigue along with high 
vigor and non-depressed mood are more likely to succeed (a profile graphically similar to 
an iceberg when plotted on the POMS profile sheet). Overall effect size was very low
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(0.15), albeit significant, but the variance accounted for was less than 1%, once again 
questioning the predictive utility o f the POMS as well as the iceberg profile. Nonetheless, 
results seem to reflect the general trend that successful athletes had slightly more positive 
moods than do less successful athletes, although “claiming that successful athletes tend to 
be mentally healthy is not a provocative concept,” and “psychopathology and success at 
nearly anything should be inversely correlated” (Rowley et al., 1995, p. 186).
Beedie, Terry, and Lane (2000) conducted two meta-analyses o f POMS research 
studies to examine relationships between mood and athletic achievement (N =13) and 
between mood and performance outcome (N = 16). Low effect sizes resulted for level of 
achievement, consistent with Rowley et al. (1995). Larger effects were found for the 
performance outcome meta-analysis. “Effects were moderate for vigor, confusion, and 
depression, small for anger and tension, and very small for fatigue” (p. 49) and effects 
were larger in short duration and open skills sports (Beedie et al., 2000).
Research on the mood in sport performance has yielded promising findings, but 
methodological limitations have been pervasive. Mood states have been frequently 
investigated by methods incorporating retrospective self-report and correlational designs, 
although many studies have collected self reports relatively soon after performance. 
Studies incorporating retrospective self-report risk reduced internal validity due to 
problems o f recall, especially after significant time delays. Evidence o f memory 
problems emerged from a zone of optimal functioning inspired study by Russell and Cox 
(2000), who compared actual and recalled optimal positive and negative affect using the 
Positive and Negative Affect scales. Significant differences in initially-reported and later- 
recalled positive affect were found in basketball, although no significant differences were
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detected in actual and recalled negative affect for football and basketball. Despite this 
potential limitation, several studies have found that mood predicts successful 
performance (Beedie et al., 2000), although the practical utility o f this effect has been 
questioned as studies have failed to consistently discriminate between successful and 
unsuccessful athletes based on mood (Rowley et al., 1995). Mood does seem to be 
effected considerably by performance outcome or degree of performance success 
however (Hassmén & Blomstrand, 1995). Considering both of these findings, it seems 
plausible that performance outcome may have a stronger influence on mood than the 
latter has on the former, as performance appears to be relatively less influenced by mood 
states, with the exception o f anxiety and arousal, which have been shown more 
consistently to influence performance depending on the type o f task. Future 
investigations into emotional phenomena may begin to illustrate more precisely how 
emotions are related to performance.
Similar to other research examining emotions in sport, mood research has strongly 
relied on retrospective self-report questionnaires that fail to give equal weight to the 
existence of other emotional phenomena. Retrospective self-report measures have been 
frequently used even in light o f observed memory distortions (Russell & Cox, 2000), and 
very few studies have focused on direct measures o f internal phenomena that reduce 
these potential problems.
Evidence o f Other Emotions in Sport. Ruiz and Hanin (2004) offered evidence, albeit 
quite indirect, that other emotions may be present during sport performance. Sixteen 
high-level Spanish karate athletes generated “extensive functionally meaningful 
metaphors” and interpretative descriptors o f feeling states prior to, during, and after
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performance. Interpretative emotional descriptors were idiosyncratic and context- 
specific. These descriptors were considered similar enough to reflect eight basic emotions 
including happiness, pride, relief, anger, anxiety, fright, sadness, and shame. Palmer 
(1993) explored floor hockey players’ emotional states, and found evidence o f aggression 
as well as humor. Criticism has been directed at the field of sport psychology for 
excessive focus on pathological processes over positive experiences such as joy and fun 
(Jackson, 2000) and the potential confounding of positive affective states (e.g., 
excitement, challenge) with negative states such as anxiety (Burton & Naylor, 1997). 
Indeed, initial, recreational, competitive, and even perhaps professional participation in 
sport would be difficult to explain without the possibility that participants’ experience 
positive emotions at some point in the process, possibly even during participation. If the 
principles of positive psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Seligman, Steen, 
& Park, 2005) influence the direction of empirical investigations, it seems likely that 
future research may examine positive internal experiences more extensively.
Emotions: Summary’
A significant degree of attention has been directed at anxiety, arousal, and stress in 
sport performance compared to other emotions. This focus would be justified if: 1) these 
emotions were examined more directly and carefully with much less reliance on 
retrospective self-report based on the deduction from theory that these emotions must be 
present; 2) these emotions were found to occur consistently during performance using 
improved methods of research; and 3) a known level of these emotions was consistently 
found to facilitate successful performance. These criteria have not nearly been satisfied. 
The dominant focus on anxiety, arousal, and stress has occurred at the possible expense
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of an understanding o f others. The breadth o f human emotional experience during sport 
performance is probably much less restricted than what is reflected by the dominant focus 
o f sport psychology research. Additional emotional experiences of positive (e.g., 
happiness, pride, relief, challenge, excitement), negative (e.g., anger, hostility, 
aggression, sadness, shame), and perhaps even benign dimensions may be prevalent, but 
the wider array o f possible emotional phenomena has rarely been carefully examined in 
sport contexts with athletes. No studies could be found that directly and immediately 
examined emotional phenomena while giving equal attention to the possible presence of 
any and all emotional experiences. Hardly any research has explored emotional 
phenomena without relying on retrospective self-reports focusing entirely on expected 
phenomena. This may shape our sense of which emotions occur in sport, how frequently 
they occur, how they influence performance, and o f course how interventions should be 
designed to respond to emotional phenomena. Qualitative investigations into emotional 
phenomena may begin to illustrate more precisely how emotions are related to 
performance by providing the degree o f resolution and richness of detail required to 
understand phenomena.
Cognition & Sport Performance 
According to sport psychologist Bob Rotella (1995), “when great players are playing 
well, trust becomes a habit. The golfer executes” the “shots without being aware” of 
“trusting” the “swing. [They] simply [pick] out a target, envision the kind of shot..., and 
hit it .. . . [They] trust... [the] body will produce the swing needed for the shot [they] 
envision...” (p. 44).
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As this profile of the ideal mental processes needed for successful golf illustrates, 
cognitive phenomena are thought to have considerable influence on sport performance. 
The most widely recognized sport-related cognitive phenomena include self-talk, 
attentional focus, imagery, as well as self-confidence and self efficacy. Considerable 
empirical attention has been devoted to these processes by sport psychology research. 
These cognitive domains will be reviewed with a general emphasis on major findings and 
specific emphasis on findings in the sport of golf and similar performance tasks. Much 
like the existing research examining emotional phenomena in sport performance, it will 
become evident from this review that almost no studies have been conducted that directly 
assessed cognitive phenomena. Empirical investigations have generally avoided the direct 
and immediate assessment o f cognitive phenomena in sport in favor o f casual and 
indirect retrospective report measures.
Self-Talk, Self-Instruction, & Self-Monitoring
A common element connecting many cognitive-behavior interventions in 
performance enhancement is self-talk. Although self-talk is one of the most frequently- 
used strategies reported by coaches across several sports (Gould, Hodge, Peterson, & 
Giannini, 1989; Weinberg & Jackson, 1990), the construct has been inconsistently 
defined. Hardy and colleagues (1996) called for better specification of “precisely what 
constitutes self-talk” (p. 37) because “past researchers have been too ‘loose’ in their 
operationalization of self-talk” (p. 37-38). According to Williams and Leffingwell 
(2002), “broadly defined, self-talk occurs whenever an individual thinks, whether that 
individual is making statements internally or externally” (p. 81; see also Williams & 
Leffingwell, 1996). This is evidently a belief shared by Bunker and Williams (1980), who
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stated “anytime you think about something, you are in a sense talking to yourself’ (p.
236; see also Bunker, Williams, & Zinsser, 1993). It seems evident that the pervasiveness 
o f self-talk has been overstated, reflecting “the widely held prejudice that all thinking is 
in words” (Hurlburt, 1997, p. 947). Thus researchers have defined self-talk both broadly 
and narrowly, but definitely not carefully. In fact, self-talk has been used to describe 
statements said aloud (Van Raalte, Brewer, Rivera, & Petipas, 1994), internally 
(Williams et al., 1993), and even statements delivered by others such as coaches that 
athletes may somehow process internally (Gould, et al., 1989; Weinberg & Jackson, 
1990).
In practice, researchers examining the effectiveness of self-talk interventions have 
typically requested that participants speak out loud so manipulation checks can be 
performed (Theodorakis, Chroni, Laparidis, Bebetsos & Douma, 2001; Van Raalte, 
Brewer & Lewis, 1995), although the degree o f similarity between external and internal 
self-talk is not apparent. Thus self-talk or self-instruction will be defined as statements 
directed inward in which the individual interprets thoughts and feelings and responds 
with instructions and reinforcement (Hackfort & Schwenkmezger, 1993; Hardy et al., 
2001).
Self-talk investigations have sought to test the assumption that positive self-talk 
improves performance, whereas negative self-talk impedes performance. Van Raalte and 
colleagues (1994), found that junior tennis players who reported using negative self-talk 
were more likely to lose matches. During matches, nearly 90% players reported using 
negative self-talk at least 13 times. In addition, participants who reported believing in the 
utility of self-talk won more points than others. Using a between subjects design. Van
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Raalte and colleagues (1995) found the performance of dart throwers’ was significantly 
better in a positive self-talk versus a negative self-talk condition. Van Raalte, Cornelius, 
Hatten, and Brewer (2000) examined the antecedents and consequences of observable 
positive and negative self-talk via the Self-Talk and Gestures Rating Scale (STAGRS) to 
adult competitive tennis players. The STAGRS is a behavioral measure completed by 
trained observers. Results indicated that match circumstances predicted negative self-talk 
for all players, whereas positive and instructional self-talk was predicted only by these 
circumstances for some players. Highlen and Bennett (1983) surveyed the use of self-talk 
in elite divers and wrestlers and found that self-reported self-talk discriminated closed- 
skilled divers more than open-skilled wrestlers. Open-skill tasks involve reaction to 
teammates or competitors in a dynamic competitive context, whereas closed-skill tasks 
involve reaction to constant competitive context (Highlen & Bennett, 1983; Meyers et al., 
1996). Results suggested that self-talk distinguished qualifiers from non-qualifiers in 
closed-skill diving better than in open-skill wrestling. Successful divers reported using 
more self-talk during training and competition and more self-instructions in competition. 
However, non-qualifiers used more positive self-talk by praising themselves during 
competition, in opposition to self-talk assumptions. Self-talk did not distinguish 
qualifying wrestlers from non-qualifiers. Finally, Rotella, Gansneder, Ojala, and Billing 
(1980) found that positive and negative self-talk actually had no effect on performance. 
Thus the notion that positive self-talk improves performance, whereas negative self-talk 
impedes performance, has been empirical supported, although inconsistent results have 
been found.
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Wegner’s (1989) ironic processes theory of mental control suggests that mental 
control interacts with thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. Janelle (1999) applied this 
theory to sport performance. Under conditions o f high cognitive load, which are thought 
to be common in sport performance, self-regulation effectiveness is thought to be 
reduced. Janelle (1999) stated that breakdowns in mental control may explain paradoxical 
effects observed in sport performance. When mental control resources are compromised, 
attempts to suppress negative thoughts may increase the occurrence o f these thoughts and 
interfere with performance. Janelle speculates that ironic processes may include motor 
control problems stemming from negative self-talk, problems controlling attentional 
focus, mood states, negative expectations, negative images, arousal management 
problems, and confidence loss. Thus ironic processes theory is use to account for 
paradoxical findings that occur when, for instance golfers think “whatever you do, don’t 
hit the ball in the water” and proceed to execute the action in opposition to this thought.
Hall, Hardy, and Gammage, (1999) suggest that other theories can equally or better 
explain some of the losses of mental control (e.g., loss of self-confidence, development of 
negative images) experienced by athletes; and it is not apparent how researchers and 
practitioners may benefit from using the theory of ironic processes compared to these 
other theories. Based on Van Raalte et al. (1994), Hall and colleagues (1999) speculated 
that “negative thought processes are mostly verbal” (p. 223), especially when compared 
to negative imagery, and that ironic processes occur verbally more fi'equently than 
nonverbally. They suggest that this is because attentional resources may be allocated 
differently in these two systems, which may be why elite athletes use more imagery to 
avoid negative thoughts.
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Self-talk interventions typically involve efforts to identify, evaluate, and modify self­
talk prior to and during performance. These interventions are grounded in the premise 
that positive self-talk results in affective improvements such as reduced anxiety, 
increased effort, and higher self-confidence (Finn, 1985; Weinberg, 1988) with 
behavioral change (e.g., performance enhancement) as the end goal. Positive preparatory 
self-statements are thought to improve physiological preparation (Rushall, 1982; 1984). 
Self-talk may be used for basic instructional assistance (Chorkawy, 1982; Zinnser, 
Bunker, & Williams, 1998). Several studies suggest that self-talk increases motivation, 
facilitates encouragement, and benefits performance (Desiderate & Miller, 1979; 
Kirschenbaum & Bale, 1979; Weinberg, Jackson, & Smith, 1984). Thought content prior 
to performance may be directed toward positive mood words and task-relevant content as 
well (Anderson, 1997).
Theodorakis, Weinberg, Natsis, Douma, and Kazakas (2000) evaluated the potential 
performance effects of motivational and instructional self-talk using an innovative 
design. Motivational and instructional conditions were separately compared to a control 
across four different performance tasks. This was carried out by conducting a series of 
four treatment outcome studies, each with a different sample. Significantly better 
performance was predicted for the instructional intervention (i.e., “I see the net, 1 see the 
target,” “1 move fast and strong”) in tasks involving greater technique skill, timing, and 
precision (i.e., soccer accuracy test, badminton service test). The motivational 
intervention (instructions to say “1 can” immediately prior to the task) was predicted to 
lead to statistically significant improvements in strength and endurance tasks (e.g., knee 
extension test). In the first study, 72 male high school soccer players were matched for
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accuracy in an empirically validated soccer passing test and subsequently assigned to the 
motivational condition, instructional condition, or a control condition in which they heard 
no self-talk instructions. After the matching trial, participants performed the soccer test a 
total o f four more times. Consistent with predictions, instructional condition participants 
performed significantly more accurate passes than control and motivational participants. 
Forty-eight university students volunteered for the second study, which used a similar 
experimental design for performance on a badminton serve test. Consistent with the first 
study, instructional participants performed significantly better than participants in the 
other control and motivational conditions. Using a similar design, the third study 
examined the performance of 54 high school students on three minutes of sit-ups. No 
significant performance differences emerged; however motivational condition 
participants performed more sit-ups during the last trial than participants in the other 
conditions. The fourth and final study examined strength and endurance with 63 
university students on a test measuring leg extension performance. After being matched 
for performance, participants were assigned to one of the three experimental conditions. 
Results of this study indicated that the motivational and instructional participants 
performed significantly better in the leg extension test than those in the control condition. 
In summary, these four studies suggested that instructional interventions are indicated for 
tasks requiring fine motor movements and precision, whereas, for strength and endurance 
performance, instructional and motivational tasks are equally effective. Far from being an 
entirely novel notion, this conclusion is consistent with several studies that have 
demonstrated the effectiveness of instructional strategies for complicated technical tasks. 
Rushall and Shewchuk (1989), for example, reported performance improvements for
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swimmers following self-talk focused on task-relevant content, positive mood words, and 
other positive thinking strategies.
Even simple cues such as “step, swing” in tennis appear to stimulate cognitive 
associations that encourage the acquisition of appropriate task execution (Bunker, 
Williams, & Zinsser, 1993; Zinnser et al., 1998). Self-talk that is rehearsed prior to 
performance can improve speed and volume of work output for athletic tasks during 
practices, leading to improved skill execution in competition (Rushall, Hall, Roux, 
Sasseville, & Rushall, 1988). Despite the empirical support for these strategies, the 
methods o f implementation (i.e., instructions from others, self-instructions) have varied 
across studies, and optimal methods have not been determined.
Hardy and Jones (1994) called for the development of techniques for gathering and 
evaluating self-statements because, despite the apparently important role of self-talk in 
sports performance, they believed that the amount of research in this area was 
disappointing. Expressed throughout the performance enhancement literature is a call for 
increased methodological thoroughness, examination o f the processes through which 
interventions operate, extension o f research to the field, the need to consider 
multidimensional mediating individual factors, and the identification o f effective 
mechanisms of instructing athlete populations in use o f interventions (Gould & Udry, 
1994; Hardy & Jones, 1994; Meyers et al., 1996). Frequently suggested throughout the 
literature is further evaluation of the conditions under which specific interventions may 
be indicated. Studies in performance profiling and treatment matching appear promising 
(Jones, 1993; Doyle & Gaynor, 1997).
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Research that has examined self-talk, self-instruction, and self-monitoring has relied 
rather strongly on retrospective self-report and indirect measures o f these processes. The 
narrow focus on these processes at the expense o f understanding cognitive processes is 
evident in the blatant prejudice that all thinking is in words. Thus research appears to 
have been conducted deductively, driven by the theoretical assumption that self-talk, - 
instruction, and -monitoring must exist in cognition and may therefore be associated with 
sport performance. The present study incorporates methods to capture internal processes 
such as self-talk and a wider array of other internal phenomena that occur during sport 
performance using inductive exploration rather than a confirmatory deductive procedure. 
Attention
Attentional focus strategies posit the existence of difference types of attention related 
to performance. For instance, Nideffer (1986) proposed two dimensions o f attention: 
width and direction. These dimensions theoretically allow four patterns of attention -  
broad-external, broad internal, narrow-external, and narrow-internal. Depending on the 
nature of the performance task, an athlete is thought to shift between different these types 
o f focus. Different sports are thought to require different types o f focus. Attentional focus 
strategies may be directed at enhancing performance directly through concentration on 
sensory or motor processes (Mallet & Hanrahan, 1997). These strategies may also be 
directed at influencing other internal processes thought to be associated with successful 
performance such as managing arousal levels, increasing or decreasing them depending 
on the task demands, in order to facilitate concentration (Nideffer, 1986).
Several investigations have demonstrated attentional differences between athletes of 
different skill levels. In an early study of attentional styles, Kirshenbaum and Bale (1980)
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found better golfers reported high sensitivity to external distractions, struggled more with 
overly narrow attentional focus, and experienced specific worry more than did less 
skilled golfers. Highlen and Bennett (1983) found that reported concentration 
distinguished qualifiers from nonqualifiers in wrestling and diving, with qualifiers 
reporting greater ability to concentrate.
Other attention studies have examined associative and dissociative strategies, 
especially in endurance tasks (e.g., long-distance running, aerobic exercise, rowing). 
Associative strategies involve directing attention toward performance, whereas 
dissociative strategies involve directing attention away from performance. One major 
finding indicates that experienced athletes tend to report utilizing associative strategies 
(Tammen, 1996), whereas inexperienced athletes tend to report incorporating dissociative 
strategies (Brewer, Van Raalte, & Linder, 1996; Connolly & Janelle, 2003; Morgan & 
Pollock, 1977; Ungerleider, Golding & Porter, 1989), but this finding may be restricted to 
endurance tasks.
Attention research has also has examined the effects of attentional strategies on task 
performance. Using a within-subjects design, Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, and Starkes 
(2002) had participants engage in a putting task under two attentional conditions: skill- 
focused and dual task. In the skill-focused condition, participants were instructed to 
attend specifically to their golf-putting swing (e.g., monitor the swing, follow through, 
and say “stop” out loud). In the dual-task condition, participants putted while listening to 
randomly occuring target and distractor tones. Upon hearing the target tones, they were 
instructed to say “tone” out loud. The single focus condition, which instructed a step-by- 
step attentional focus process, led to increased performance on tasks for which athletes
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had lower relative skill. Conversely, the same step-by-step attentional focus strategy was 
debilitative when used by athletes for whom tasks were well learned whereas a divided 
attention distraction task appeared to facilitate performance. These results were 
demonstrated for both golfers and soccer players. Skilled soccer players dribbling with 
their dominant (right) foot performed best under a distraction (dual-task) condition. In the 
skill-focused (e.g., step-by-step) condition, skilled soccer players dribbled more 
accurately with their non-dominant (left) foot than the dual-task condition. Both 
dominant and non-dominant novice dribbling performance was optimal under the skill- 
focused condition. A similar pattern o f results was found for skilled golfers. Putting 
accuracy was highest for skilled golfers under the dual-task condition. The authors 
concluded that “whereas novices and the less-proficient performances of experts benefit 
from online attentional monitoring of step-by-step performance, high-level skill 
execution is harmed” (Beilock et al., 2002, p. 6). However, this finding was not replicated 
for higher skilled putters as accuracy did not significantly differ on single versus dual­
task condition in a different study (Beilock, Wierenga, & Carr, 2002). The authors of 
both studies stated the evidence did support the notion that well-learned skills are more 
automated and requires less attentional resources.
More recently, Poolton, Maxwell, Masters, and Raab (2006) found that attentional 
focus has an effect on learning to putt. Groups learned to putt under different conditions 
either 1) being instructed to focus on the movement of the putter (external focus) or 2) on 
their hands (internal focus). The external group’s performance remained robust, whereas 
the internal group’s performance dropped significantly.
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The efficacy of attentional focus interventions has been mixed. Developing focus 
plans based on managing arousal via attentional focus has been shown to be effective for 
100 meter sprinting performance (Mallet & Hanrahan, 1997) with elite sprinters using a 
multiple baseline design. Meta-analysis by Meyers and colleagues (1996) reported a large 
effect size {d=  1.21) for attentional focus interventions; however, standard deviations 
were so large {SD =1.61) that the effect size was nonsignificant.
Research on attention in sport performance has often used retrospective and indirect 
measures o f this cognitive phenomenon rather that dealing with attention more directly 
and immediately. The experiments by Beilock and colleagues (2002) and Poolton, and 
collegeaus (2006) are exceptions to this due to the lack o f reliance on self-report. Even 
so, the observation of different performance for more and less experienced athletes under 
different experimentally manipulated conditions was not replicated and still deals will 
attention quite indirectly. Thus research on attention in sport performance could also be 
improved with more direct and immediate methods.
Imagery ■
Imagery is one of the most studied internal processes in sport psychology and the 
most frequently used mental rehearsal strategy (Meyers et al., 1996). Imagery has been 
described as internal visual experience in the absence of visual stimuli. In the context of 
athletic performance, imagery has been defined as broadly as using all of the human 
senses to re-create or create an experience in the mind (Vealey & Greenleaf, 2001) and as 
narrowly as “symbolic sensory experiences that may occur in any sensory mode” (Hardy 
et al., 1996, p. 28).
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Several theories have been posited to explain why imagery might facilitate 
performance (e.g., psychoneuromuscular, symbolic learning, bioinformational, 
attentional-arousal), but most suggest that imagery interacts with other mental (e.g., 
attention, arousal, learning) and physical (e.g., muscles memory) processes (Vealy & 
Greenleaf, 2001). Paivio (1985) offered a parsimonious conceptualization, suggesting 
that the function o f imagery in sport performance is cognitive and motivational. 
According to Paivio, specific or general performance goals may be accomplished using 
cognitive or motivational imagery. Hall, Buckolz, and Fishbume (1992) also considered 
imagery to have “both a motivational and a cognitive role in mediating behavior” (p. 19).
Imagery use by athletes has been reported to be as high as 99% (Orlick & Partington, 
1988), but imagery ability has been shown to be individually different (Hall & Martin, 
1997; Overby, 1990). Olympic athletes reported that attentional focus and imagery were 
the most important mental skills at the Olympics (Orlick & Partington, 1988).
Imagery use has been linked to performance success. Highlen and Bennett (1983) 
found self-reported use of imagery distinguished qualifiers from nonqualifiers in 
wrestling and diving. Crews and Boutcher (1986) found that successful LPGA golfers 
used significantly longer full swing and preshot routines compared to lower-ranked 
players, a result that led Crews and Boutcher to speculate that successful LPGA golfers 
might have more developed visualization and imagery strategies. McCaffery and Orlick 
( 1989) interviewed golf professional instructors and top touring professional players and 
asked them what factors the believed were related to excellence. Commonly reported 
factors included commitment, goal setting, practice and tournament planning, tournament 
focus control, distraction control, tournament evaluation, mental preparation, and
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imagery training. Somewhat more direct investigations o f the relationship between 
imagery and performance followed, but no study has directly investigated imagery use in 
golf during performance.
The potency of imagery for motor performance was demonstrated for tasks requiring 
the acquisition of new skills. Rawlings, Rawlings, Chen and Yilk (1972) examined motor 
performance acquisition on a rotary pursuit tracking task with three practice conditions 
(mental, physical, no practice control). After 10 days of practice with 24 females, the 
physical practice and mental rehearsal groups were superior to the no-practice control 
condition, and between group comparisons indicated both physical practice and mental 
rehearsal groups were equally proficient. For 20 males, a combined mental and physical 
practice group learned faster than the physical-practice-only group. Although physical 
practice is typically more facilitative o f performance, mental rehearsal, including 
techniques such as imagery, is typically more effective at enhancing performance than 
controls (Feltz & Landers, 1983; Hall et al., 1992; Meyers et al., 1996). According to 
Hall and Bemoties (1995) and Hall and colleagues (1992), imaginai practice may be 
more effective on certain occasions due to the nature o f the motor task, the imagery 
abilities of the individual, and the type o f imagery used.
The relationship between imagery and performance has been studied quite 
extensively in golf. Because much of the research has been based on novices on putting 
tasks in artificial laboratory conditions in skill acquisition studies, the generalizability of 
these findings to competition in natural environments is questionable. It is also not 
apparent how well these studies related to higher skilled and elite athletes. Despite these 
limitations, which extend to the entire field of sport psychology (see ecological validity
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problems as discussed by Meyers et al., 1996), imagery strategies employing positive 
thought content have typically been associated with improved performance.
Woolfolk, Murphy, and Gottesfeld, (1985) investigated the effects of using imaginai 
strategies incorporating positive and negative outcomes in a controlled experiment with 
50 male students on a simple motor skill accuracy task (putting a golf ball). Findings 
indicated lower performance in conditions employing negative outcome imagery. 
Enhancement of performance resulted from positive outcome imagery. Self-efficacy was 
correlated with performance. The authors interpreted this as being most likely due to “the 
strong relationships between these variables and performance on the previous trial.” 
Nonetheless, imaginai strategies related sport outcome had stronger influence on 
performance than brief mental rehearsal of movements. In a different controlled study, 
Woolfolk, Parrish, and Murphy (1985) examined imagining positive and negative 
outcomes on golf putting using 30 students. Positive imagery led to significantly more 
improvement compared to controls, whereas negative imagery resulted in worse 
performance. Imagery influenced self-confidence as well.
Meacci and Pastore (1995) studied the effects of different imagery modalities for golf 
putting acquisition and retention with 80 student participants who registered for 
beginning golf classes. Putting performance was measured for visual contact with 
imagery, nonvisual contact with imagery, visual contact, and control conditions. Putting 
acquisition was significantly higher among the combined no vision and visual imagery 
condition participants than it was among the combined visual practice with the ball and 
no imagery participants. In addition, no differences were found for the no vision imagery 
condition compared with visual imagery for acquisition or retention of putting skill.
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Martin and Hall (1995) conducted a controlled experiment with 39 beginners to 
examine the influence of a golf putting-related imagery intervention on golf putting 
practice and task specific self-efficacy. The imagery group used significantly more 
putting practice, set higher goals, had more realistic self-expectations, and had higher 
outside lab practice adherence than did controls.
Imagery functions are thought to be cognitive and motivational and may be directed 
toward specific or general performance goals (Hall et al., 1992; Paivio, 1985). Short, 
Bruggeman, and Engel (2002) conducted a controlled experiment with 83 participants to 
examine the potential interaction between imagery function and imagery direction on golf 
putting performance. Participants were randomly assigned to either a 1) cognitive specific 
only; 2) motivational general mastery only; 3) cognitive specific and facilitative imagery; 
4) cognitive specific and debilitative imagery; 5) motivational general mastery and 
facilitative imagery; 6) motivational general mastery and debilitative imagery, only; or 7) 
a no imagery control group. A 3 (imagery direction) x 3 (imagery function) x 2 (gender) 
ANCOVA indicated higher mean performance for the facilitative compared to the 
debilitative group. Results reflected an interaction as predicted, which suggested that 
“imagery direction and imagery function can affect self-efficacy and performance and 
that males and females respond differently to imagery interventions” (Short et al., 2002, 
p. 48).
Smith and Holmes (2004) conducted a controlled investigation of different modalities 
of delivering imagery interventions go experienced golfers. Participants were randomly 
assigned to control or experimental conditions. Experimental participants were delivered 
personalized image interventions via either written, audio, or video scripts. Control
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participants spent equivalent time reading golf literature. Post-tests indicated video and 
audio groups performed significantly better than did written script and control groups, 
suggesting that imagery intervention format is important for intervention success (Smith 
et al., 2004).
Not all studies have found that imagery facilitates performance. Lutz, Landers, and 
Linder (2001) found that mentally practicing a good task outcome produced better 
performance than mental practice of task form  with golfers. The effectiveness of imagery 
depended on level of skill, however. Highly skilled golfers’ performances actually 
deteriorated after mental practice, whereas performance improved for less skilled 
participants. Studies using imagery have also demonstrated no effects on performance 
(Andre & Means, 1986).
Paradoxical effects have been studies in imagery as well. A paradoxical effect may 
occur when negative imagery suppression leads to the opposite experience, the activation 
of the negative imagery, making reduced performance more likely. Beilock, Afremow, 
and Rabe (2001) examined the frequency and impact of paradoxical performance in golf 
using a controlled 3 x 2  imagery type (positive, suppression, suppression-replacement) by 
imagery frequency (before every or every third putt) factorial design using 126 novice 
golfers. The positive imagery group was instructed to imagine motor functions leading to 
eventual performance success. The suppression group was instructed not to imagine 
missing. The suppression replacement condition was instructed not to imagine missing, 
but they were instructed that if  they did, they should try to replace the image with one of 
performance success. Performance in the positive imagery condition improved for both 
imagery frequencies. The suppression and suppression-replacement imagery groups’
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accuracy improved with low frequency imagery, but performance deteriorated with 
higher frequency (i.e., when imaging before every putt). The author concluded that 
suppressive imagery was deleterious to performance and that efforts to replace negative 
images with positive ones did not restore performance to positive levels (Beilock et al., 
2001 ).
Interventions incorporating imaginai rehearsal are thought to improve performance by 
better preparing athletes for competition. “By confronting possible problems, practicsing 
[sic.] means of coping with them, and overcoming them in mental imagery, the athlete 
should be better able to cope in the reality o f the sports competition (Biddle, 1995, p.
185).” The diverse collection of practices that constitute imaginai rehearsal typically 
includes closing the eyes and visualizing motor skills, and can include auditory, visual, 
and emotional stimuli (Suinn, 1993). Research suggests that more experienced athletes 
benefit from mental practice when compared to novices (Suinn, 1993), although many 
studies demonstrate the positive effects of imagery on performance for novices as well, 
and inconsistent finds are prevalent. Imaginai rehearsal has been shown to be effective 
alone (Lutz et al., 2001; Rawlings et al., 1972; Short et al., 2002, Smith et al., 2004; 
Woolfolk et al., 1985a; 1985b) and when combined with additional interventions 
(Kendall et al., 1990).
Imagery has been studied quite extensively in relation to sport performance. As we 
have seen throughout this review, this research has used retrospective and indirect 
measures rather that dealing with imagery more directly and immediately. The present 
study will attempt to examine whether imagery and other inner experiences occur during
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golf performance using a more direct and immediate method of examining inner 
experience.
Self-Confidence & Self-Efficacy
According to Bandura (1977), psychological processes influence self-efficacy, one’s 
perceived capability for successful action, and related expectations determine behavior. 
Self-efficacy is thought to by determined by performance accomplishments, vicarious 
experience, verbal persuasion, and physiological states, with the more consistent 
experiences being more influential on self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977). This theory has been 
extended to sport performance behavior, as the relationship between previous and 
subsequent performance is thought to be mediated by self-efficacy (Krane & Williams, 
1992). Like most internal process related constructs. Hardy and colleagues (1996) 
suggest that research is characterized by a “general lack of consensus over how self- 
confidence should be both conceptualised [sic] and operationlised [sic].” Nonetheless, 
Hardy and colleagues (1996) conceptualize confidence as a being both a global construct 
“associated with overall performance expectancies in sport” (p. 45) as well as a state-like 
phenomenon related specifically to performance tasks. Self-efficacy is typically seen as 
“situation-specific self-confidence” (Hardy et al., 1996, p. 46).
Two specific types o f statements received prior to performance appear to improve 
performance. Motivational statements seem to inspire greater effort, generate a positive 
mood, and increase self-confidence, whereas task-relevant instructional statements may 
enhance performance by directing desired behavior on tasks through focusing on strategy 
execution (Hardy et al., 1996). Motivation and attention to technical skills appear to be 
key factors in performance enhancement efforts.
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Efficacy is thought to lead to effort and determination and is typically enhanced via 
modeling, observational learning, ensuring successful accomplishments in practice, and 
verbal persuasion. Through enhancing efficacy, arousal, which is cognitively appraised as 
readiness for performance, may increase, thus increasing the probability of enhancing 
performance (Singer et al., 1993). Anxiety has been proposed as being inversely related 
to self-efficacy as performance expectations may lead to worry, negative thinking, and 
behavior change (Feltz, 1992). Thus performance expectations are believed to directly 
influence an athlete's level of cognitive anxiety, or worry, and athletic performance 
(Krane & Williams, 1992). Self-efficacy strategies, self-statements, and simply focusing 
on arousal to increase arousal state self-awareness have been incorporated within with 
mental preparation strategies to improve performance (Meyers et al., 1996).
Unfortunately, efficacy may be an effect of successful performance rather than its 
cause, a possibility overlooked by correlational designs. Research has identified a 
tentative reciprocal influence between performance and self-efficacy (Feltz, 1982, 1988; 
Feltz & Mugno, 1983). Krane and Williams (1992), however, failed to find support for 
the relationship between performance and state confidence, citing different measurement 
techniques as a likely cause. State confidence was the best predictor o f golf performance 
in a different study of female college golfers, however (Krane & Williams, 1987).
Despite the hypothesized relationship between self-efficacy and performance, the 
direction o f the relationship is difficult to determine. For instance, Highlen and Bennett 
(1983) found that self-reported confidence distinguished qualifiers from nonqualifiers in 
wrestling and diving. Woolfolk and colleagues (1985a) found that imagery was positively 
related to self-confidence in golf. Nonetheless, it is not evident whether confidence leads
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to performance success or reverse causation occurs. Unfortunately, simple linear 
deterministic views of the confidence-performance relationship are omnipresent in 
conventional circles, and to some extent this has been encouraged by researchers such as 
Bob Rotella, the author o f Golf is a Game o f Confidence (1996). An example of when 
simple unidirectional models fail occurs when, similar to arousal and anxiety, excessive 
confidence may be deleterious to performance. In fact Kirshenbaum, O ’Connor, and 
Owens (1999) found that when golfers of different skill were overly optimistic (e.g., 
positive illusions) about their skill, decreased performance success on challenging holes 
resulted. The authors suggested this may have resulted from overly aggressive shot 
selection. In addition, McAuley (1985) found that precompetitive anxiety measures did 
not predict performance among college golfers, but golf performance significantly 
predicted of post competition cognitive state anxiety and self-confidence. Thus self- 
confidence may be an effect of successful performance rather than its cause. Finally, 
recall that Hardy et al. (2004) found that self-confidence played a moderating role 
between anxiety and performance. Self-confidence may therefore be related to 
performance other in a more complex multidimensional manner.
In summary, self-confidence and self-efficacy have been studied quite extensively in 
relation to sport performance. Consistent with our recurring theme, research on imagery 
in sport has used retrospective and indirect measures rather that dealing with self- 
confidence and self-efficacy more directly and immediately. The present study will 
attempt to examine whether these and other inner experiences occur during golf 
performance using a more direct and immediate method of examining inner experience.
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Performance Enhancement Interventions that Target Cognitive Processes
As evident from the review of emotion research in sport performance, interventions 
from the cognitive-behavioral perspective dominate the field of sport psyehology. Over 
the last few decades, several researchers examining performance enhancement 
interventions adopted the fundamental assumptions that 1 ) behavior is determined by 
internal processes such as thoughts and emotions and, 2) cognitive processes ean be 
modified to facilitate optimal performance behaviors. Albert Ellis (1982), as well as 
Williams and Leffingwell (1996), acknowledged the pervasiveness of irrational beliefs in 
sport, which are so common they have become cliches (e.g., “no pain, no gain,” “winning 
isn’t everything, it’s the only thing”). Thus performanee difficulties were hypothesized to 
be related to disturbed cognitive patterns, whieh could be identified and restructured into 
logical and positive cognitive patterns. Optimal internal processes, desired behavior, and 
enhanced performance were expected to follow.
Thought content associated with optimal performance has been examined in several 
investigations. Greenspan and Feltz’s (1989) review of performance enhancement 
interventions suggested that successful athletes have reported using cognitive strategies 
differently than did less successful athletes, and the authors speculated that this may have 
led to better performance. In a qualitative study, Gould, Eklund, and Jackson (1992) 
interviewed all 20 members of the 1988 Olympic wrestling team and found that wrestlers 
reported their best performances after using mental preparation techniques targeting 
confidence, optimal arousal, focusing attention, and tactics. In addition, golfers reported 
more self-eonfidenee in tournament competition preceded by cognitive reinforcement 
strategies (Cohn, 1991). Hundreds o f studies have evaluated the effectiveness of
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cognitive-behavioral interventions, many o f which seem to be multi-component 
interventions (Greenspan & Feltz, 1989).
Meyers and colleagues (1996) performed a meta-analysis of the effieacy o f several of 
the rapidly proliferating cognitive-behavioral interventions, including goal setting, 
imagery and mental rehearsal, cognitive self-management, arousal management (as 
previously discussed), and multi-component interventions that combine components of 
many of these interventions. Goal setting emphasizes near term, midterm, and long term 
performance goals that are specific, concrete, and measurable. Challenging and realistic 
goals are evaluated in terms of attainment with emphasis on process and effort over the 
performance outcome. The effectiveness of goal setting strategies on performance has 
been equivocal, but research has been promising, and a small number o f studies 
demonstrated moderate effectiveness (c/= 54, 5D = .15) according to Meyers and 
colleagues (1996). Imagery and mental rehearsal involves interventions incorporating 
strategies for visualizing specific factors assessed as essential to optimal performance.
The diverse collection o f practices that constitute imaginai rehearsal typically includes 
closing the eyes, visualizing motor skills, and can include using auditory, visual, and 
emotional stimuli (Suinn, 1993). Research suggested that more experienced athletes 
benefit from mental practice when compared to novices (Suinn, 1993). Imaginai rehearsal 
has been shown to be more effective when combined with additional interventions, and 
multi-component interventions have been efficacious (Meyers et al., 1996). Mental 
rehearsal was combined with relaxation and self-talk by Kendall and colleagues (1990) 
and found to be effective for enhancing basketball performance during games. Cognitive 
self-management interventions include attentional focus, self-instruction, self-monitoring.
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and cognitive restructuring. With the exception o f attentional focus and self-instruction 
strategies, all interventions have demonstrated at least moderate efficacy when compared 
with controls, according to Meyers and colleagues (1996). In addition, multi-component 
interventions, consisting of a combination of the aforementioned interventions, have 
demonstrated efficacy in controlled studies. Thus two existing literature review supported 
the efficacy of several cognitive-behavioral interventions (Greenspan & Feltz, 1989; 
Meyers et al., 1996). Although these interventions have demonstrated efficacy, it is not 
apparent how these interventions operate in relation to inner experience because few 
studies have directly addressed this.
Cognition Summary
The notion that successful performance depends on control of mental processes is 
pervasive throughout the field of sport psychology. The understanding o f these processes 
is limited by the overwhelming reliance upon retrospective self-report evident in the field 
o f sport psychology. Rather than directly assessing the experience o f these phenomena 
during sport performance, the majority o f studies have dealt with cognitive processes 
indirectly and retrospectively. Because the results of so many studies depend on the 
method of retrospective self-report, embarrassingly little is actually understood about the 
actual cognitive processes that occur during performance in general and golf performance 
in particular.
Emotion <Sc Cognition Conclusion
A multitude of internal processes have been associated tentatively with successful 
performance including optimal arousal, successful coping with stress, positive mood 
states, positive and even negative emotions, positive self-talk, attentional focus, positive
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self- confidence, and positive imagery, although findings have been inconsistent. 
Although cognitive-behavioral interventions have been generally effective (Greenspan & 
Feltz, 1989) for both team and individual sports, for open-skill tasks such as soccer and 
closed-skill tasks such as golf, and for tasks requiring accuraey, strength, and endurance 
(Meyers et al., 1996), this does not imply the mechanisms through which these 
interventions operate are understood.
Investigations of inner experience in sport performance that have been conducted to 
date have typically been retrospective and indirect. Most of these studies have been 
conducted under the apparent assumption that athletes have the capacity simultaneously 
to compete and to report about internal processes without significant distortions. This 
assumption is contradicted by the acknowledged the limitations o f retrospective self- 
report —  these methods may be limited by participants’ verbal ability and self-awareness 
(Hackfort & Schwenkmezger, 1989), social desirability, demand characteristics, social 
and experimental expectations, and reactivity due to repeated assessments (see Raglin & 
Hanin, 2000). A lack o f concordance between retrospective self-reports and daily reports 
has also been found (Ptacek, Smith, Espe, & Rafferty, 1994). Problems with retrospective 
self-report may lead to fundamental misunderstandings about inner experience. The 
limitations of retrospective self-report measures may explain the prevalence of 
inconsistent findings in sport psychology research. Despite this, self-report measures are 
quite frequently used to study inner experience in sport performance with little 
consideration or use of alternative methods. Alternative methods of examining internal 
processes such as directly investigating inner experience during sport performance may
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illuminate athletes’ experiences and overcome the inherent limitations associated with 
retrospective self-report.
Few explorations have extensively examined inner experiences that occur during 
sport performance, and even fewer have done so in golf. No study has ever been 
conducted that that directly, immediately, and thoroughly examined the wide array of 
inner experiences in sport performance while giving equal attention to the presence of 
any and all possible inner experiences. The explorations of these internal processes that 
have been conducted to date have typically been retrospective, indirect, and rather 
narrowly-focused. Notable exceptions to the latter include Klinger et al. (1981) and 
Hudson et al. (2002), and these studied could easily be improved. Few studies have 
examined the phenomenological frequency of internal processes (e.g., emotions, 
thoughts, etc.), the degree o f individual differences or similarities, and even the presence 
versus the possibility they may be absent during athletic performance and competition. 
Without methods that directly assess internal phenomena, the presence of these 
phenomena during any period of time is questionable. Conversely the a priori assumption 
that specific internal phenomena are present during performance combined with the 
delivery of specific retrospective self-report instruments to measure them may encourage 
unintended response biases.
The current study sought to examine these processes extensively, methodically, and 
inductively during sport performance in a naturalistic context with both moderately and 
highly skilled athletes, following past methodological suggestions (Greenspan & Feltz, 
1989; Hardy et al, 1996; Meyers et al, 1996). Idiographic descriptions provided by the 
method may further illuminate the experience o f internal processes assumed to exist in
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sport performatice, processes that are far from well-understood. Findings generated by 
the current study may support or undermine existing theories or observations, but in 
either case, information will be provided to better inform future investigations. The 
following chapter will describe methods for how this will be accomplished by 
considering inner experience sampling methods in general, the rationale for the current 
study, and a methodological overview of the current study. Thus the following chapter 
largely departs from research in sport psychology and discusses inner experience 
sampling methods, with a notable emphasis on studies that have been conducted in sport 
performance when they have been conducted.
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CHAPTER 2
INNER EXPERIENCE SAMPLING METHODS 
The purpose o f this chapter is to examine inner experience sampling methods relevant 
to the current study. This will be accomplished in two ways. First, methods of sampling 
inner experience in general will be reviewed. Second, a rationale and an overview of the 
methods for the current study will be provided.
Methods o f Exploring the Phenomena o f Inner Experience: A Review 
In this section, five methods o f sampling inner experience will be sequentially 
reviewed. Examples o f studies from each o f the different methods will be used. Speeific 
emphasis will be plaeed on studies that have been conducted in sport performance if they 
could be found. If  no studies were found, examples of studies will be used from outside 
the field of sport performance. Finally, the relative strengths and weaknesses o f these 
methods will be examined.
Introduction
Renewed interest in the study of inner experiential phenomena such as cognitions and 
emotions has led to the development o f methods to examine inner experience (Ericsson, 
2003). Methods that attempt to circumvent the inherent limitations of both retrospective 
self-report as well as those o f traditional introspeetion have emerged in recent decades. 
The five sampling procedures that will be described target specific moments o f inner 
experience immediately after their occurrences in order to reduce memory distortions
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(Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987 ) and enhance ecological validity by sampling phenomena 
in more natural environments (Hormuth, 1986).
The think aloud method has participants report their thoughts out loud continuously 
while performing a task o f interest. Thought and Mood Sampling randomly or quasi- 
randomly prompts participants to respond to questionnaires related to their thought 
content and often their emotional experience. Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) 
prompts participants to report about inner experience phenomena as they occur in the 
natural environment using a broad range of flexible measures (Jones-Forrester, 2004), 
and information about the elements of the environment related to momentary experience 
is also collected (Stone, Shiffman, & DeVries, 1999). The Experience Sampling Method 
(ESM) typically asks the same set of questions about thinking, mood, and the 
environment, typically using a narrower range of self-report measures than does EMA. 
The latter collects more information about the elements of the environment related to 
momentary experience (Stone, Shiffman, & DeVries, 1999). Descriptive Experience 
Sampling (DES) randomly prompts participants to report about momentary inner 
experience and provides narrative descriptions of the details o f experience. All of these 
methods attempt to reduce distortions of memory associated with retrospective self-report 
and enhance ecological validity. O f these methods, we will see that DES 1) is the least 
likely to be influenced by the limitations of self-report because it avoids using these 
measures to examine inner experience, 2) goes to the greatest length to reduce 
experimenter bias, 3) goes to the greatest length to facilitate accurate reporting by 
extensively training participants in the method, and 4) provides the most extensive 
description of momentary inner experience.
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Researchers have described momentary experience sampling methods by their 
inherent attributes (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Payne, 1994), the techniques they use and 
the type of data they generate (Hurlburt, 1997), the degree of focus on environmental 
factors (Stone, Shiffman, & DeVries (1999), and the interval used to signal participants’ 
reporting (Reis & Gable, 2000). Ericsson and Simon (1993) described the think aloud 
method by its attributes. The think aloud approach has participants continuously report 
their thoughts out loud while performing a task of interest (Payne, 1994) such as a 
problem-solving task, and many times verbalizations are reeorded on tape (Yang, 2003), 
after which the researcher analyzes and codes verbal reports. In 1997, Hurlburt reviewed 
three experience sampling methods: Thought and Mood Sampling, ESM, and DES. The 
common feature described included that fact these methods have participants carry 
beepers that signal at random or quasirandom intervals, and sampling occurs in natural 
environments. Two of these methods. Thought and Mood Sampling and ESM, were 
lumped together as “loose categories of quantitative methods” (p. 941), as both typieally 
have participants fill out quantitative questionnaires at beeped intervals. The third, DES 
was categorized as qualitative because it has participants write a short narrative 
description of the experience and attend a subsequent interview. Stone, Shiffman, and 
DeVries (1999) distinguished EMA from ESM as the former examines elements of the 
environment related to momentary experience as well as momentary inner experience. 
Other researchers even have categorized sampling methods based on the interval used to 
signal participants’ reporting (Reis & Gable, 2000). Reporting can depend on an event 
that occurs (event-contingent), a chosen time period (interval-contingent), or a randomly
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generated signal (signal-contingent), and the latter has been more typically recommended 
due to its potential to reduce sampling bias (Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003).
Although researchers have described momentary experience sampling methods in 
several ways, this review will use methodological attributes and the type o f data they 
generate to distinguishes them from one another. As we will see, the common feature of 
these methods is their purpose. These sampling procedures all target specific moments of 
inner experience immediately after their occurrences in order to reduce memory 
distortions (Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987) and seek to enhance ecological validity by 
sampling phenomena in more realistic if  not natural environments. The five prominent 
methods for sampling inner experience that will be reviewed are the think aloud method. 
Thought and Mood Sampling, EMA, the ESM, and DES. These five methods will be 
reviewed because o f their similar purpose.
Studies that have explored inner experience related to sport performance using these 
methods will be used as examples methods during this review. Since few studies have 
accomplished this however, examples o f sampling studies outside o f sport performance 
will be discussed when sport studies are absent. Thus sampling literature will be reviewed 
by providing two types of studies: 1) sampling and 2) sport-related sampling studies. 
Finally, the strengths and weaknesses o f experience sampling methods will be presented. 
The Think-Aloud Method
The first sampling method that will be described is the think aloud method. This 
method has participants report their thoughts out loud continuously while performing a 
task of interest (Payne, 1994). Examples of tasks include problem-solving as well as sport 
performance-related processes. Verbalizations are often recorded on tape (Yang, 2003).
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Finally, researchers organize, analyze, and code verbal reports (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). 
In this section, first the think aloud method will be described in more detail. Next, five 
studies that were found that used the think aloud method to examine thoughts related to 
sport performance will be described. Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of this method 
will be discussed.
In 1980, Ericsson and Simon developed a framework for using verbal reports of 
thoughts as data. Ericsson and Simon (1980) believed that accurate verbal reports could 
be obtained by having participants think aloud rather than relying solely on retrospective 
self-report. Think aloud participants have been instructed to “say out loud everything that 
you say to yourself silently” (p. 376) or “tell me EVERYTHING you are thinking” (p. 
378) while in the process of doing something such as solving math problems or 
anagrams. Concurrent verbal reports were recommended so processing and verbal reports 
could coincide in time, thus avoiding reliance on participants’ inferences about their 
mental processes and memory distortions (Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1993). To 
accomplish this, think aloud studies have tape recorded verbal reports for later analysis 
(Ram & McCullagh, 2003). Thus the goal o f the think aloud method is to examine the 
actual concurrent sequences o f thoughts from verbal reports during experimental 
activities (Ericsson & Simon, 1993).
Five think aloud studies were found that examined thoughts related to sport 
performance. Four of these studies sampled experience indirectly related to sport 
performance by sampling outside o f the actual competitive setting, using the think aloud 
method in skill acquisition, analogue sport situations, and during an intervention. Only 
one study examined thinking directly by interrupting sport performance. First, the four
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indirect studies will be described. After this, the only study to directly examine inner 
experience by interrupting actual sport performance will be described.
The first o f these studies, by McPherson (1993), used the think aloud method to 
examine the influence of player experience on problem solving during a baseball batting 
analogue situation. Twelve experts (college baseball players), one of their coaches, and 
12 novices (undergraduates) watched one half-inning of a college baseball game and 
were instructed to assume the role o f the batter and think out loud during standard fixed 
intervals immediately before batting and between each pitch of their simulated at bat. 
Verbal reports were transcribed verbatim and coded into 3 categories —  conditions, 
actions, or goals. Conditions were reports related to the performance situation (e.g., the 
pitch, the pitcher, the base runner). Actions involved performance behaviors (e.g., hitting, 
movement, visual tasks). Goals were experiences directed at influencing the outcome of 
the game (e.g., driving in a base runner, avoiding a double-play, winning). Results 
indicated that experts reported a significantly greater number o f thoughts about 
conditions (M = 69.3, SD = 30.3) than did the novices {M =  40.2, SD -  23.2). In addition 
to the number o f thoughts reported, which were greater on average for experts compared 
with novices, the relative within-group frequencies o f condition, action, and goal related 
thoughts were reported. No differences in the relative frequency of these categories of 
thought were found between the groups as groups reported similar frequencies of 
conditions, actions, and goals. Experts’ reported thoughts were categorized as much more 
sophisticated and based on problem-solving strategies compared to novices. For instance, 
most experts thought about four well-defined condition concepts: a) past patterns, b) their 
position as a hitter, c) game status, and d) the position of the runners. Thus the rules that
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were described from experts’ reports reflected “more tactical, refined, and associated 
compared to novices’ rules” (p. 304). In other words, thinking processes that emerged 
from experts’ reports were more sophisticated, more extensive, more specific, and more 
task-relevant than those of novices. Expert reports also more frequently reflected self- 
regulatory strategies that allowed them to generate and modify their predictions of pitcher 
characteristics. The coach’s responses were generally similar to those of the players.
This study was an indirect examination of inner experience in sport performance 
because a simulated videotaped analogue game situation was used. A direct examination 
would sample inner experience during actual performance. Thus it is somewhat 
ambiguous whether experts would use similar strategies during actual performance. 
Nonetheless, differences between experts and novices would most likely stem from the 
obvious difference between the groups in terms of expertise. As both quantitative of 
qualitative data reflected, relatively consistent differences between experts and novices in 
information processing during an analogue sport situation. This study demonstrates the 
quality of information that may be gained from immediate methods o f sampling inner 
experience related to sport performance.
The second think aloud study found was a skill acquisition study that indirectly 
examined of inner experience related to sport performance. Hare & Graber (2000) 
investigated thinking misconceptions related to sport performance with fifth-grade 
children (10-11 years of age) learning floor hockey and soccer skills in physical 
education classes. They non-randomly chose four participants including two high ability 
males, one average ability female, and one low ability male from a class with 27 students. 
Thoughts were collected during class instruction in sport skills. During this, participants
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were instructed to think aloud at non-random times in the presence of a researcher who 
encouraged participants to “say what you are thinking” (p. 62) into a wireless microphone 
that transmitted to a receiver and was recorded via tape cassette. Raters then rated these 
tapes to examine participants’ misconceptions. Misconceptions were assessed by 
observations, interviews, open-ended daily question self-report cards, and interviews 
asked about thinking that occurred after the think aloud procedure. Participants had three 
to four recorded think aloud sessions each and were subsequently interviewed by 
researchers in videotape-recorded session, although the authors failed to indicate how 
much time elapsed between tape recordings and interviews. According to the authors, the 
think aloud interviews were “the least valuable o f all procedures employed” because 
“students had tremendous difficulty describing what they were thinking” (p. 71) and were 
even discouraged from reporting by teachers for being “disruptive” (p. 71). Many times 
they were silent or failed to comply. Thus participants only rarely conveyed what they 
were thinking. Additional methodological problems occurred with the interviews 
including short duration and limited compliance with participation, and daily question 
self-report cards indicated participants’ difficulty in answering questions. These problems 
call into question the results o f the study, which were qualitatively analyzed, but this did 
not prevent the authors from drawing conclusions that misconceptions were “best 
described as naïve conceptions” (p. 73), conclusions based mainly on interviews. Thus it 
appears essential to consider individual factors (e.g., verbal ability, cognitive ability) as 
well as contextual factors (e.g., group size) and interactions in designing sampling 
studies.
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A third study by Ram and McCullagh (2003) used the think aloud method during an 
intervention. Five intermediate-level volleyball players were administered an intervention 
in a multiple baseline design. First, a baseline videotape of other athletes performing 
unrelated tasks in other sports was shown to participants to train them in the think aloud 
task prior to the self-modeling intervention. The think aloud method instructed 
participants to “verbalize what you notice on the videotape and how the videotape makes 
you feel” (p. 228) while watching the video. Then, the think aloud method was used to 
examine inner experience during a self-modeling intervention aimed at enhancing 
volleyball performance and self-efficacy. This intervention had participants observe 
videotaped segments of their best serve prior to performing 10 serves. Increases in serve 
accuracy were observed, but the intervention was not found to be effective in terms of 
increasing reported self efficacy. Five themes emerged from the verbalizations in 
volleyball: description of the sequence of movement (e.g., hitting the ball), description of 
movement process (e.g., keep eye on the ball), description of scenery (e.g., “there is 
white on the wall in the background”), thoughts and affect (e.g., “this guy is sort of 
boring,” “I love it”), interpretation o f the physical action (no examples provided), and 
surprise and shock. Regarding the latter, participants found the images o f themselves on 
videotape to be “shocking,” saying phrases such as “Oh God it’s m yself’ and “Oh my 
goodness” (p. 234). Participants reported no shock seeing others during the baseline 
video. One participant said “1 hope this isn’t going to be seen by anybody else” and “my 
first reaction to it was that I looked horrible” (p. 238). Think aloud results indicated that 
participants verbalized 24% fewer words in the intervention compared with the baseline 
condition. A greater amount o f silence was also observed in the intervention compared
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with the baseline condition. The authors interpreted the greater amount o f silence and 
fewer number of words during think aloud and the intervention implied the intervention 
was “demanding of cognitive resources” (p. 220), which is consistent with Ericsson and 
Simon’s interpretations when fewer words have been elicited (1993). In addition, the 
authors believed that cognitive attention may have been “diverted from verbalization to 
images of the se lf’ (p. 238), however without directly addressing this in a more detailed 
interview, it seems difficult to explain exactly what “shocking” meant, and whether it 
was experienced similarly or differently among participants. Nonetheless, the think aloud 
method generated information during the intervention that would likely have otherwise 
have been missed, which could explain the lack of intervention effectiveness. Relatively 
detailed description o f inner experience is an advantage of this method, although it will 
become evident that the method to be used in the current study generates even more 
extensive descriptions o f inner experience.
The fourth study was the first think aloud study to be found that sampled inner 
experience directly during sport performance. Führer (1985) examined the thinking 
process with 22 table tennis beginners by having them think aloud during experimentally 
inserted interruptions o f the game. This study was a direct examination o f inner 
experience in sport performance because it interrupted inner-experience during actual 
performance. As such, this study partially resembles the Thought and Mood Sampling 
method, which will later be described. Verbal reports suggested “a high percentage of 
reported cognitions were related to the action o f playing table tennis” (p. 194), which 
Führer stated was consistent with the notion that “playing table tennis is thought to
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involve action-related cognitions” (p. 194). No differences however were found between 
winners and losers in terms of action-related or non-action-related thoughts.
The fifth study also directly examined inner experience during performance. In 1995, 
Langley examined cognitive focus with 20 undergraduate participants learning how to 
bowl in a 10 week bowling class, a skill acquisition situation. Four sources of data were 
collected: daily participant reports (written responses to a 20-item skill learning 
questionnaire), researcher observations and interpretations of behavior, informal 
interviews, and verbal reports o f participants’ thoughts during think aloud sessions. 
During these sessions, a subset of the sample including 7 participants were instructed to 
“tell what you are thinking” (p. 28) and reported their thoughts into a wireless 
microphone that transmitted a signal to a tape-recorder for 20 minutes during practice of 
the bowling task. Results revealed that participants’ perspectives and thoughts were 
generally related to mechanical errors and psychological mistakes during task 
performance. Results from the think aloud sessions reflected “a central theme involving 
error in task performance” (p. 30). According to Langley, “physical and psychological 
states” (p. 30) and “improper bowling mechanics” were major cause[s] o f errors” (p. 31). 
This study was also a direct examination of inner experience in sport performance and 
partially resembles the Thought and Mood Sampling method, which will later be 
described.
Davison, Robins, and Johnson (1983) modified the think aloud method to create the
Articulated Thoughts in Simulated Situations (ATSS) method. This method
provides open-ended verbal reporting of thoughts as they are experienced during an 
emotional reaction. In the ATSS method, participants listen to an audiotaped scenario 
and image that they are an active part of the interaction. After a brief segment of the 
tape is played, they are asked to articulate their thoughts for 30 seconds. The tape
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then continues, followed by another pause for artieulation, and so on. (Eckhardt, 
Barbour, & Davison, 1998, p. 260).
As an example, Davison and colleagues sought to examine thoughts in laboratory 
conditions that simulated social situations with 33 male undergraduates. Participants 
listened to experimental and control tapes o f simulated situations and were instructed to 
imagine themselves in the recorded event. Experimental tapes had participants imagine 1 ) 
talking with a teaching assistant to increase their grade or 2) overhearing others speak 
negatively about the participant in conversation. The control tape consisted of 
overhearing a conversation unrelated to the participant. After listening to these scenarios, 
participants were instrueted to speak their thoughts aloud into a tape reeorder. Both 
experimental and control situations led to reports of thoughts related to evaluation, but 
more thoughts related to critical evaluation, harm, positive evaluation of and defense of 
self were reported after experimental conditions. ATSS methods provide participants 
with analogue situations, have participants report thoughts, and use a broad range of 
situations to elicit thoughts. ATSS methods have been used to examine thoughts 
predictive o f smoking cessation and relapse (Haaga, Davison, McDermut, Hillis, & 
Twomey, 1993), thoughts in maritally violent men during anger (Eckhardt, Barbour, & 
Davison, 1998), and thoughts o f about anti gay hate erimes Rayburn & Davison, 2002), 
but no studies could be found that used ATSS in sport situations.
Issues o f compliance, reactivity, and validity in think aloud studies have been 
reviewed. Compliance problems were evident in the study by Hare & Graber (2000). 
Eriesson and Simon (1993, 1998) believed compliance could be enhanced by extensive 
training in the think aloud method, and that non-reactive reports of cognitive processes 
can be obtained when the think aloud method relies on thinking as inner speeeh. Thus the
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authors suggested that the think aloud method focus on actual concurrent verbal thought 
process rather participants’ explanations and inferences about how and why thoughts 
happen. In 1993, Ericsson and Simon addressed the validity of the think aloud method by 
reviewing studies that used different instructions for verbalization. One type of study 
instructed simple concurrent think aloud reports. The second type of study included 
concurrent think aloud reports as well as asking participants for the reasons and 
explanations for thoughts. Instructions to think aloud only changed the accuracy of 
performance compared to silent controls with the second type of instructions. The second 
type o f question, which calls for causal inferences into thought processes, was later 
referred to as “overshadowing” (Ericsson, 2002, p. 981). In 2002, Ericsson stated that the 
think aloud method eneourages participants to give free and spontaneous verbal thought 
expression elicit valid and non-reactive verbal reports. In contrast, overshadowing 
procedures require participants to produce prescribed types of verbalizations (e.g., telling 
them how to verbally describe thoughts). So question like “how did that make you feel” 
that have been used (Ram & McCullagh, 2003) should be strictly avoided. Ericsson 
believed the reactive effects o f overshadowing were due to the requirement of producing 
prescribed verbalizations and are not caused by spontaneous verbal expression of 
thought.
The think aloud method has allowed participants to provide thoughts in laboratory 
conditions while solving problems or analogue situations. As such, this method has made 
inherent improvements compared to retrospective self-report methods. Think aloud 
studies have evident strengths and weaknesses. Strengths of the think aloud method 
include the examination of thoughts more immediately, thus overcoming memory
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distortions, and typically less reliance on participants’ causal inferences about thoughts. 
In addition, more detailed inner experience is typically provided. By sampling experience 
that more closely resemble natural settings rather than relying on retrospective 
generalization about past inner experiences the think aloud method provides enhanced 
ecological validity compared to retrospective self-report methods. Compared with the 
other sampling methods that will subsequently be described however, think aloud studies 
have been more frequently conducted in laboratory or analogue situations, which 
increases the degree of experimental control over situations presented to participants. 
Nevertheless, the think aloud method has inherent weaknesses. Nisbett & Wilson (1977) 
criticized the use of verbal reports about inner experience in general because they 
believed that people have little ability to observe directly or report accurately about inner 
experience, this criticism is valid for think aloud methods that fail to sufficiently train 
participants in the method. Another concern related to the think aloud method has been 
the potential for the reporting process to alter the experience being reported, which was 
discussed by Payne (1994) This may more likely occur with the think aloud method 
compared to the other four sampling methods because the think aloud method samples 
thoughts non-randomly, which may allow participants’ expectations to intrude upon 
thinking and verbal reports (e.g., reactivity), although think aloud protocols have 
included training in the method to reduce this problem (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). In 
addition, since the think aloud method has focused specifically on thoughts that are 
verbalized, reports may have more readily focused on inner speech at the possible 
expense o f other thought processes (e.g., images) and emotions that may be related to 
domains o f interest. Think aloud studies that used self-report questionnaires may have
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been susceptible to socially desirable responding as well (see Schwarz, 1999). Finally, 
think aloud studies have typically been eonducted in laboratory or analogue situations, 
which may reduce ecological validity compared with the following four methods of 
sampling experience. Overall, think aloud studies have added improvements over the 
more traditional retrospeetive self-report methods in sampling inner experience, but we 
shall see how other sampling methods may further improve the examination of inner 
experience.
Thought and Mood Sampling
The second sampling method. Thought and Mood Sampling, originated from research 
in 1974 independently by Hurlburt (1976) and Klinger (1978-1979; Hurlburt, 1997). This 
method will be described, examples o f studies will be provided, and one study related to 
sport performance that was found will be reviewed. Reliability o f Thought and Mood 
Sampling will also be diseussed. Finally the strengths and weaknesses o f the methods 
will be described.
Thought and Mood Sampling methods have prompted participants to sample at 
random or quasi-random intervals into their natural environments. Some methods have 
had researchers deliver prompts at quasi-random intervals and let events determine 
prompts (see Klinger, Barta, & Glas, 1981), but other methods have had partieipants 
carry beepers that signaled randomly (Klinger & Cox, 1987-1988; Hurlburt & Sipprelle, 
1978). After the signal, participants have been instructed to write narrative deseriptions of 
internal experience, respond to rating scales, or both (Hurlburt, 1997) in their natural 
environments.
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Klinger and Cox (1987-1988) examined consciousness or thought content in everyday 
life with 29 undergraduate students, who were given a random beeper for 7 days. 
Participants used the beeper for as much of each sampling day as they comfortably could. 
When the device signaled, participants completed four brief questionnaires; a thought- 
sampling questionnaire, a questionnaire about what they were doing, a state measure of 
depression, and a state measure of anxiety. Participants completed the thought-sampling 
questionnaire by reporting immediate thought content and rated their thought content on 
4-point scales such as how clear or specific the inner experience was, how much detail or 
color there was, how visual or auditory the experience was, and whether there was 
interior monologue. Participants described inner experience for a total of 1,425 moments. 
Factor analyses yielded eight independent factors including Visual Modality, Auditory 
Modality, Operantness, Attentiveness to External Stimulation, Controllability, 
Strangeness, Past Time Orientation, and Future Time Orientation. In addition, the authors 
noted that inner speech and the “visual modality” (p. 105) was reported for most 
individuals. Finally, about one-third o f thought was reported as undirected, one-third was 
reported as “stimulus-independent,” and “about one-quarter contained at least traces of 
dream-like elements” (p. 105).
Hurlburt and Sipprelle (1978) described the case of a 48-yr-old male with debilitating 
anxiety attacks. The cause of the attacks was difficult to determine because he described 
a highly satisfying family life and career and a pleasant upbringing by his two parents. 
The participant was given a pocket-sized beeper that signaled randomly (an average of 
once every 45 minutes) through an earpiece. Upon hearing the random signal, the 
participant was instructed to write down the thought or thoughts he experienced and rate
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his level o f anxiety at the moment just before the signal, and samples were discussed with 
researchers. From an analysis o f two days o f thought sampling, a large percentage o f his 
thinking was categorized as feelings of annoyance with his 3 young and active children to 
whom he was emotionally attached. His anxiety was dramatically alleviated by 
discussion and acceptance of his feeling of annoyance.
The first sampling study of experience directly related to athletic performance was 
conducted by Klinger and his colleagues in 1981. Thus study investigated thoughts 
during brief slumps and hot periods during basketball play to examine attention and 
content of performance-related thoughts. The authors speculated that slumps may occur 
because “something in the game —  perhaps a slight reversal or strong challenge —  
distracts attention from the flow of concentrated play and focuses it instead on a self- 
conscious interaction with oneself’ (p. 113). They suggested that “this may then impede 
play further, thus producing a vicious circle that constitutes the slump” (p. 113). Due to 
the limitations o f sampling internal processes during an open skill team sport, players on 
the bench were interrupted semi-randomly by the researcher and thoughts were sampled 
by audio tape. In addition, thoughts were sampled non-randomly when athletes came off 
of the court due to substitution. Responses were coded into a priori constructed categories 
with acceptable interrater agreement. Few thoughts were unrelated or irrelevant to 
performance, whereas most were more suggestive of associative attention. In addition, 
significantly more negative self-exhortation/evaluation thoughts were found during 
slumps, whereas task-related problem-solving/pereeptual were significantly more 
common during hot periods. Thus results seem to support the positive relationship 
between team performance and associative thought.
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Two studies examined the properties o f Thought and Mood Sampling. In 1979, 
Hurlburt proposed examining the cognitions in everyday life by randomly sampling 
thoughts and behaviors. Interrater reliability of narrative descriptions was coded by two 
independent raters on six categories including tense, affect, sex, aggression, 
interpersonal, and relatedness. Interrater reliabilities ranged from 0.66 to 0.89 for these 
scales. Questionnaire and thought sampling data were compared by Hurlburt and 
Melancon (1987b) by conducting five studies with different student participants using 
different methodologies on the imaginai processes inventory (IPI) data. Methods of 
gathering data were manipulated by immediate versus retrospective recall, single versus 
multiple-moment questions, and questions about specific thoughts or general 
observations were delivered in a between-subjects design. The main comparison of 
interest was immediate, single moment, specific methods such as thought sampling 
against other methods. Results suggested that “questionnaires and thought sampling 
methodologies provide broadly similar results” (p. 698); however a closer look revealed 
that retrospective questionnaires may have lead to distortions of how frequently internal 
processes occur, minimizations o f the strength of affect, and a misinterpretation of the 
relationship between specific internal processes. As we shall see, this has important 
implications for experience sampling procedures.
The strengths and weaknesses o f Thought and Mood Sampling methods will now be 
discussed. An added advantage over think aloud studies includes the potential reduction 
in reactivity involved in Thought and Mood Sampling with beepers that emit a random 
signal, which may reduce the intrusion of expectations. In addition. Thought and Mood 
Sampling studies have focused not only on thoughts, but emotions have been examined
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as well. Thought and Mood Sampling studies have also been extended beyond laboratory 
or analogue situations, which may increase ecological validity. Thought and Mood 
Sampling studies have yielded both quantitative (e.g., Klinger & Cox, 1987-1988) and 
qualitative data (e.g., Hurlhurt & Sipprelle, 1978), demonstrating the versatility of the 
approach. Reliability of Thought and Emotion Sampling has also been adequately 
demonstrated. The weaknesses of Thought and Mood Sampling compared with the think 
aloud method are fewer in number and it seems less likely they would seriously impact 
Thought and Mood Sampling methods. The possibility that verbal reports about inner 
experience have been subtly influenced by participants’ causal inferences exists (see 
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Data from Thought and Mood Sampling studies that used self- 
report questionnaires may have been influenced by socially desirable responding as well 
(see Schwarz, 1999). Reactivity may have been less likely, especially with studies that 
used random intervals, although to some extent it may have still existed due the use of 
repeated measures.
Ecological Momentary Assessment
The third method. Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA), has participants 
immediately report inner experience in natural environments on different schedules. 
Although no studies could be found that used EMA in sport situations, EMA studies will 
he briefly described with example studies provided. Next, computerized sampling will be 
described. After this, compliance and reactivity will be addressed. Finally, the strengths 
and weaknesses of this method will be discussed.
EMA is a method that obtains information from participants’ reports about inner 
experience phenomena as they occur in the natural environment on a signal- and or event-
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contingent schedule. Information about the elements o f the environment related to 
momentary experience is also collected (Stone, Shiftman, & DeVries, 1999). Random 
signal-contingent schedules occur when a beeper device or wristwatch signals the 
moment about which to respond on a random time interval. This schedule has been used 
to reduce sampling bias over event-contingent methods that ask participants to respond 
immediately after the occurrence of an event, potentially allowing participants greater 
influence over when to respond (Barrett & Barrett, 2002; Christensen, Barrett, & Bliss- 
Moreau, 2003). Regardless o f the sampling schedule, EMA requires participants to 
respond to relatively specific items on a questionnaire immediately after the specified 
moment. Thus this procedure samples inner experience in natural settings using self- 
report questionnaires to yield quantitative data, but unlike most Thought and Mood 
Sampling Studies, EMA also collects data about the environment.
Shiftman and colleagues (1994) used EMA to explore the link between smoking and 
drinking behaviors in the natural environment. Participants were 57 cigarette smokers 
enrolled in a smoking cessation program. Participants retrospectively reported their 
smoking history (e.g., how much they tried to restrain drinking) at baseline and how 
many drinks they consumed in a typical week. Hand-held computers randomly prompted 
participants to enter data about inner experience during smoking and non-smoking 
periods during all waking hours of the day. After participants were trained to use the 
hand-held computers, sampling began. Closed-ended questions were administered on the 
computers including questions about whether alcohol had been consumed within the past 
15 minutes, negative mood, arousal, attention disruption, activity (e.g., work, 
eating/drinking, leisure, social interaction, inactivity), intrinsic interest in the current
94
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
activity (e.g., was this something you wanted to do?), smoking regulation (e.g., were you 
permitted to smoke in the setting?), social setting (i.e., alone or with others), and finally 
location (e.g., home, work, bar or restaurant, vehicle). Data confirmed an association 
between drinking and smoking that was independent of situations. The hypothesis that 
alcohol increases smoking by disinhibiting a person’s restraint was not supported because 
alcohol use had no more effect on smoking among those who reported attempting to limit 
their smoking than those who did not. Drinking was equally likely to cue smoking 
regardless of how much arousal or cognitive impairment was reported during sampling.
Compliance to the EMA method has been addressed. Litt, Cooney, and Morse ( 1998) 
used EMA to assess the antecedents to relapse in 27 treated alcohol abusers. Participants 
recorded urge to drink alcohol, mood state, situation, and alcohol on 5 x 7 inch cards on 
a random schedule from a wristwatch. Although compliance was reported as 81 % and 
drinking and drinking urges were reported relatively rarely, significant methodological 
problems such as long delays in recording from about 5 minutes to several hours were 
may have compromised the results. Collins, Morsheimer, and Shiffman (1998) used 
EMA to assess predictors of self-reported excessive drinking in a sample o f heavy 
drinkers. This study found high participant compliance in terms of EMA use and 
reporting. The authors suggested this may have resulted from EMA training. Thus 
complianee appears to be enhanced when participants are trained in EMA.
The advent of handheld computers and other similar devices has provided additional 
options for signaling and recording responses in experience sampling methods. Handheld 
computers and similar devices may be used by most if not all of the five experience 
sampling methods reviewed, but since EMA and ESM have often used these devices.
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computerized sampling will be discussed here. Computerized sampling procedures reflect 
the effort toward increased automation in sampling studies. Computerized sampling can 
be used in ESM or other sampling procedures by incorporating hand-held computers or 
personal data assistants (PDA’s) that typically serve the dual function o f signaling the 
moment about which to respond and providing a media through which to record the 
response (Barrett et al., 2002; Christensen et al., 2003). Cellular phones have even 
recently been used. Collins, Kashdan, and Gollnisch (2003) compared the responses of 
social drinkers randomly assigned to either paper-and-pencil (PP) self-monitoring or 
eellular phone (CP) monitoring conditions. Ten PP participants were instructed to 
“randomly choose 4 times each day” (p. 76) to write responses on cards whereas ten CP 
participants responded at randomly generated intervals into a voice interactive system 
over their cell phones. In general, the authors found fewer significant group differences 
between PP and CP in terms o f alcohol use, compliance, and satisfaction than non 
significant differences, but compliance with self-monitoring was actually significantly 
lower in the CP group (e.g., failure to report drinks). Conversely, the PP group reported 
significantly greater difficulty rememhering to complete morning sampling, but they 
perceived themselves as more suceessful at overall Reporting. Despite these problems, 
since more similarities in responding were found than differences the authors cautiously 
suggested that CM could provide useful advantages such as instantaneous entry of data, 
date and time stamping of data, and easy integration into daily life. Higher compliance in 
the PP group however, seems to suggest than paper-and-pencil methods may be safer.
The advantages o f automatized computer sampling include precisely controlled 
timing of signals, better tracking o f participant compliance, potentially reduced human
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error (Barrett et al., 2002; Christensen et al., 2003), and the higher appeal to participants, 
which is seen as an advantage to recruitment (Barrett et al., 2002). The ease o f data entry 
may be increased as well (Collins, Kashdan, & Gollnisch, 2003). This advantage could 
plausibly lead to the recruitment of individuals with lower motivation and interest in the 
study however, which could possibly even increase attrition if the novelty of the 
technology is insufficient to maintain participant interest. Training the user is also a 
potentially time-consuming issue for samples less experienced with technology, although 
this is perhaps less of a problem with college student samples. Disadvantages include 
programming the software, setup and maintenance (e.g., errors, storage, restricted battery 
life) (Barrett et al., 2002), practical problems with PDA’s (e.g., participants playing with 
palmtops and wasting battery life), damage, loss, cost, and data management (Christensen 
et al., 2003).
Hufford, Shields, and Shiffman (2002) examined behavioral and motivational 
reactivity with EMA among 33 undergraduates identified as having drinking problems 
using palmtop computers. Participants completed questionnaires that assessed alcohol 
abuse and dependence, positive and negative, self-efficacy, motivation for change, and 
social desirability. After this, participants were trained to use electronic diaries on the 
palmtop and were instructed regarding about how to record when they consumed any 
alcohol and when they experienced any change in temptation to drink. Random signals 
prompted participants to responds to questions about activities, setting, mood, and 
alcohol urges. Data entry was disallowed after two minutes by the computer program to 
ensure immediate reporting. In addition, participants were instructed enter data on an 
event-contingent basis whenever they experienced any subjective increase in their
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temptation to drink or if  they consumed any alcohol. Compliance was high (over 80%), 
and real-time monitoring of drinking behavior for short periods did not produce 
significant overall changes in drinking quantity and frequency, suggesting participants’ 
level of reactivity to EMA is small. This was quite different from the mixed evidence of 
behavioral reactivity and lower compliance by Collins and colleagues (1998). Hufford 
and colleagues (2002) suggested their findings of less reactivity were due to the short 
(two-week) period they used compared to the long (eight-week) period used by Collins 
and colleagues (1998) (8 weeks). Thus shorter intervals may lessen reactivity.
To summarize, EMA collects data about participants’ environment and inner 
experiences immediately after their occurrence using event and/or signal contingent 
sampling schedules. Compared with methods such as Thought and Mood Sampling and 
ESM, EMA collects more information about the environment and uses broader and more 
flexible measures (Jones-Forrester, 2004). One of the strengths of this method is 
enhanced ecological validity compared to retrospective self-report methods (Shiffman & 
Stone, 1998), and this is a relative strengths over many think aloud studies as well. 
Reactivity may be less problematic than with think aloud studies, especially when 
random signal-contingent strategies are used because the likelihood of intrusions of 
expectation influencing inner experiential phenomena is probably reduced. EMA studies 
have also been broader in focus than think aloud. Thought and Mood Sampling, and 
ESM. EMA studies have been extended beyond the exclusive focus on thoughts —  
studies have examined emotions as well. Reactivity and compliance to EMA is 
acceptable, and is may be better over shorter intervals. Weaknesses o f EMA include 
some problems with compliance and reactivity due most likely to repeated measures and
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extended intervals (Collins et al., 1998). Although EMA samples immediate experience 
in natural environments, EMA has often relied on self-report, which depends on the 
awareness and accurate description of experiences by participants. In addition social 
desirability may influence responses (Scollon et al., 1993). Finally, rich detailed 
descriptions afforded by idiographic studies have usually been shunned in favor of the 
opportunity to generate nomothetic comparisons.
Experience Sampling Method
The fourth method, the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) uses random signals 
notifying participants to complete self-report questionnaires (e.g.. Experience Sampling 
Form) immediately after the beep (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992). Well over 300 
articles and dissertations have been conducted using different methods o f experience 
sampling according to Scollon, Kim-Prieto, and Diener (2003), and hundreds of articles 
and dissertations have used ESM. Despite this, only two studies could be found that used 
ESM to sample experience related to sport performance. ESM will be described in further 
detail, examples of ESM will be provided, and validity and reliability will be discussed. 
Next, the two ESM sport performance studies will be reviewed. Finally the strengths and 
weaknesses of the method will be examined.
ESM uses devices that emit signals on fixed or random intervals to prompt 
participants to respond to self-report questionnaires (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983). 
This method has been distinguished from EMA, as the latter tends to examine more 
elements of the environment related to momentary experience as well as momentary 
inner experience (Stone, Shiffman, and DeVries, 1999) and tends to use broader and 
more flexible measures (Jones-Forrester, 2004). ESM methods attempt to obtain
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ecologically valid momentary samples of inner experience to overcome the memory 
distortions associated with retrospective self-report. ESM requires participants to respond 
to relatively specific items on a questionnaire immediately after the specified moment. 
Thus this procedure samples inner experience in natural settings using self-report 
questionnaires to yield quantitative data.
ESM studies have examined a broad range of topics related to inner experience. For 
example, studies have been conducted on work activities (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 
1982), the relationship between attachment styles and emotions (Torquati & Raffaelli, 
2004), and the relationship between environmental faetors and happiness 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Hunter, 2003), and the relationship between mothers’ self-esteem 
and activities (Wells, 1988). Computerized sampling, described earlier, has also recently 
been used in ESM (Barrett & Barrett, 2002; Christensen et al., 2003). Thus ESM is one of 
the most widely-used experienee sampling methods (Scollon et al., 2003).
ESM evolved from observations of everyday experience using dairy techniques 
(Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983), which later advanced to the use an electronic pager 
that signals randomly borrowed from the behavioral paradigm. Eventually this device 
was applied to inner experiential states (e.g., activities, thoughts, feelings) by having 
participants report experience each time the pager signaled on self-report measures such 
as questionnaires (Hunter & Csikszentmihalyi, 2003). In practice, ESM studies typically 
sample many participants, generate a large number of ratings, and involve quantitative 
analyses. For instance, Csikszentmihalyi and Figurski (1982) used ESM to sample inner 
experience (e.g., thoughts, feelings) during work activities with 107 adults over 7 days, 
which yielded over 4,800 self-reports.
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Specifically, respondents are given an electronic paging device to carry for eight 
days: one practice day, a full work week, and one week-end. This instrument 
emits signals (beeps)...according to a schedule randomized within two-hour 
periods.... Accompanying the pager is a booklet of Random Activity Information 
Sheets... [questioning] the respondent’s activity, thoughts, and moods “as you 
were beeped....” The responses to these items provides the data.
(Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, p. 17-18, 1982).
A positive relationship was found between emotional experience and perceived
voluntariness. Self awareness, on the other hand, was associated with emotional
experience depending upon perceived volition —  when an activity was reported to be
voluntary rather than obligatory, self-awareness was associated with lower affect,
activation, and personal involvement. Thus self-awareness was reported as an aversive
experience depending on the voluntariness o f the task (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski,
1982).
ESM has also examined the relationship between personality and inner experience. 
Considering the positive relationship between secure attachment and psychological well 
being, Torquati and colleagues (2004) sought to examine the relationship between social 
context (e.g., alone, with others) and attachment style (e.g., secure, insecure) with inner 
experience. Social contexts and emotions of 69 young adults who differed in global 
attachment style were sampled using ESM. Participants initially completed an attachment 
style questionnaire. Sampling occurred during 2-hour blocks o f time between 9:00am and 
9:00pm during the school semester, and signals occurred randomly. After the signal, 
participants responded to a questionnaire on social connection and energy level as well as 
several different emotions later categorized as positive or negative with moderate to high 
internal consistency. Significantly more positive affect, higher levels of energy, and more 
connection were reported among secure individuals when they were alone. In social
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contexts and in isolation participants that scored high in attachment reported more 
extreme positive emotions, whereas those that scored low in secure attachment reported 
more extreme negative emotions, but this was especially true when both groups were 
alone. Thus the emotional experience of young adults with secure and insecure 
attachment tendencies differed in social contexts and in isolation (Torquati et al., 2004).
Csikszentmihalyi and Larson ( 1992) reviewed studies that supported the reliability 
and validity o f ESM. ESM reports correlated highly with diary methods (Robinson, 1977; 
Szalai, Converse, & Feldheim, 1972), r = 0.93 (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992). 
Individual consistency over a week has been estimated as moderate to high. Participants’ 
self-esteem was measured in an ESM study using data from the first half and second half 
o f the week, which yielded a correlation of r  = 0.86 (statistically significant) and 
Cronbach’s alpha o f 0.94 (Wells, 1985). Pawlick & Buse (1982) correlated students’ the 
frequency of responses from the first and second half of the week and obtained 
correlations of 0.75 for locations, 0.76 for moods, and 0.80 for motives. So despite the 
possibility that behaviors and internal states may fluctuate, ESM responses appear to 
have been relatively reliable (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992). Evidence o f the 
convergent validity o f ESM measures has been inferred from the convergence of diary 
and ESM measures (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992). Additional psychometric support 
o f ESM, as reviewed by Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1992), includes: 1) ESM reports 
o f behavior correlated predictably and significantly with the physical conditions such as 
heart rate (Hoover, 1983); 2) reports of self-esteem were predictably significantly 
different when mothers were taking care of children than when involved with leisure 
(Wells, 1985); 3) reports of psychological states correlated with situational factors such
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as activity, location, and social context (Larson, Csikszentmihalyi, & Graef, 1982); 4) 
measures o f individual differences based on ESM (e.g., motivation, activity) correlate 
with independent measures o f similar constructs (e.g., enjoyment) (Hamilton et al, 1984); 
5) and ESM reports differentiated significantly and predictably between disordered 
groups such as those with schizophrenia and other patient groups such as those with 
affective disorders on severity of disordered thought, thought-action congruence, and 
affect (deVries et al., 1986; deVries, 1983). Although these studies seem to support the 
reliability and validity of ESM, activity stability (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992) and 
convergent validity has not always been found. Petra & Baltes (1999) found little 
convergence between interviews and ESM with older adults, and this was only partially 
explained by older age and declining cognitive ability. Reactivity due to repeated 
measures has also been mentioned as potentially problematic (Scollon et al., 1993). Lack 
of compliance with the sampling task has been problematic with blue collar workers but 
not with clerical workers (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992), and appropriate incentives 
for participating may increase motivation and compliance (Scollon et al., 1993).
Two ESM studies were conducted on inner experience in sport performance using 
ESM with martial arts athletes. Both o f these studies sampled irmer experience indirectly 
insofar as they sampled inner experience prior to performance but did not sample during 
performance.
The first the two ESM sport studies was conducted by Cerin and colleagues (2001) to 
examine whether the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) is appropriate for assessing 
emotions prior to competition. Participants were 66 male tae-kwon-do practitioners that 
were randomly assigned to one of three groups. Two groups had momentary assessments:
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1) the ESM group was assessed randomly (3 times a day 1 week before and 1 hour before 
competition), and 2) the repeated measurements was assessed non-randomly (7 days, 4 
days, 1 day, and 1 hour before competition). The last group was 3) a retrospective 
assessment group that was assessed non-randomly and retrospectively (2 days after the 
competition). The ESM group was assessed on pre-eompetitive emotions (e.g., anxiety) 
using the CSAI-2, positive and negative emotions using the Positive-Negative Affects 
Questionnaire, and cognitive intrusions using a single item -  “To what extent is/was the 
competition occupying your mind at this/that stage?” (p. 31). Participants were prompted 
randomly to report by a pager. Immediately after this participants responded to these 
measures at three random times a day for one week before the competition and finally 
one hour before competition. The repeated measures group was assessed on a less 
frequent sehedule (7 days, 4 days, 1 day, and 1 hour before competition) with the same 
questionnaires as the ESM group, albeit non-randomly. All three groups were finally 
assessed retrospectively two days after the competition, and of course this was only the 
second assessment o f the retrospective group. This meant that the two momentary groups 
were sampled immediately after experience whereas the retrospective group was asked 
two days after competition to recall how they felt 7 days, 4 days, 1 day, and 1 hour before 
competition. The authors suggested that ESM might “artificially increase intensity of 
negative emotions and cognitive intrusion and affect temporal patterns of pre-eompetitive 
emotions” (p. 27) because the repeated assessment o f psychological variables may cause 
changes in people’s experience, an issue of reaetivity. Evidence of this was not found as 
no differences between the timing and intensity of emotions were detected between the 
ESM and the repeated measures groups, however, the ESM group reported less cognitive
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intrusions. The retrospective group was compared to the two momentary groups on 
responses to emotion and cognitive intrusion questions. A between-group comparison 
revealed differences in recalled positive affects between the momentary and retrospective 
assessments. Differences were also found between momentary and retrospective 
assessments on negative affect as well as cognitive intrusion; the retrospective group to 
gave less accurate ratings of pre-eompetitive emotions, which suggested memory 
distortions. Surprisingly, significant differences between the ESM and the repeated 
measures group in accuracy o f recall of emotions and thoughts were observed, with the 
latter group being more accurate; however the authors suggested that the repeated 
measures group may have responded according to what they recalled their responses 
being because they only had one report per day. This may have artificially inflated their 
recall.
The second of the two ESM sport studies was conducted by Cerin in 2004. This study 
used ESM with 22 martial artists to examine affect, proximity o f competition and 
personality traits as predietors of anxiety direetion, and the role of personality in 
moderating the relationship between anxiety direction and affective states. These 
participants completed personality measures that assessed neuroticism and extraversion, 
which were measured initially. Participants were given a pager and were paged three 
random times a day for one week prior to a competitive event. Participants responded to 
momentary measures on this schedule including intensity and direction o f competitive 
anxiety (CSAl-2) and positive and negative affect. Results of a multi-level regression 
analysis indicated cognitive anxiety intensity, positive affect, proximity to competition 
and extraversion were signifieant predictors of cognitive anxiety direction. Several
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complex interactions were found including proximity to competition and neuroticism, 
neuroticism and negative affect on cognitive anxiety direction, and “somatic anxiety 
direction was a function of positive affect, somatic anxiety intensity, proximity to 
competition and the interaction effects of neuroticism and somatic anxiety intensity and 
neuroticism and proximity to competition” (p. 497). In light of these two studies, Cerin 
(2004) stated ESM could potentially eontribute greatly to the explanation o f intra- and 
inter-individual differences in anxiety direction.
ESM typically samples experience in natural settings rather than relying on reactions 
evoked in laboratory conditions that may not necessarily reflect o f real-life situations 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992). Thus enhanced ecological validity is one of the 
relative strengths o f ESM over many think aloud studies. Reactivity may be less 
problematic for ESM than with other nonrandom sampling methods because ESM studies 
have used random signals more often, thereby probably reducing intrusions of 
expectation that could influence inner experiential phenomena. As with EMA, ESM 
studies have also been broader in focus than previous methods, studying processes 
beyond the exclusive focus on thoughts -  studies have examined emotions as well. The 
validity and reliability of ESM appear to be strong (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992), 
although not all studies have supported these properties with ESM (Csikszentmihalyi & 
Larson, 1992; Petra & Baltes, 1999). Weaknesses of ESM include problems with 
compliance (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992) and reactivity due to repeated measures. 
Although ESM randomly samples immediate experience in natural environments, ESM 
has typically relied on self-report, which depends on the awareness and accurate 
description o f experiences by participants. In addition social desirability may influence
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responses (Scollon et al., 1993). Finally as with EMA, ESM has shunned rich detailed 
descriptions afforded by idiographic studies have in favor of the opportunity to generate 
nomothetic comparisons.
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES). The fifth sampling method. Descriptive 
Experience Sampling (DES) sampling experience in natural settings by using random 
signals to notify participants to immediately write down information in a notebook to cue 
them about inner experience for interviews that are conducted within 24 hours. Since no 
studies have used DES to sample experience related to sport performance, DES will be 
described in detail, examples of DES studies will be provided, validity and reliability will 
be discussed, and finally the strengths and weaknesses o f the method will be considered.
DES evolved from the Thought and Mood Sampling method. The goal of DES is to 
describe the main characteristics of inner experience by randomly sampling immediate, 
single, specific moments in time. The most substantial difference between DES and other 
methods is the type of data generated. DES provides narrative descriptions of inner 
experience, and therefore qualitative data. This is accomplished by a process containing 
four steps (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002); 1) Participants wear a device that emits a random 
audible tone (beep) via earpiece. Using this device in their natural environment, 
participants record their discrete inner experience at the moment o f the beep in a journal 
or notebook when the beep signals. Between 5 and 8 instances of inner experience are 
recorded per session. 2) Participants are interviewed within 24 hours, either the same day 
or the next day, about their inner experience. Interviews about inner experience 
phenomena are conducted in a methodical, non-leading manner (Hurlburt, 1990; 1993; 
Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002), in which experienced researchers “obtain as detailed a
107
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
description of that particular sampled inner experience as possible, all the while 
suspending our own preconceptions about what that person’s experience might be like” 
(Hurlburt, 1990, p. 18). This continues over a series of sampled moments as inner 
experiences are described with the cooperation of the participants. Next, researchers write 
descriptions o f inner experience. 3) Researchers review the set of all descriptions and 
describe and summarize patterns of inner experiences or other salient characteristics. 4) 
Researchers examine, summarize, and describe frequent characteristics o f participants’ 
inner experience (see Hurlburt & Heavey, 1999). Thus the results of the expositional 
interviews are narrative descriptions of inner experience generated from interviews 
between participants and researchers. In addition, inner experiences are coded based on 
categories derived from prior studies such as inner speech, image, just doing, 
unsymbolized thinking, feeling, and sensory awareness (Hurlburt & Heavey, 1999; 
Hurlburt, Koch, & Heavey, 2002); however, DES is an open method, which means that 
new categories are created if experiences fall outside the range o f pre-existing categories 
(see Monson & Hurlburt, 1993).
DES studies have established the existence of different forms o f inner experience. In 
2000, Hurlburt and Heavey developed a codebook for 16 different categories of inner 
experience (see Appendix A). The reliability of DES was examined by Hurlburt & 
Heavey (2002). Results indicated acceptable reliability as interobserver-reliability kappas 
from .52 to .92 were found on five categories of inner experience, and median reliability 
was 0.76. Spearman-Brown adjustments indicated reliabilities of .92 to .98. This was 
described as “comparable to highly reliable questionnaires” (p. 135). These five were the 
most frequently-occurring categories, and although participants experienced the other
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eleven categories o f inner experience, the five most frequent were analyzed “because 
reliability statistics may be unstable” (p. 139) with less frequent categories. These 
categories of inner experience will be described to illustrate some of the forms through 
which inner experience has been found to take shape.
The most frequently occurring five categories of inner experience found by Hurlburt 
and Heavey (2002) were images (referred to in current DES research and from now on in 
this study as inner seeing), inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, feeling, and sensory 
awareness. First, inner seeing is seeing something internally that is known not to be 
externally present. Second, inner speech is the experience of speaking words in one’s 
own normal voice without the external sound actually being produced. It is typically 
experienced as very similar to how one might speak aloud, but it typically contains no 
external sound. Third, unsymbolized thinking is the experience o f a mental event without 
the experience of words, inner seeings, or any symbol o f inner experience. It may be, for 
instance, a hoping, wishing, or wondering thought process without inner speech or inner 
seeing. Fourth, feeling is an emotional experience that includes such experiences as 
anger, guilt, sadness, and so on. Fifth, sensory awareness an internal (e.g., hotness, 
coldness, itchiness) or external (e.g., brightness, shininess, blueness) sensory experience 
that is, in and of itself, a major theme of an inner experience. Sensory awareness is often 
experienced as being absorbed in the sensory details o f an inner experience (see Hurlburt 
& Heavey, 1999).
DES has been used to study inner experience in normal samples as well as samples 
suffering from psychological disorders, but to date, no study has ever been condueted on 
the inner experience of sport performance using DES, and few sampling methods have
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been used to accomplish this to any extent. Because no DES sport performanee studies
exist, DES studies will be described to illustrate the application of the method.
DES emerged in the 1980s with the publication o f an article that described the inner
experience of individuals with schizophrenia (Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987a). DES was
extensively described when Hurlburt eompared normal individuals and those with
schizophrenia using DES (1990). Large difference between the groups came to light,
differences that had not been found by other methods. For instance, individuals with
schizophrenia had “extremely clear emotional experiences” (p. 254) rather than shallow
or blunted affect and this occurred even when affect appeared to be externally blunted. In
addition, color seemed to have more prominence in inner experience for individuals with
schizophrenia than others, and inner visual experience occurred more frequently as well.
Quite surprisingly, images occurred even “more concretely for schizophrenics than for
normals” (p. 255), but images were frequently “goofed up” as well (Hurlburt, 1990, p.
256; see also Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987a). For instance.
Bob described an image o f a sweater that was in reality being knitted by the person 
next to him, except that the imagined sweater was blue and white tweed while the real 
sweater was blue and green stripes; Sally described an image where the books and 
papers were missing from a clearly seen shelf. (Hurlburt, 1990, p. 256).
It appeared to take individuals with schizophrenia much longer to experience the beep
compared to normal participants. Words were seen to move in schizophrenic experience
and were even experienced as independent objects “stripped of their meaningful
connections” which allowed “the words of a sentence to be seen in jumbled order” (p.
257). When decompensating, individuals with schizophrenia may have had no inner
experience at all. Thus Hurlburt suggested that schizophrenia may be a disorder that
consists of image disorganization rather than the commonly-held belief that
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schizophrenia is a disorder of association. In addition, Hurlburt suggested that depressive 
symptoms found in schizophrenia may not result from negative self-thoughts. Instead, 
depression may stem from the relative absence of words and images.
Also in 1990, Hurlburt found evidence of a mental process described by participants 
as “implied or assumed experience” (p. 78), or understanding “with unspoken meaning” 
(p. 90). Hurlburt referred to this process as unsymbolized thinking. In 1993, Hurlburt 
described the inner experiences of individuals with psychological disturbances . 
Unsymbolized thinking was defined as a thought process with clear meaning, but without 
1) any type of symbol, 2) without words, 3) without images, and 4) without bodily 
sensations. Unsymbolized thinking was frequently experienced by almost all of the 
participants o f this study, and individuals who were depressed, anxious, or bulimic 
generally experienced a large number o f unsymbolized thinking experiences. The 
features of unsymbolized thinking were complex and differentiated, specific, and usually 
very difficult to describe, perhaps because of the prejudice that all thinking is in words 
(Hurlburt, 1993; 1997). In fact unsymbolized thinking was often first reported in words 
but with much less confidenee, more confusion, and/or discomfort. As participants 
became more experienced in the sampling procedure further investigations in the 
interview setting could rule out the presence of words at least in the participants’ 
awareness (Hurlburt, 1993), increasing certainty as to the presence of unsymbolized 
thinking. In other words, participants may think that all thinking occurs in words, but 
what they often find is that they lose confidence in this and find that there is thinking that 
occurs that uses no words, which surprises them. The process of unsymbolized thinking 
is a wonderful example of the potential o f DES to uncover inner experiential phenomena
1 1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that are unrecognized or perhaps even misunderstood and/or misreported by other 
methods.
Descriptive experience sampling collects data about inner experience at random 
intervals immediately after the occurrence o f internal phenomena. This method has 
inherent strengths and weaknesses. Participant causal inferences about inner experience 
(see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) are much less likely to distort data than with studies that 
have relied on retrospective self report and even other sampling methods because: 1) in 
an interview setting, DES researchers may often observe when this happens in sampling 
training (e.g., I was having an image about my mother because she made me angry), 2) 
researchers take measures to reduce future reoccurrences by direct communication o f the 
goals of DES with participants (e.g., focusing on the actual inner experience rather than 
causes o f it), 3) researchers avoid the deliverance o f questions leading to causal inference 
responses (e.g., why did you have that image?). Thus DES participants become better 
trained observers of inner experience than are participants of other methods that causally 
accept self-reports with little training or scrutiny. In addition since researchers meet with 
participants after each sample is obtained in interviews, simple methodological problems 
(e.g., how to best wear the beeper, what situations may be less appropriate), 
noncompliance, and reactivity can be discussed and reduced in sampling training sessions 
prior to experimental sessions. Questions and confusions can also repeatedly be 
addressed. Reactivity may be less problematic for DES than with other nonrandom 
sampling methods because due to the exclusive use of random signals, which probably 
reduce intrusions of expectation (e.g., when the beep will occur) that could influence 
inner experiential phenomena (e.g., by changing situations or behaviors). Addition
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methods to reduce reactivity and measure noncompliance include allowing participants to 
keep certain experiences private and asking them to report when this happens and when 
beeps are spoiled or missed. As with EMA, ESM, and later Thought and Mood Sampling 
studies, DES studies have studied thoughts, emotions, behaviors, and situations. DES 
goes further than these methods however, by using 1 ) an open system of evolving 
categories rather than assuming all experiences will fit into a few a priori categories, 2) a 
bottom-up approach to coding that maintains the integrity of inner experiences rather than 
forcing them to conform to categories, and 3) an inductive approach to generalizing about 
participants that is shaped by empirical observation rather than a deductions from a priori 
theories or personal presuppositions. DES samples experience in natural settings, so 
enhanced ecological validity is one of its relative strengths over many think aloud studies 
that have collected data in artificial settings. Interobserver reliability was found to be 
strong for the predecessor of DES, Thought and Mood Sampling (Hurlburt, 1979), as 
well as the method itself (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002). Weaknesses o f DES include 
potential problems with compliance, although this is evident in other sampling methods 
as well. In addition social desirability may influence responses, however the presence of 
interviewers that may build rapport, observe, and encourage even socially undesirable but 
accurate reports constitutes and improvement over other sampling methods. Thus the 
weaknesses of DES are fewer and may be repeatedly observed and compensated for 
when one considers those of other methods. Finally, the most significant improvement 
afforded by DES compared to other methods is the provision of rich idiographic 
descriptions that enable researchers to uncover processes that could otherwise go 
unrecognized by participants and researchers.
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Disadvantages and Advantages to Experience Sampling Methods
A brief summary of the disadvantages and advantages of experience sampling
methods will now be provided. It is suggested that DES provides the greatest number of
advantages of the experience sampling methods reviewed.
One common criticism of methods that seek to examine inner experience was also
directed at introspection. This issue will be discussed with an emphasis on how DES
most sufficiently addresses it. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) critically reviewed of
introspective endeavors that have advanced inferences about higher order mental
processes by assuming that internal processes mediate the relationship between stimuli
and responses. The authors criticized introspective approaches for reliance on reports
from individuals who may be unaware of 1) the existence of a stimulus that may have
influenced a response, 2) unaware of the response itself, and 3) unaware if stimulus
affected the response. Thus Nisbett and Wilson (1977) suggested that introspective
reports “are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments ahout the extent to
which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response” (p. 233). Nisbett and
Wilson (1977) were more critical of causal inferences based on introspective reports than
they are on the content of introspective reports. In fact they stated that accurate reports
“will sometimes” occur “when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of
the responses they produce” (p. 233).
It seems likely that there are regularities concerning the conditions that give rise 
to introspective certainty about cognitive processes. Confidence should be high 
when the causal candidates are (a) few in number, (b) perceptually or memorially 
salient, (c) highly plausible causes of the given outcome (especially where the 
basis o f plausibility is an explicit cultural rule), and (d) where the causes have 
been observed to be associated with the outcome in the past. (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977, p. 255)
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Thus the ability o f people to provide information about causal relationships is in doubt. 
(Examples of questions about cognitive processes criticized by the authors are mainly 
“why” questions.) It is possible that the investigation o f internal processes may more 
safely proceed if individuals’ reports are separated from a priori causal theories, and if 
their levels of confidence and the clarity of their experiences are considered. Techniques 
for achieving this use more disciplined, contemporary methods of sampling experience, 
and in the case o f DES, skillful judgments are made about the specific nature o f inner 
experiential phenomena that occur at discrete moments observed in time, which are 
separated from a priori causal theories.
Perhaps the greatest advantage to experience sampling methods is the enhanced 
ecological validity that is provided by sampling inner experience in natural settings. 
Experience sampling procedures are not immune to weaknesses. As would be expected 
with repeated measures, reactivity may increase self-reflected awareness, influence 
phenomena, but this may be less o f a problem (Cruise et al., 1996) because the stability 
o f emotion ratings across time is fairly good (Feldman Barrett, 1998). And as Barrett and 
Barrett pointed out (2001), additional evidence suggests that reactivity has occurred when 
participants try to change the behavior of interest (McFall, 1970). This may be reduced 
by random sampling, although participants ultimately have a high degree of control over 
when they sample. In addition, compliance has been mentioned as a potential burden to 
participants (Feldman Barrett, 1998), although a review by Hurlburt (1997) suggests that 
compliance is typically favorable, and DES provides practical suggestions for discrete 
use of the beeper. Participant attrition can be considerable given the series of repeated 
measures, and thus a large degree of effort is requested from participants. Nonetheless,
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attrition has been higher than that of most laboratory studies according to Barrett and 
colleagues (2002). In response to this, Barrett and colleagues (2002) have used an 
incentive schedule to keep motivation high and express appreciation (e.g., movie ticket, 
earned lottery tickets to win palmtops, university clothing, gift certificate donated by 
local businesses). Thus many of the limitations o f experience sampling procedures may 
be easily addressed, and as previously discussed, DES goes to greater lengths to 
maximize the strengths of sampling inner experience in natural environment and 
minimize inherent weaknesses.
Current methods of exploring inner experience provide seven advantages over 
retrospective self-report methods: 1) Immediate, single-moment, specific investigations 
of inner experience see to minimize memory distortions by less reliance on memory and 
reconstruction (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983). 2) Experience sampling methods can 
be conducted in natural environments, allowing the researcher to gain access to ongoing 
internal experiences that are otherwise difficult to examine, especially in artificial 
laboratory settings. Thus sampling methods enhance ecological validity (Hormuth, 1986). 
3) Although discrete moments may not be representative of others, (Hurlburt & 
Melancon, 1987b) if  a sufficient number of single moments are collected, 
representativeness may increase, especially in comparison to retrospective self-report. 4) 
Sampling methods increase the resolution of internal processes by placing a higher 
degree of focus on immediate inner experience. 5) Higher fidelity of individual 
descriptions results from the participants’ immediate observation o f internal processes 
and the researchers’ subsequent examination, although we shall see how the extent to 
which researchers examine this processes varies by sampling method. 6) Richer
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description of internal experiences is afforded by the reduction of memory distortions and 
the opportunity to engage in qualitative examination of subjective experience (Hurburt & 
Heavey, 2001; 2004). 7) Finally, sampling methods ground of responses in concrete 
experiences in place of generalities. Sampling methods are more grounded in immediate 
concrete moments and potentially less filtered by participants' generalities about 
themselves (see Christensen et al., 2003; but also see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This 
makes it more likely that reported inner experience was observed when and how it 
actually occurred, thus improving the accuracy of reports (Hurburt & Heavey, 2001 ; 
2004). These advantages have important implications for the exploration of inner 
experience in sport performance. In the following section we will examine these 
implications and describe the present study.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CURRENT STUDY 
Rationale for the Current Study 
Unlike other subfields of psychology, sport psychology has devoted more attention to 
the development and evaluation of effective interventions. Relatively less attention has 
been directed to assessment (Anderson, 2002; McCann, Jowdy, & Van Raalte, 2002), that 
is, the evaluation of inner experience during performance. When internal processes have 
been evaluated, sport psychology research has traditionally relied on retrospective self- 
report obtained well after performance. These methodologies are susceptible to a wide 
range of problems that lead to questionable validity of obtained results because 
1) reporting bias may be present on the part of participants due to memory problems such 
as the hindsight bias (see Hawkins & Hastie, 1990), foresight bias, and/or overconfidence 
(see Koriat & Bjork, 2005), availability and/or representative heuristics (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974); 2) participants may exhibit inaccurate styles of responding such as 
minimization or exaggeration (Overholser, Spirito, & Difilippo, 2000); 3) researchers 
may unwittingly influence results by imposing demand characteristics on subjects, 
researchers may frame leading questions, and/or subjects may tailor their responses based 
on researchers’ interests (Norenzayan & Schwartz, 1999); 4) participants may be unable 
to accurately engage in the cognitive and motor functions necessary for effective 
performance and, simultaneously, to attend, process, encode, store, and later retrieve the
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phenomena of internal processes during performance. Competing effectively and 
simultaneously remembering aspects o f inner experience are difficult behavioral and 
cognitive tasks, and the ability of participants to accurately report the about internal 
processes under sport performance conditions is largely unknown. Nonetheless, 
participants’ abilities to accurately sense, perceive, remember, and report their internal 
processes during performance are unfortunately widely unquestioned, if  not taken 
completely for granted. This has made it difficult to know more precisely what is 
happening in metaphorical “the space between your ears’’ during sport performance.
More literally, the present study proposed a less restricted, broader, novel approach for 
examining the internal processes that occur during golf performance.
When internal processes have been assessed, sport psychology research had 
traditionally used two main methods -  questionnaires and interviews. Previous sport 
psychology research has relied on retrospective self-report, but more immediate self- 
report techniques and a greater reliance on interview techniques have recently emerged. 
Thus attitudes toward utility o f qualitative methodologies have become more favorable 
(Hardy et al., 1996). The current study seeks to advance the trend of using a qualitative 
methods o f examining internal processes related to athletic performance using descriptive 
experience sampling, (DES), a method that relies on random-sampling o f internal 
experience and subsequent interview.
The genesis of the present study was rooted in 1 ) the need to address the limitations 
o f traditional sport psychology research examining golf performance, and 2) the 
expectation that a less restricted, broader, novel approach for examining the internal 
processes that occur during golf performance may provide a more accurate and consistent
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picture o f inner experience with the potential to uncover processes previously 
unrecognized.
This study was the first descriptive experience sampling study to be conducted during 
performance. It sought to demonstrate that DES could be used to advance the existing 
knowledge about inner experience that occurs during human performance by better 
observing and describing the factors thought to influence performance.
The current study sought to explore inner experience during golf performance to 
address very basic scientific questions including 1) what is inner experience during golf 
performance, 2) what are the similarities and differences between golf and daily life inner 
experiences, and 3) what is the relationship between inner experience and the quality of 
golf performance, if  any?
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CHAPTER 4
METHOD
Participants
Twelve golfers were recruited from contacts in the Las Vegas community. Two 
participants dropped out of the study. One moderate handicap group participant dropped 
out before starting sampling for unknown reasons. The other was a low handicap group 
participant that dropped out before golf sampling due to an injury incurred outside o f the 
study. The remaining ten participants all completed the study. Five participants 
represented the moderate handicap (moderate skill) group, and the other five represented 
the low handicap (high skill) group. Within the moderate handicap group, handicaps 
ranged from 13 to 26 with a mean of 17.6. Three of these five participants (60%) had 
registered handicaps. Within the low handicap group, handicaps ranged from 2 to 7 with 
a mean of 4.2. All five participants (100%) had registered handicaps.
Materials
Beeper. This device is 4.15 by 2.4 by 0.85 inches and emits an audible signal or beep 
at random intervals through an earpiece that can be worn with minimal interference with 
behavior (Hurlburt, 1979). This device can be worn using its clip on the waistline or 
within a pocket. When the device is “on,” it emits an audible continuous 700 Hz tone that 
is reset with the push of a button. Volume can be adjusted by the user during sampling.
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Notebook. A 3 x 5 inch notebook was issued to participants to record any notes they 
needed to cue themselves about the details of their inner experience that occurred at the 
moment o f the beep. In addition, participants filled out a label that they stuck to the 
notebook page where they described the details of their inner experience. This label asked 
them to record when beeps occurred (i.e., which hole and stroke) and what they were 
doing at the moment o f the beep (e.g., waiting, hitting the ball, etc).
Local Golf Course. The final stage of the study took place on at Tuscany Golf Course 
in Henderson, Nevada.
Demographic Form. Basic demographic information including age, gender, and 
ethnicity was obtained using a paper and pencil form. In addition, participants were asked 
to provide their handicap and current telephone number(s). (See Appendix B.)
Procedure
Twelve adult golfers were recruited through contacts within the local community for 
this study and ten completed the study. The duration o f the study was approximately six 
months, taking place from about March to October 2006. Participants took part in the 
study for approximately one month each.
This study contained two phases: 1) standard DES training and daily life sampling 
and 2) an on-the-course golf tournament.
Phase 1: Standard DES Training
Participants were trained in the DES method for approximately three sessions (range 
two to four) during the first stage o f the study. Participants were instructed on how to use 
the beeper, options for wearing it, and how to use the notebook to record anything they 
needed to cue themselves about the details of their inner experience that occurred at the
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moment of the beep, about which they were asked during interviews. For training 
sessions, participants were asked to wear heepers during times of their choosing until 
they collected six beeps. Within 24 hours, participants met with the researcher for the 
DES expositional interview about those beeps. Beeps collected outside o f 24 hours were 
not analyzed. The expositional interview asked open-ended, non-leading questions to 
explore inner experience. All interviews were videotaped. The specific number of 
training sessions depended on individuals’ time needed to train to the task of reporting 
about inner experience, which was determined via agreement between the two primary 
investigators o f the study. After training was complete, participants moved on to Phase 2. 
Phase 2: On-the-Course Golf Tournament
The 18-hole on-the-course golf tournament took place at Tuscany Golf Club. 
Participants were greeted by the researcher and provided space in which to warm-up for 
approximately 15 minutes. After warm-up, participants wore the beeper during 
competition in the on-the-course golf tournament. Participants completed a record of their 
scores, which were verified by researchers. When the heeper signaled, golfers were 
trained first to note the features of their experience in the notebook; then to write down 
what they were doing at the moment o f the beep, the hole on which they were competing, 
and their current stroke. In the event that a participant is in the act of swinging at the 
moment of the beep, they were required to take a “do-over” shot at the place of the 
original shot. Participants competed in groups of 2, 3, or 4 participants, and participants 
individually competed for one overall tournament first place cash prize o f $50. Beepers 
were worn for the duration of competition (18 holes). The beeper was set to randomly
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signal at an average frequency o f one signal every 25 minutes. Finally, golfers were 
interviewed within 24 hours in a standard DES expositional interview.
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CHAPTER 5
INTRODUCTION OF RESULTS 
This study presents two types of results. First, idiographic descriptions will illustrate 
the salient characteristics o f each individual participant’s inner experiences. One chapter 
will be devoted to each of the 10 participants. These chapters are organized by the skill 
group membership o f the participants. Thus the salient characteristics o f each of the five 
moderate handicap (moderate skill) group participants will be described, including John, 
Brad, Caleb, Samuel, and Will. This will then be followed by the five low handicap (high 
skill) group participants, Tom, Chris, Mike, Ryan, and Aaron. Second, nomothetic results 
will be described. This will include across-participant descriptions that will illustrate the 
most salient characteristics o f all participants’ inner experiences together during golf and 
daily life as well as between group descriptions that will illustrate the most salient 
characteristics of the two separate skill group inner experiences during golf and daily life.
The Categories o f  Inner Experience Defined 
In the DES subsection o f Chapter 2, it was noted that DES research has shown that 
inner experience takes different forms. The most frequently-occurring forms of inner 
experience were described as five reliable categories o f inner experience by Hurlburt and 
Heavey (2002). These included what used to be termed images and what we now refer to 
as inner seeing as well as inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, feeling, and sensory 
awareness. To refresh the reader, these categories will be briefly revisited and defined. To
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further prepare the reader at the outset of exploring inner experience during golf 
performance, examples of each of these inner experiences will be provided from the 
participants o f this study.
First, inner seeing is seeing something internally that is known not to necessarily be 
externally present. John experienced inner seeing in Sample 2.1, for example. At the 
moment of the beep he is innerly seeing himself and his friend sitting under a tree 
smoking cigars as he sees a green tree, metal tables, and two chairs as well as himself and 
his friend in less detail.
Second, inner speech is the experience of speaking words in one’s own normal voice 
without the external sound actually being produced. It is typically experienced as very 
similar to how one might speak aloud, but it typically contains no external sound. In 
Tournament Sample T.2, Aaron was lining up to make a putt saying to himself internally, 
“This is left to right,” and externally seeing a brown spot on the green where he will aim 
the ball. The phrase he is saying internally is an example of inner speech.
Third, unsymbolized thinking is the experience of a mental event without the 
experience of words, inner seeings, or any symbol of inner experience. It may be, for 
instance, a hoping, wishing, or wondering thought process without inner speech or inner 
seeing. In Tournament Sample T.IO, John experienced unsymbolized thinking when he 
was looking at the swelling in his finger to and is wondering if it has gotten bigger 
without words or inner seeing present.
Fourth, feeling is an emotional experience that includes such experiences as anger, 
guilt, sadness, and so on. John also experienced a feeling in Sample 2.1. At the same time
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he is experiencing an inner seeing of himself and a friend smoking cigars in this sample, 
John is also experiencing relaxed enjoyment at the moment of the beep.
Fifth, sensory awareness is an internal bodily (e.g., hotness, coldness, itchiness) or 
external (e.g., brightness, shininess, blueness) sensory experience that is, in and of itself, 
a major theme of an inner experience. Caleb experienced sensory awareness in 
Tournament Sample T.6 when he was absorbed in the brightness o f the sun’s reflection 
shining on the metallic coin. Sensory awareness is often experienced as being absorbed in 
the sensory details of an inner experience (see Hurlburt & Heavey, 1999).
In Chapter 2, it was also mentioned that DES is an open method, which means that 
new categories are created if experiences fall outside the range of pre-existing categories 
(see Monson & Hurlburt, 1993). As we will see, this occurred during the current study 
with three categories of inner experience -  perceptual awareness, golf-related content, 
and mental preparation strategies. These categories o f inner experience will now be 
defined to further prepare the reader for what follows.
Perceptual awareness is a process o f focusing on objects of the environment for their 
objective or instrumental qualities, often for the purpose o f a task. Perceptual awareness 
is a form of inner experience that is often visual, as the seeing of an object as part of 
conscious experience for its objective, instrumental qualities. Perceptual awareness is 
different from sensory awareness. Sensory awareness, by contrast, focuses awareness on 
the sensory aspects of an object, regardless of the object’s objective or task-related 
qualities.
Mike’s Tournament Sample T.IO, for instance, is an example o f perceptual 
awareness. Mike was preparing for a shot, planning where he is going to hit the ball. This
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is experienced as actively looking down the right side of the fairway, an external visual 
experience. There are two carts out there, but Mike is looking past them, focused on the 
fairway as part of his planning of where to hit the ball. His focus is broad and without 
much specific detail aside from the general area o f the fairway in his visual awareness. 
This is a perceptual awareness because Mike is viewing this scene for its instrumental 
significance; he is looking to see where he should hit is next shot. He is not absorbed in 
the sensory aspects of the scene: he is not particularly interested in the shade o f green of 
the grass, the patterns of shadow the trees throw, or the like.
In contrast, Caleb’s Tournament Sample T.6, which was previously-mentioned, is an 
example of sensory awareness. Caleb was reaching down to pick up his ball mark, a coin, 
off the green. At the moment o f the beep, Caleb is paying attention to the brightness of 
the sun’s reflection shining on the metallic coin. Caleb is absorbed in the brightness of 
the coin and experiencing a mild sense of aesthetic satisfaction with the brightness o f the 
coin. This is a sensory awareness because Caleb is more involved in the sensory aspects 
(brightness) than the instrumental aspects (ball marker) of the coin.
Perceptual awareness is a specific category o f inner experience we refer to as a form 
of inner experience. Perceptual awareness describes how the inner experience occurs. In 
contrast, golf-related content is a category of inner experience we refer to as the content 
of inner experience. The term golf-related describes what the contents of the inner 
experience were. In Tournament Sample T.IO, Mike’s experience o f the general area of 
the fairway in his visual awareness is golf-related. In contrast, Caleb’s involvement in the 
sensory brightness of his coin is non-golf-related. He is absorbed in the brightness o f the 
coin as opposed to the objective, golf-related, ball marker qualities o f the coin.
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Mental preparation strategies are inner experiences with future-oriented golf-related
content that serves the purpose o f preparing for a golf (or sport) performance task. M ike’s
Tournament Sample T.IO, for instance, is also an example of a mental preparation. In this
sample, Mike was getting ready to make a shot and was looking down the fairway of the
last hole. At the moment of the beep, Mike is planning where he is going to hit the ball by
experiencing perceptual awareness of the right side o f the fairway. Mike also experienced
a mental preparation strategy, but during golf practice when he was collecting samples in
his daily life in Sample 1.1. In this sample, he was on the driving range hitting balls to
warm up before beginning his round. He is addressing the ball when the beep catches
Mike in his backswing innerly saying the word “Tempo” to himself rhythmically in his
own voice. Also at the moment o f the beep, Mike is actively focused on the ball, paying
attention to the center of the ball by looking at it, an instance o f perceptual awareness.
An evident advantage o f categorizing inner experiences as we have done to this point
is the heuristic value of illustrating inner experience in an organized manner that
expedites the reader’s understanding of inner experiences. As Monson and Hurlburt
(1993) explain, however,
categories we might advance to organize phenomena of inner experience will not 
have clear, unambiguous borders; categories of inner experience do not end abruptly 
but fade into one another... introspectionists’ referred to a ‘continuum of vagueness 
(p .2 5 )/
Thus the reader is advised to take advantage of these categorizes in order to illustrate and 
organize inner experience with the cautionary caveats that 1) the borders of categories of 
inner experience are imprecise, 2) nascent categories such as perceptual awareness, golf- 
related content, and mental preparation strategies are more likely to be imprecise
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compared to the more established categories, and 3) these nascent categories are open and 
may naturally evolve as DES research progresses.
The following 10 chapters will provide idiographic descriptions to illustrate the 
salient characteristics of each individual participant’s inner experiences during golf and 
daily life. The aforementioned categories will be evident throughout these idiographic 
descriptions of the inner experiences o f John, Brad, Caleb, Samuel, and Will as well as 
Tom, Chris, Mike, Ryan, and Aaron. After this, nomothetic results will be described.
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CHAPTER 6 
JOHN
John is a 44 year-old moderately-skilled golfer with a handicap of 13. He was 
recruited by one o f the researchers. He completed his first two sampling days by 
obtaining 12 samples from his daily life at work, driving, and at home. He colleeted his 
daily life samples at the end o f the spring. He participated in the golf competition 
sampling in the beginning of the fall and collected 12 golf samples. John shot 83, which 
is 11 strokes over par, 2 strokes lower than his handicap of 13. As a result, John finished 
5*̂  in the golf competition.
John took to the sampling method with relative ease; he became adept at describing 
his inner experience very quickly. He was very engaged in exploring his inner 
experience, and he seemed quite interested in the nature o f his own inner experience.
John exhibited a very good ability to apprehend his inner experience at the moment of the 
beep, and he had little difficulty describing the details o f his inner experience throughout 
all three of his sampling days.
Perceptual Awareness
In 7 of 24 or 29% of John’s samples, he was experiencing perceptual awareness at the 
moment of the beep. O f these experiences, only two occurred during John’s daily life 
samples; both were instances o f active, goal-directed perceptual awareness. For example, 
in Sample 1.2 John was starting up his new laptop, staring at the screen waiting for the
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laptop to run its initial security programs so he can open his file. At the moment of the 
beep, John is visually going back and forth from looking at his screen and looking at his 
finger on the mouse pad. He is not sure whether his screen or his finger is in his 
awareness, but he is sure only one of these is in his awareness at the moment o f the beep. 
This visual process is the most prominent aspect of his awareness at the moment of the 
beep. Also at the moment of the beep, John is experiencing a mental feeling of 
impatience in his head that is related to waiting for his laptop.
John also experienced active, goal-directed perceptual awareness in Sample 2.6 when 
he was working on his computer with several windows open. He had received a message 
that told him to log on and put in a password. At the moment of the beep, John is taking 
in the visual scene with conscious awareness, studying it actively to see if one of the 5 
windows cues him to which one has the password. Also at the moment of the beep John 
is wondering, without any words or inner seeing associated with it, which of the five 
open windows has his password on it. Thus this is a clear active visual process with an 
associated mental wondering, both clearly present at the moment of the beep.
Most John’s perceptual awareness experiences were active, goal-directed experiences. 
John had one passive, idly-looking perceptual awareness experience, but it still had an 
active aspect to it present just before the moment o f the beep. In Tournament Sample T.9, 
John’s bunker shot had come up short. He was inspecting a divot he had made in the 
bunker. He wanted to see where he started to take the sand compared to where the ball 
had been. He had already made the decision that he had been way behind the ball, about 
five inches fat. At the moment o f the beep, he is having an experience of externally 
seeing. In addition to this seeing, he was looking with awareness at the big divot at the
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moment o f the beep. He is not aware of the previous analysis of how fat the swing was; 
he is just externally looking and aware of his divot. There are no other thoughts or 
emotions present at the moment o f the beep. At the moment o f the beep, this is a passive 
perceptual awareness experience in that he is looking without the active process he had 
been engaged in being present (the perceptual inspection process). Since his judgment 
occurred before the moment of the beep, John’s momentary experience is passive 
external looking with awareness o f the divot at the moment o f the beep. This passive idle 
looking experience was different than the purest passive idle looking in that John had a 
sense of setting it in motion actively just before the moment of the beep, whereas 
intentionality was often absent in other participants’ pure experiences o f passive 
perceptual awareness even just before the moment o f the beep.
The majority of John’s perceptual awareness was active focusing on visual stimuli as 
the function of a task. So far we have seen how his perceptual awareness occurred in his 
daily life; however, as we will see, most of his perceptual awareness occurred during the 
golf tournament. Half of John’s perceptual awareness experiences co-occurred with other 
forms of inner experience at the moment of the beep.
Unsymholized Thinking
In 6 o f 24 or 25% of John’s samples, he was experiencing unsymbolized thinking at 
the moment of the beep. In Sample 2.2, John experienced unsymbolized thinking with no 
other inner experience present at the moment of the beep. Before the beep, John was 
leaving the house and his hands were full, so he was closing the gate with his foot. He 
was walking away from the gate and waiting to hear the gate shut; he does not like it 
when the gate does not shut. Still before the beep, he was looking across the street at a
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Terminex truck and thinking to himself, “why would any of our homes have termites out 
here.” At the same time as this, but still before the beep, he wanted the gate to be closed, 
and he was waiting for it to close. The gate made a rattling sound as it finally closed. At 
the moment of the heep, John is in the process of turning his head to look, not yet seeing 
the gate, and he is experiencing a mental sense of conquering the gate without words, 
inner seeing, or emotions. His sense of conquering the gate is experienced as if to say 
“Yeah, you better have closed,” although no words are present at the moment of the beep. 
At the moment of the beep, he has no words, inner seeing, or feelings in his conscious 
experience, nor is he aware of walking, the things in his hands, or worrying about 
dropping them. He is also in fact raising one of his eyebrows as if he has conquered the 
gate by getting it to close, but this is not part of his conscious awareness at the moment, 
nor is anything other than his unsymbolized mental sense of conquering the gate.
John experienced unsymbolized thinking with a simultaneous inner seeing during 
Sample 2.4. John was driving to work in a car he was borrowing at about 65 or 70 miles 
per hour with the rest of the traffic, slightly faster than his usual speed he drives in his 
convertible, which is 60 miles per hour. Before the moment of the beep, he was 
approaching a red beat-up Toyota in the middle lane that is driving slower, about 55 or 60 
miles per hour, than other cars that have been passing. John passed the Toyota on the 
inside lane and was looking back in his rear view mirror at the front of the slower car, 
condemning the other car with frustration, and thinking “what an idiot,” still before the 
moment of the beep. At the moment of the beep, John is looking through the rear view 
mirror and experiencing an understanding of the other driver by considering a number of 
reasons all at once that might be causing him to drive slower. It is occurring to John that
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this is how he drives when he drives his convertible slower than the other traffic, that 
maybe there is some reason why the driver has to do this, maybe this is the car's top 
speed, maybe the wind is too loud to hear his radio (like in John's convertible). This is a 
mental epiphany that is justifying the other driver's slowness, a mental understanding of 
several attributions all at once. He is experiencing this as just getting it, that the other 
driver may be having the same experience John has in his convertible. There are no 
words or feelings associated with this epiphany at the moment of the beep. At the 
moment of the beep, John is also seeing an external image of his car, transposed upon the 
Toyota. John is projecting an image of the front o f his silver Mercedes upon the red beat- 
up Toyota, seeing the front of his car as if  it is externally out there. To summarize, at the 
moment of the beep John is experiencing a simultaneous unsymbolized thinking and 
external image. He has an epiphany, an understanding all at once, o f the slower driver, 
and he is having and an external image of his slower car transposed upon the red beat-up 
Toyota. He is no longer condemning the other car with frustration and no longer thinking 
“what an idiot” at the moment of the beep.
O f John’s instances of unsymbolized thinking, 5 of 6 or 83% co-occurred with other 
forms of inner experience (e.g., perceptual awareness, sensory awareness, inner seeing) 
present at the moment of the beep. The content of John’s unsymbolized thinking 
experiences included three instances of wondering and one instance each o f having a 
mental sense, experiencing understanding, and hoping.
Feeling
In 6 of 24 or 25% of John’s samples, he was experiencing a feeling at the moment of 
the beep. In Sample 1.6, for instance, John was in the office at the printer picking up
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some paper from a project he was working on. Before the moment of the beep, he saw 
someone in the comer of his eye in the waiting room, and he was wondering if the person 
in the waiting room was waiting for him. At the moment of the beep, John was having a 
mental irritation experience, being bothered that this person might be waiting for him 
(which, incidentally, would interfere with completing his project, not in his awareness at 
the moment). John is not sure whether the person is still in his visual awareness at the 
moment of the beep, but they had been before the moment of the beep.
In Sample 2.1, John experienced a feeling with a simultaneous inner seeing. John was 
retrieving a missed call on his cell phone. He saw the number on his phone that indicated 
the call was from a friend of his, Anthony, whom he will meet the next morning at 
Starbucks. At the moment of the beep, he is innerly seeing himself and Anthony sitting 
under a tree smoking cigars. He sees a green tree, metal tables, and two chairs. He also 
sees two people without much detail to them that are known to be himself and Anthony. 
John also is experiencing relaxed enjoyment at the moment of the beep. This emotion is 
felt physically as tension going away in his shoulders. Together the inner seeing and the 
emotion are experienced almost as if he is there at Starbucks.
In 4 of John’s 6 feelings, 67%, he was experiencing co-occurring other forms of inner 
experience including inner speech, inner seeing, sensory awareness, and perceptual 
awareness. In 4 of 6 or 67% of his feelings, John’s feelings that were experienced 
mentally, whereas 2 of 6 or 33% were experienced bodily. John’s feelings included a 
mental feeling of impatience, mental irritation, mental excitement, mild mental sorrow, 
bodily panic, and the bodily experienced relaxed enjoyment.
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Inner Seeing
In 5 of 24 or 21% of John’s samples, he was experiencing an inner seeing at the 
moment of the beep. As previously discussed, John experienced a feeling along with a 
simultaneous inner seeing in Sample 2.1 when he imagined being at Starbucks and 
experienced relaxed enjoyment. In Sample 2.5, John experienced an inner seeing with no 
other inner experience present at the moment of the beep. He was editing a page on his 
company’s website. He had just finished typing some text, saved it, and had posted it to 
the site. At the moment of the beep, he is internally visualizing the text within the borders 
of the website to see if it fits. He is seeing the text in deep blue-colored 18-point Book 
An tiqua font on a white background. In the same inner seeing, he is also seeing the edges 
of the website with green on the left side and off-gray on the right. His seeing is the way 
he thinks it will look rather than how it actually looks. There is no central focal point in 
the inner seeing. Both the text and the borders are equally prominent in his awareness. No 
awareness o f what he is looking at externally is present at the moment of the beep.
John’s unsymbolized thinking experience in Sample 2.4 occurred with a simultaneous 
seeing experienced externally. At the moment of the beep, John has an epiphany about 
the slower driver, and he is seeing an external seeing of his slower car transposed upon 
the red beat-up Toyota. John is projecting an image o f the front of his silver Mercedes 
upon the red beat-up Toyota, seeing the front o f his car as if it is externally out there.
Of John’s inner seeings, 4 o f 5 or 80% were experienced internally, and I was 
experienced externally as projected on the visual field. As we will see, 1 of these 5 was a 
kinesthetic inner seeing. Two of his 5 inner seeings or 40% co-occurred with other forms 
of inner experience (feeling, sensory awareness).
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Inner Speech
In 4 o f 24 or 17% of John’s samples, he was experiencing inner speech at the moment 
of the beep. During Sample 1.4, for instance, John was driving his car. He was mentally 
listing out things he had to do in chronological order and had arrived at the realization 
that there is no liquor in the house, and he is thinking if  he wants a Martini he should stop 
at Von’s for some gin and olives. At the moment of the beep, John is saying internally “1 
should probably stop at Vons and pick up some gin and olives” one word after another at 
the same speed and tone of his own normal voice. This is said definitively, and it is the 
last item of the list he had been mentally experiencing before the moment o f the beep.
During Sample 1.5, John was in the office, editing a word document. He was reading 
the first line of a proposal letter he had written last year and editing it to make it relevant 
to this year. He was three quarters of the way through the first line of the letter. At the 
moment o f the beep, John is reading the word “Golf.” He is saying the words to himself 
internally blurred altogether, “Golf,” as if they are all one word. He is reading and saying 
this word to himself in his own normal internal reading voice. John's eyes are aimed at 
the words, but he is not aware of them. John is only aware of his inner-spoken blurred- 
together words. All of John’s inner speech involved his normal voice spoken internally, 
and only 1 of 4 or 25% of these had a co-occurring other form of inner experience (e.g., 
feeling) present at the moment of the beep.
Inner Experience During Golf
John collected 12 Tournament Samples. His perceptual awareness, unsymbolized 
thinking, inner seeing, inner speech, and feeling experiences will be described as well as
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his mental preparation and emotion regulation strategies and his golf-related content. 
Finally, a comparison of his inner experience during golf and daily life will be provided. 
Perceptual Awareness
John experienced perceptual awareness in 5 of 12 or 42% of his golf tournament 
samples. Although perceptual awareness did not occur with as much frequency during his 
daily life samples (2 of 12 or 17%), it was the most frequent category of his golf 
tournament samples.
In Tournament Sample T.2, John experienced perceptual awareness with no other co­
occurring experience. John was on the 2”*̂ hole, his 3"̂  ̂stroke. He was feeling like his 
group was not playing quickly enough, like they needed to hurry up. John had turned his 
head to look at the group of golfers behind him to see if  they were holding the other 
golfers up. At the moment of the beep, he is looking broadly at the other group 
consciously to evaluate whether his group is holding the others up. He is making external 
visual contact at the moment o f the beep, without having yet arrived at a perceptual 
evaluation. (After the beep, he saw his group was not holding the others up.) This was an 
active form of perceptual awareness that consisted of looking broadly and actively for the 
purpose of evaluation without evaluation having occurred yet at the moment o f the beep.
In Tournament Sample T.3, John experienced active perceptual awareness along with 
co-occurring unsymbolized thinking. John was on the 2"*̂  hole. Will was on John's putting 
line. John was hoping Will would hit his ball all the way to the hole so John could see the 
break. At the moment of the beep, John is looking at the black inset on the face o f Will’s 
putter as Will is getting ready to putt. He has no awareness of the details of the rest of the 
putter; his eyes are just focused on the center part of the black inset o f the putter’s face.
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This is an active process of putting a good deal of attention into looking at the putter, a 
clearly focused external visual activity. The hope that Will will hit the ball close to the 
hole is most likely still in his awareness at the moment of the beep, although John is not 
eompletely certain about this. This hope occurs without words or inner seeing present at 
the moment of the beep.
Of his perceptual awareness experiences during golf, one was a passive instance of 
not doing much but looking and remainder were active looking as a function of a task 
experiences. O f these perceptual awareness experiences, 4 of 5 or 80% perceptual 
awareness occurred with no other simultaneous inner experience during golf. In contrast, 
both of his perceptual awarenesses during daily life had co-occurring inner experience at 
the moment of the beep. Four of five or 80% of his perceptual awarenesses during golf 
were related to golf in content.
Unsymbolized Thinking
In Tournament Sample T.IO, John experienced unsymbolized thinking. John’s finger 
had been in pain. At the moment of the beep, he was looking at the swelling in his finger 
to determine if it has gotten bigger since the last swing. He is looking to get information 
but has not yet had time to make a perceptual judgment about whether it has gotten 
bigger. Also at the moment of the beep, he is wondering if it has gotten bigger without 
words or inner seeing present. The wondering is the most prominent aspect o f his inner 
experience at the moment of the beep. He is not feeling pain at the moment o f the beep.
All but one o f John’s unsymbolized thinking experiences, 5 of 6 or 83%, co-occurred 
simultaneously with other forms o f inner experience (e.g., perceptual awareness, sensory
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awareness). Only 1 of 3 or 33% of his unsymholized thinking experiences was related to 
golf in content.
Other Inner Experiences During Golf
John experienced 2 of 12 instances of inner seeing, the same amount of inner speech, 
and the same amount of feeling experiences during golf (17% each).
In Tournament Sample T.12, John experienced a shapeless inner seeing with no other 
form of inner experience present. John is on the tee of the 17‘̂  hole. He had been looking 
for the tee box marker, which is purple. He had found a marker, but he could not see if it 
was green or purple. Then he saw it was purple. At the moment o f the beep, John is 
having an inner seeing, a shapeless uniform field of purple. This is not an after-image of 
the actually seen marker, but an inner seeing, which John experiences as being the answer 
to his question about whether the tee box is green or purple.
In Tournament Sample T.7, John had both a feeling and inner speech present at the 
moment o f the beep. John was waiting for his stroke o f the 6'*’ hole. He was watching 
Will’s shot, which is traveling too fast, roll across the green. At the moment of the beep, 
John is experiencing a negative feeling and saying something to himself internally in 
words. John is feeling bad for Will, a feeling mild sorrow that is experienced mentally 
and not bodily. At the same time as this feeling, he saying to himself “bad shot” in his 
own internal voice in a sorrowful way. John is also visually focusing on Will’s white ball 
moving across the green about half way to the hole; he is narrowing focused visually on 
the ball.
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In both of John’s tournament feeling samples, and in both of his tournament inner 
speech sample experiences, he had golf-related experiences. He had golf-related content 
in only one of his two inner seeings at the moment o f the beep.
Mental Preparation & Emotion Regulation Strategies
The beeper captured one mental preparation and one an emotion regulation strategy 
that John was using at the moment of the beep.
In Tournament Sample T.l 1, John was engaged in a kinesthetic inner seeing for 
mental rehearsal. John was in his cart before his tee shot on the 15*'’ hole, which is a par 
3. The distance to the hole is the same as the par 3 a few holes back. He had hit a bad shot 
and missed the green on that hole. At the moment of the beep, he is mentally rehearsing 
his next shot. He is internally picturing his backswing. He sees a little bit of his shoulder, 
his feet, and the ball as if  he is over the ball at the top o f his backswing getting ready to 
hit the ball. This inner seeing also has two kinesthetic, bodily components. The first is 
what he would like to do; he is purposefully trying to lead with his hips. The second 
kinesthetic component is less prominent in his experience; he is feeling what his hips are 
doing in the inner seeing rehearsal, which feels like he is not leading enough with his 
hips. This is an imaginary process with two related kinesthetic experiences of 
purposefully leading with his hips and feeling what his hips feel like in the inner seeing. 
This is a less a visual experience and more of a kinesthetic experience.
In Tournament Sample T.4, John was experiencing inner speech during an emotional 
regulation strategy. John was on the 3"" stroke o f the 5* hole. He had just lit a cigar, taken 
a puff, and he was thinking he had had a bad stroke with the nine iron on the last hole. At 
the moment of the beep, John is saying “that nine iron was a bad shot; it’s time to smoke”
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in his own internal words, just as if  he had said it out loud. He has already taken a puff, 
so this thought is like a reflection back, a thought validating his smoking. John has a 
sense that this phrase is in the future tense, but the meaning of the phrase is in the past 
tense; he has already lit up. (Incidentally, John reported that his routine is to light up a 
cigar when he has made a bad shot to take the edge off, to keep from getting too 
frustrated with the game. He does this to give himself something to “fiddle around with,” 
something to do to derail the negative emotional process. This was apparently working 
because he was not experiencing frustration at the moment o f the beep.)
Golf-Related Content
Of John’s Tournament Samples, 8 o f 12 or 67% contained golf-related content. 
Examples of golf-related content experiences include thinking and having a feeling about 
another golfer’s performance, looking actively or passively at golf-related stimuli, and 
mental preparation or emotion regulation strategies.
Comparing Inner Experience During Golf and Daily Life
In both golf and daily life, John was engaged in what he was doing. His golf and daily 
life inner experiences were typically related to what he was doing at the moment of the 
beep. During golf, he had 67% golf-related content, and during his daily life, he had 75% 
doing-related content (e.g., working on his computer and having an inner seeing of what 
he was looking at). His irmer experiences were also typically very clear and detailed 
during both golf and daily life.
John had fewer feelings during golf than daily life. He had feelings during 2 of 12 or 
17% of his golf samples and during 4 of 12 or 33% or his daily samples. Half o f his four 
feelings during daily life were positive (e.g., relaxed, excited), whereas both of his two
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feelings during golf were negative but neither were about his own performance (e.g., 
panic about being in the wrong place, sorrow for another golfer’s performance).
John had more perceptual awareness during golf than daily life. He had perceptual 
awareness in 6 of 12 or 50% of his golf samples and 2 of 12 or 17% of his daily samples. 
Two o f these during golf were passive instances of not doing much but looking and 
remainder were active looking as a function of a task experiences.
Discussion
John took to the sampling method with relative ease, and he was very engaged and 
seemingly interested in exploring his inner experience. John’s inner experience was 
typically quite clear, detailed, and differentiated in comparison to some of the other 
participants.
John’s most salient inner experience was perceptual awareness. The majority of his 
perceptual awarenesses were active focusing on visual stimuli as the function of a task. 
Only one experience was passive perceptual awareness, and John had a sense of setting 
this in motion actively just before the moment o f the beep, unlike in other participants’ 
experiences o f passive perceptual awareness as we will see.
John’s next most salient inner experience was unsymbolized thinking. The content of 
John’s unsymbolized thinking experiences included several instances o f wondering, a 
mental sense experience, an understanding, and a hoping experience; these occurred in 
the absence o f associated words or inner seeing. He experienced about an equal amount 
o f unsymbolized thinking in his daily life and golf samples. John experienced as many 
feelings as he did instances o f unsymbolized thinking. Most of his feelings were 
experienced mentally, whereas a couple were experienced bodily. John’s mental feelings
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included a impatience, irritation, excitement, and sorrow; whereas his bodily feelings 
included panic and relaxed enjoyment.
John experienced a variety o f inner seeings. Most o f were experienced internally. In 
contrast with this, one inner seeing was experienced externally as projected on what he 
was seeing with his eyes, and another was a kinesthetic inner seeing for golf preparation. 
All of John’s inner speech involved his normal voice spoken internally.
Nearly half o f John’s Tournament Samples contained perceptual awareness, which 
was an increase in frequency from his daily life samples. All but one of these experiences 
contained golf-related content. He also experienced several unsymbolized thinking, inner 
seeing, inner speech, and feeling experiences. In both of John’s feeling and inner speech 
tournament sample experiences, he had golf-related experiences. Only one of his two 
inner seeings had golf-related content.
The beeper caught John using two mental preparation strategies and one emotion 
regulation strategy. One of his mental preparation strategies involved clearing his mind, 
and the other involved inner seeing. His emotion regulation strategy involved inner 
speech related to smoking a cigar, which was apparently working given the absence of 
emotion at the moment.
Most o f John’s Tournament Samples (67%) contained content related to golf at the 
moment of the beep including thinking and having a feeling about another golfer’s shot, 
looking actively or passively at golf-related stimuli, and mental preparation or emotion 
regulation strategies.
In both golf and daily life, John was engaged in what he was doing; his inner 
experiences were typically related to what he was doing at the moment o f the beep. John
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had fewer feelings during golf than daily life and more negative feelings during golf than 
daily life. He had more perceptual awareness during golf than daily life. His inner 
experiences were typically very clear, detailed, and differentiated during both golf and 
daily life.
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CHAPTER 7 
BRAD
Brad is a 30 year-old moderately-skilled golfer with a handicap of 15. He was 
recruited by one o f the researchers. Brad was a previous participant in DES training, 
which involved repeated DES sampling and interviewing to assist in the training of new 
DES researchers. Thus Brad was very familiar with the DES procedures. He completed 
his first two sampling days by obtaining 10 samples from his daily life in at the end o f the 
spring. He participated in the golf competition sampling at the beginning of the fall 
semester collected 7 golf samples. Brad shot an 87, which is 15 strokes over par, even 
with his handicap of 15. As a result. Brad finished 6* in the golf tournament.
No Inner Experience
In 5 o f 17 or 29% of his samples. Brad had no inner experience present at the moment 
of the beep. All but one of Brad’s instances of no inner experience at the moment of the 
beep occurred during golf competition. Brad had a sense that some of these instances o f 
no inner experience were somewhat closer to the threshold of awareness than were 
others, but he was convincing about the absence of inner experience at the moment of the 
beep in all these cases. Tournament Sample T.l was the closest to the threshold of an 
experience in conscious awareness. Brad was on the 3"" hole and had just pulled his cart 
up to the tee box. It had been about an hour without having had a beep, and Brad was 
turning the volume dial o f the beeper when the beeper went off. At the moment of the
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beep, Brad’s eyes are aimed at the dial, and he is turning the dial of the beeper with his 
finger. He has no visual awareness of looking at the dial and no tactile awareness of 
feeling the dial as he turns it. Brad thinks this experience is akin to driving with no 
awareness. Nothing is present in his inner experience at the moment of the beep, but of 
Brad’s instances of no inner experience, he thinks this experience is the closest to the 
threshold of having visual awareness at the moment of the beep.
In Tournament Sample T.2, Brad was on the 5'*’ stroke of the 5* hole, and he was 
standing on one side o f the green with the beeper in his pocket. At the moment o f the 
beep, he was looking across the green, his eyes aimed at fellow golfer John standing on 
the far side o f the green. However, neither John nor the green itself were in his 
awareness; in fact, nothing seemed to be in his awareness at the moment o f the beep. This 
was very similar to the last instance o f no inner experience, except in one case his eyes 
were aimed at the beeper and in the other his eyes were aimed at a fellow golfer. In both 
cases, he does not think he ever would have been aware of what he was looking at if  not 
for the beep.
In Tournament Sample T.5, Brad had no inner experience with a sense of even less 
awareness. Brad was sitting in the cart having just finished the 10‘*’ hole. At the moment 
o f the beep. Brad’s eyes were aimed at the beeper and there was nothing in his awareness. 
This experience was similar to the other instances of no inner experience just described, 
but this time there seems to be even less awareness. He knows his eyes were open, but he 
somehow has even less awareness.
Brad had little difficulty articulating these instances of no inner experience, but he 
apologized and said he felt guilty for having no irmer experience. He was serious about
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articulating his inner experience, but in several instances, no inner experience could be 
found. He had more instances of no inner experience during golf; during golf, 4 o f 7 or 
57% of his samples contained no inner experience. Brad’s instances of no inner 
experience were clear, but for some of these instances. Brad thought it was more possible 
than others that he had could have had very slight awareness usually of visual stimuli. 
These instances ranged from having very slight possible awareness usually of visual 
stimuli to much less possibility of awareness present at the moment of the beep.
Unsymbolized Thinking 
In 4 o f 17 or 24% Brad’s samples, he experienced unsymbolized thinking. In Sample 
2.5, Brad was reading an abnormal psychology textbook. He then began typing the word 
“social” on his computer. At the moment of the beep. Brad is wondering if  there is a 
DSM diagnosis for social anxiety. He knows that social phobia is in the DSM at the 
moment of the beep but is wondering if social anxiety is in the DSM. This is a mental 
process without words, inner seeing, or other inner experiences. In Tournament Sample 
T.3, Brad was on the 8* hole standing at the tee and talking to John. Before the beep. 
Brad had just said his beeper has only gone off twice. After this but also before the beep, 
he had experienced an inner seeing of another beeper that is in his bag, along with a sense 
that he could switch to that beeper. At the moment of the beep, he is having two related 
thoughts. First, he is thinking about switching beepers to his second beeper. This thought 
about switching beepers is an unsymbolized, mental sense, an understanding that he 
could switch beepers. Second, he is thinking about the beeper in the bag. This 
unsymbolized thought is related to the other and was about where the beeper was in his
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bag. Both thoughts are equally prominent. Brad’s unsymbolized thinking experiences 
were clear inner experiences without words or inner seeing.
Other Inner Experience
Brad experienced an equal number of several other forms of inner experience at the 
moment of the beep. These include two instances o f each of the following: inner seeing, 
inner speech, feeling, and multiple awareness. These forms inner experience each 
occurred in 2 of 17 or 12% of his samples. One example of each o f these instances will 
be described. After this, an example of inner hearing, the only one that occurred during 
sampling, will be described.
Brad experienced an inner seeing during Sample 2.6. At the moment o f the beep.
Brad is imagining talking in front of his class as if  he is giving a presentation there. He is 
innerly seeing the room of his one o’clock class without motion as if  he is on the right 
side o f the room looking up and slightly to the left comer of the room. The entire room is 
more dim in lighting than his class would typically be. At the center of the inner seeing is 
the side wall on the left hand side of the room. He sees a few students (two or three) 
where they typically would sit outside the center o f what he is seeing. He sees these 
things with relatively equal clarity. Further outside of this in terms of direction, he is 
seeing an obscured section of the room as if is right cheek is blocking this imagined 
vision. One additional component of this inner seeing experience is that it experienced as 
if he is somehow having more inner experience coming through his right side than his 
left.
During Tournament Sample T.7, Brad experienced inner speech. Brad was on the 15*'’ 
hole after his first stroke. He was sitting in the golf cart watching his fellow golfer, John.
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John had a wooden club that he used for short distances. John had called it a “5” wood 
before, and Brad couldn’t believe it was because he hit the ball so short with it. At the 
moment of the beep. Brad is saying to himself “What is that wood?” in his own voice, 
which is normal in volume with an inquisitive tone. This is an instance of clear inner 
speech at the moment of the beep with not much doubt about it.
Both of Brad’s feelings co-occurred with other forms of inner experience. One of 
these. Sample 2.4, occurred when Brad was playing online chess with a human opponent 
named Joe. At the moment o f the beep, Brad is looking at the Joe’s knight take Brad’s 
bishop as part of his inner experience. This visual perceptual awareness is about 70% 
prominent in his conscious experience. In addition to this. Brad is experiencing an 
aggressive feeling in his chest just below the surface o f his skin, which is an aroused 
experience. He feels a sense of stimulated lightness as if  there is increased blood flow to 
his chest. This is a bodily and an emotionally negative experience that is not very intense, 
about 3 out or 10 (if 10 were to be the highest). This feeling is about 30% prominent.
Brad had a multiple awareness experience in Sample 2.3. This was a co-occurring 
instance o f experienced listening to a voice recording and a looking and unsymbolized 
thinking about chess. Brad was listening to his answering machine at work while playing 
online chess, again with a human opponent named Mark. At the moment of the beep, the 
most prominent part of Brad’s experience (about 65%) is listening to the person he works 
with, Sarah, on the recording say “just got to know one.” Brad is tracking the sound of 
the Sarah’s voice and some of its meaning, but he is not very focused on the details of 
what she is saying. Also at the moment of the beep Brad is looking at his Mark’s bishop, 
which is in the process of moving and taking Brad’s knight. This experience of looking is
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more than merely his eyes being aimed at the screen with no awareness at the moment of 
the heep. The experience of looking is a conscious aspect of his experience at the moment 
of the beep. The looking experience is less prominent than the experience o f listening 
(about 25%). Brad is also wondering why his Mark is moving, which is experienced both 
as a sense of mental confusion and emotional negativity without bodily awareness. This 
is a mental process with an emotional quality, a thought/feeling, without words or inner 
seeing and is the least prominent o f his three simultaneous inner experiences (about 
10%).
Brad experienced just one instance o f inner hearing. In Tournament Sample T.6, Brad 
was on his 4*'’ stroke of the 11'*’ hole. He was walking across the green to the ball on the 
back of the green. He had a Bob Dylan song in his head frequently during the day. At the 
moment o f the beep, it was fainter than usual it had been, but he is hearing Bob Dylan 
singing a phrase. He is hearing it just as it is in the real song with some words unclear 
because Bob Dylan mumbles when he sings. He is hearing “you can take your [mumble] 
put it in a [mumble].” Brad is experiencing the song as if it is coming at him at the 
moment o f the beep, but before the moment of the beep, the thinks he had started the 
song playing himself. It is possible that another inner experience is also present at the 
moment o f the beep. If so, it is even fainter and therefore not possible to determine if it is 
actually present. This possibly present inner experience is a feeling of surprised 
satisfaction about the shot he just hit that had been diminishing before the moment of the 
beep.
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Inner Experience During Golf 
Brad collected seven Tournament Samples o f inner experience during golf 
competition. Most o f these samples, 4 of 7 or 57%, were instances of no inner experience 
at the moment of the beep. Brad also had an unsymbolized thinking, an inner speech, and 
an inner hearing experience during golf, which were described earlier. Brad’s golf-related 
content will be discussed, followed by a comparison of Brad’s golf and daily life inner 
experiences.
Golf-Related Content
O f the Tournament Samples collected during golf performance, 6 of 7 or 86% were 
not related to golf in content. Since 4 o f these 6 Tournament Samples were instances of 
no inner experience at the moment o f the beep, it seems unlikely there could be content 
without inner experience. Taking the instances of no irmer experience out of 
consideration, 2 of Brad’s remaining 3 irmer experiences or 67% were not related to golf. 
Thus most o f Brad’s Tournament Samples o f inner experience during golf competition 
were not related to golf.
Comparing Inner Experience During Golf and Daily Life
Brad’s irmer experiences from his golf samples were similar to his daily life samples 
with respect to two forms of irmer experience; these forms were inner speech and 
unsymbolized thinking. His inner experiences from his golf samples were different from 
his daily life samples with respect to one form of inner experience; this form was no inner 
experience at the moment of the beep.
Brad experienced a similar amount of inner speech during his daily samples (1 of 10 
or 10%) as he did during his golf samples (1 o f 7 or 14%). He had also a fairly similar
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amount o f unsymbolized thinking during his golf samples (1 of 7 or 14%) as he did his 
daily samples (3 o f 10 or 30%).
Brad experienced more instances of no inner experience during his golf samples than 
during his daily samples. Brad had instances of no inner experience at the moment of the 
beep in 4 o f 7 or 57% of his golf samples and in 1 of 10 or 10% o f his daily samples.
Brad’s inner experiences during golf compared with his daily life were similar with 
respect to the amount of inner speech he had and fairly similar with respect to the amount 
of unsymbolized thinking he had. His inner experiences were different during golf 
compared with his daily life with respect to no inner experience. Brad had a notable 
increase in no inner experience present at the moment o f the beep during golf.
Discussion
Brad’s inner experiences were typically very clear and differentiated. Brad had 
previously sampled, and he took to the sampling process with ease. This was a notable 
difference in comparison with some of the other participants in this study. Brad 
frequently experienced unsymbolized thinking during daily life, and he had one 
unsymbolized thinking experience during golf. He also frequently experienced instances 
o f no irmer experience present at the moment o f the beep during golf, and had one of 
these during daily life. In addition. Brad experienced an equal number of instances of 
inner seeing, irmer speech, feeling, and multiple awareness. When he was golfing, his 
irmer experiences were most often not related to golf in content. His golf irmer 
experiences were similar to those of his daily life with respect to the amount of irmer 
speech and unsymbolized thinking he had, and different with respect to the amount of no 
irmer experience he had.
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CHAPTER 8 
CALEB
Caleb is a 64 year-old moderately-skilled golfer with a handicap of 16. He was 
recruited by one of the researchers. He completed his first three sampling days by 
obtaining samples from his daily life, sometimes at work, but mostly at home. The 
samples from Caleb’s first day were not analyzed because they were collected three days 
before the expositional interview. The remaining three expositional interviews were 
conducted within 24 hours o f his sampling -  two daily life sampling days and his golf 
tournament sampling day. These last three sampling days were used for the descriptions 
o f Caleb’s inner experience that follow. He collected his 15 usable daily life samples at 
the end o f the spring. He participated in the golf competition sampling in the middle o f 
the same summer collected 9 golf samples. Caleb shot an 85, which is 13 over par, 3 
strokes lower than his handicap of 16. As a result, Caleb finished in a tie for 3"̂  in the 
golf competition.
Perceptual Awareness 
In 9 of 24 or 38% of Caleb’s samples, he was experiencing perceptual awareness at 
the moment o f the beep. Caleb experienced two different kinds o f perceptual awareness. 
In some of his samples, he was not doing much other than looking at something at the 
moment of the beep. In these instances, he was just idly looking with much less 
concentration on what he was looking at, a passive form of perceptual awareness. In other
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samples, he was looking at something with much more concentration at the moment of 
the heep, an active form of perceptual awareness. This active looking typically served the 
task he was doing or a task he was preparing to do.
Passive Perceptual Awareness: Idly Looking
In Tournament Sample T.2, Caleb experienced not doing much other than passively 
looking at something at the moment o f the beep. Caleb had just finished his tee shot on 
the fourth hole and was picking up his tee. At the moment o f the beep, he is looking at 
the tee and picking it up. He has no awareness of the task he is doing other than idly 
looking at it, and he is not particularly interested in the details of the golf tee; he is 
visually focused on the tee and just picking it up with no other inner experience at the 
moment of the beep. In Tournament Sample T.3, Caleb was on the 5*'’ hole watching 
Chris tee up his ball and address it. At the moment o f the beep, Caleb has no inner 
experience other than just watching what Chris is doing. He is not particularly focused on 
the details o f what he is looking at; he is just idly watching Chris. Thus there is not much 
inner experience at the moment of the beep, he is just passively focusing in what is 
visually present.
Active Perceptual Awareness: Goal-Directed Looking
In Sample 2.5, Caleb experienced the type of perceptual awareness that involved 
actively concentrating on what he was looking at as a function of the task he was doing. 
Leading up to the moment of the beep in this sample, Caleb is taking inventory of spare 
sprinkler parts. At the moment of the beep, he is looking at parts and noticing he has only 
two riser caps. This is a mental process of recognizing that he has only two parts as a 
function of looking at the parts, which incidentally means he needs to buy more (although
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the latter is not in his awareness at that moment). In Sample 2.7, Caleb was cleaning rust 
off of his gate prior to the moment o f the beep. At the moment of the beep, Caleb is 
visually inspecting the top horizontal crossbar of the gate to check the gate for rust. This 
is a visual inspection process Caleb was doing to figure out which part of the gate he 
would later sand; this process occurs with no other simultaneous inner experience.
Whether they were active or passive experiences, Caleb’s perceptual awareness 
experiences were matter-of-fact visual experiences. His perceptual awareness experiences 
were often related to the tasks he was doing, but they lacked the richness and depth of 
experience he had with other irmer experiences (with the exception of two just doing and 
one just listening experiences). Caleb experienced his perceptual awareness as not having 
much inner experience at the moment of the beep other than passive visual experience or 
active visual experience related to a task at hand.
Sensory Awareness
In 9 of 24 or 38% of Caleb’s samples, he had sensory awareness experiences. He 
experienced two different types o f sensory awareness. Caleb had sensory awareness 
experiences that involved bodily sensation (6 of 9) and also visual sensory experiences (3 
of 9). Bodily sensory awareness instances involved experiences of internal physical 
sensations. Visual sensory awareness involved being absorbed in the sensory qualities of 
external visual stimuli.
Caleb experienced visual sensory awareness in Sample 2.1, where he was getting 
ready to take an Aspirin pill. At the moment of the beep, Caleb is paying particular 
attention to the yellowness of the pill. He is particularly immersed in the intense mustard 
yellow color o f the pill, being impressed by its shade of yellowness. Caleb experienced
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one instance o f external sensory awareness during golf. During Tournament Sample T.6, 
Caleb was on the 11* hole. He had picked up his ball and marked it; now he was reaching 
down to pick up the ball mark on the green and replace the ball. At the moment of the 
beep, Caleb is paying attention to the brightness of the metallic coin, the reflection of the 
sun shining on the coin. Caleb is absorbed in the brightness of the coin and experiencing 
a mild sense o f aesthetic satisfaction with the brightness of the coin he is seeing. This 
satisfaction is part of the experience of being absorbed in the brightness o f the coin.
Caleb experienced bodily sensory awareness during Sample 2.4. At the moment of 
the beep, Caleb is experiencing stiffness, soreness, and tingling in his right hand. The 
stiffness and soreness are equally prominent in his experience, and the tingling is less 
prominent by comparison. These painful sensations are mild in intensity at the moment.
In addition to this, Caleb is sorting out whether these pains are due to carpal tunnel 
syndrome, arthritis, or a cut on his finger, and Caleb is considering consulting his 
physician. This is a mental process that occurs without any words present in his 
experience. The mental process is more prominent than the stiffness and soreness. Caleb 
also experienced an instance o f bodily sensory awareness during golf. In Tournament 
Sample T.7, Caleb had finished his third stroke on the 14* hole. At the moment o f the 
beep, Caleb is feeling weak from the heat and saying to himself “it's getting steamy” in 
his own normal voice. His inner speech is the most prominent of the experiences at the 
moment of the beep. At the same time, however, Caleb is feeling weak, which is 
experienced as tiredness felt mostly in his arms. He may also have a slight headache as 
part o f the weakness experience at the moment of the beep. Caleb was sure he was hot, 
and had been attending to this as a very constant bodily experience around this time, but
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he is not attending to it at the moment of the beep. At the moment o f the beep, Caleb is 
saying “it’s getting steamy” internally and feeling weakness in his arms.
Caleb’s sensory awareness experiences had much more personal conscious 
involvement, richness, and depth than his perceptual awareness experiences. His sensory 
awareness experiences involved being absorbed or immersed in the qualities o f external 
visual phenomena or the qualities of personal internal physical sensations such stiffness, 
soreness, tingling, and weakness.
Unsymbolized Thinking 
In 5 o f 24 or 21% of Caleb’s samples, he had unsymbolized thinking experiences.
In Sample 2.2 for instance, Caleb had been aware that the beeper had not gone off in a 
while leading up to the moment of the beep. At the moment of the beep, Caleb was 
wondering if the beeper was turned off. This was a mental process without words. This 
process was the most prominent part o f his awareness. In addition to this, Caleb was 
checking the beeper in his pocket to see if it was turned off, which is a simple physical 
action that he is doing at the moment of the beep. The wondering experience is directly 
related to the physical doing process at the moment o f the beep.
In Sample 2.6, Caleb had a feeling and an unsymbolized thinking experience. At the 
moment o f the beep, Caleb was in his garage retrieving a piece of wire that has dropped 
on the floor while retrieving a can of naval jelly. In addition to this action, Caleb is 
feeling mildly irritated and frustrated at the fact of having to get in an awkward position 
to perform this action at the moment of the beep. This irritation/frustration is experienced 
to be an emotional process that takes place in his head. Finally, Caleb is experiencing an 
unclear mental awareness that the activity he is doing, picking up the piece o f wire he
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dropped, is not directly related to his overall goal o f fixing his sprinklers. This mental 
process occurs without words at the moment of the beep. These two experiences are both 
equally prominent at the moment o f the beep.
Caleb’s unsymbolized thinking often co-occurred with other forms of inner 
experience. In 4 o f 5 o f his unsymbolized thinking experiences, there were co-occurring 
inner experiences such as sensory awareness, feeling, or just doing a task.
Inner Speech
In 3 o f 24 or 13% of Caleb’s samples, he had inner speech experiences. For example, 
in Sample 3.5 Caleb was walking down the hall to get his sampling notebook. At the 
moment of the beep, Caleb is rehearsing what he is going to write for the prior beep. He 
is saying the phrase “reaching for a loaf o f bread” in his own normal voice. This is a 
clear, unambiguous inner experience. Also at the moment of the beep, Caleb is walking 
down the hall and feeling the coldness and hardness of the tile floor, which feels good, 
but Caleb is not entirely certain that this sensory awareness is in his awareness at the 
moment of the beep. He thinks it more likely than not that it is remotely in his awareness, 
a much less prominent experience than his inner speech. Caleb is walking at a faster pace 
than normal, but he not entirely certain about whether or not this faster pace is in his 
awareness at the moment of the beep. He thinks it is more likely his fast walking pace is 
not part of his conscious awareness of it at the moment of the beep. Caleb also 
experienced irmer speech during golf. In Tournament Sample T.7, which was described 
earlier, Caleb is saying “it’s getting steamy” internally in his own normal voice and 
feeling weakness in his arms at the moment of the beep.
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Caleb’s inner speech experiences involved words internally said in his own normal 
voice. Two of his three inner speech experiences co-occurred with other forms o f inner 
experience, and all three were clear inner experiences. Caleb may have experienced a 
fourth inner speech experience during Tournament Sample T.5, but he was not exactly 
sure if  words were present, as we shall see.
Feeling
In 2 o f 24 or 8% of Caleb’s samples, he experienced feelings. In the previously- 
described Sample 2.6, Caleb had a feeling o f irritation/frustration along with an 
unsymbolized thinking experience at the moment of the beep. In Tournament Sample 
T.5, Caleb had a partially unclear multiple awareness that involved a very unclear inner 
mental experience, a clear anxiety feeling, and looking at the moment o f the beep. In this 
sample, Caleb was riding from the 9* green to the 10* tee with Chris. At the moment of 
the beep, Caleb is wondering if his beeper is working. This seems to be a mental process 
o f some kind. It is not entirely apparent whether this is a pure mental process without 
words or inner seeing or if  Caleb has words related to it. If there were words, Caleb 
thinks he is saying to something to himself in his own normal voice with words like “1 
hope this device is plugged in and working. I’d hate to be messing up this experiment.” 
Caleb is not sure of the exact words, so the actual words may be different from these but 
with the same meaning. This is the most prominent o f Caleb’s inner experiences. Also at 
the moment of the beep, Caleb is experiencing an anxious feeling related to whether his 
beeper is working. He is not aware of any bodily experience o f anxiety. This anxiety is 
more of a mental experience related to but separate from the wondering process that may 
or may not have been in words. Finally, Caleb is also looking at the color codes on the tee
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markers to identify which one is his at the moment of the beep, but this is a less 
prominent aspect of his inner experience. He is just looking for his tees, which were red. 
This is a multiple awareness experience that has a very unclear inner mental experience 
with or without words, a clear anxiety feeling, and a looking at the moment o f the beep.
Both of Caleb’s feelings co-occurred with mental experiences. His feelings also had 
much more personal conscious involvement, richest, and depth than his perceptual 
awareness experiences.
Inner Experience During Golf
Caleb experienced perceptual awareness in 4 of 9 or 44% of his golf tournament 
samples. For comparison, perceptual awareness occurred in 5 o f 15 or 33% of his non­
golf samples. O f his perceptual awareness experiences during golf, two were passive 
(instances o f idly looking) and three were active (looking as a function o f a task) 
experiences.
Caleb’s two passive perceptual awareness experiences were Tournament Samples T.2 
and T.3, described earlier. In Tournament Sample T.2, Caleb is idly looking at the tee and 
picking it up no awareness of the task he is doing and without interest in the details of the 
golf tee. In Tournament Sample T.3, Caleb is idly watching Chris tee up his ball and 
address it with no inner experience other than just watching what Chris is doing.
Caleb experienced three instances of active perceptual awareness. As an example of 
these, in Tournament Sample T .l, Caleb had just finished his first shot o f the day. He was 
putting his golf club back into his bag. At the moment o f the beep, Caleb is looking in his 
bag to try and locate the place where the club belongs. He is paying visual attention to the 
bag for the purpose of finding the place where his club belongs. At the moment o f the
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beep, he has not yet found it but is in the process of visually finding it. This is an active 
visual perceptual activity. In Tournament Sample T.4, Caleb was on the 7* hole and 
watching Chris tee up. He has started looking at the group ahead of them to see if  they 
are out of Chris’s range. At the moment o f the beep, Caleb is looking at the group ahead 
of them and in the process o f making a perceptual judgment about whether or not they are 
out of Chris’s range. He has not arrived at an actual judgment about whether or not they 
are out of range, rather he is in the active process of making the judgment to see if  they 
are far enough out o f Chris’s range for Chris to safely hit the ball.
Caleb had two sensory awareness experiences during the golf tournament (22% of his 
golf tournament samples). In Tournament Sample T.6, Caleb experienced visual sensory 
awareness. He is paying attention to the brightness of his metallic coin; he is absorbed in 
its brightness and experiencing a mild sense o f aesthetic satisfaction. In Tournament 
Sample T.7, also described earlier, Caleb is experiencing a bodily sensory awareness 
along with inner speech as he is feeling weakness in his arms from the heat and saying to 
himself “it’s getting steamy” in his own voice.
Caleb had several other irmer experiences once each during the golf tournament 
including an irmer speech, an unsymbolized thinking, a feeling, a just doing experience, 
and a multiple awareness experience. In 5 of 9 or 56% of his inner experience during the 
golf tournament, Caleb’s inner experience was related to golf in content. In all but one of 
these instances, Caleb experienced perceptual awareness related to golf as he was looking 
either passively or actively at objects related to golf. His perceptual awareness 
experiences during golf were mostly matter-of-fact visual experiences lacking the richest, 
depth, and personal conscious involvement that was apparent in his sensory awareness.
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inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, a feeling experiences. His just doing experience 
was much more matter-of-fact, similar to his perceptual awareness experiences. 
Golf-Related Content
O f Caleb’s Tournament Samples collected during golf performance, 5 of 9 or 56% 
were related to golf in content. Examples of golf related content include paying visual 
attention to finding the place where his golf club belongs by looking in his bag, focusing 
visually on his tee while just picking it up, just passively watching what another golfer is 
doing, looking at the group ahead in the process of making a perceptual judgment about 
whether they are out of range, deciding as unsymbolized thinking about whether to hit the 
ball over the water with a safer eight- or riskier nine-iron to the green.
Comparing Inner Experience During Golf and Daily Life
Caleb’s inner experiences from his golf samples were similar to his daily life samples 
with respect to six forms of inner experience; these forms were perceptual awareness, 
inner speech, feeling, just doing, and multiple awareness. His inner experiences from his 
golf samples were different from his daily life samples with respect to two forms o f inner 
experience; these were sensory awareness and unsymbolized thinking.
Caleb experienced a similar amount of perceptual awareness during his golf samples 
(4 of 9 or 44%) as he did during his daily samples (5 o f 15 or 33%). He also had a similar 
amount of inner speech during golf (1 of 9 or 11%) as he did during his golf samples (2 
of 15 or 13%). Caleb had a similar amount of feelings, just doing, and multiple awareness 
during his daily samples (1 of 9 or 11 % for each of these three) as he did during his golf 
samples as well (1 o f 15 or 7% for each of these three).
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Caleb experienced less than half as many instances of sensory awareness during his 
golf samples (2 of 9 or 22%) as he had during his daily samples (7 o f 15 or 47%). Caleb 
also had less than half as many instances of unsymbolized thinking during his golf 
samples (1 o f 9 or 11%) as he had during his daily samples (4 of 15 or 27%).
Caleb’s inner experiences during golf compared with his daily life were similar with 
respect to the amount o f perceptual awareness, inner speech, feeling, just doing, and 
multiple awareness he had. His inner experiences were different during golf compared 
with his daily life with respect to sensory awareness and unsymbolized thinking. Caleb 
experienced about a decrease in sensory awareness and unsymbolized thinking during 
golf. Thus Caleb’s irmer experience during golf was mostly similar to his irmer 
experience during his daily life.
Discussion
Caleb was surprised that most of his samples were task specific and did not include 
much o f what he considered inner experience. His inner phenomena were often matter- 
of-fact occurrences that lacked the richness and depth that he expected to find. Whether 
they were active or passive experiences, for instance, Caleb’s perceptual awareness 
experiences were typically matter-of-fact visual experiences often related to the tasks he 
was doing, but lacking the richness and depth of experience he had with other inner 
experiences such as sensory awareness. Caleb experienced his perceptual awareness as 
not having much inner experience at the moment of the beep other than passive visual 
experience or as active visual experience related to a task at hand. His unsymbolized 
thinking, inner speech, and especially his just doing experiences also lacked the depth 
and richness he expected to find.
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Caleb’s feelings and sensory awareness experiences had more depth and richness than 
his perceptual awareness, unsymbolized thinking, inner speech, and just doing 
experiences. His feelings had more depth and richness, and in addition to this, his sensory 
awareness experiences also had more personal conscious involvement as he was absorbed 
or immersed the external visual phenomena or internal physical sensations.
Caleb’s inner experience during golf also contained a high frequency of perceptual 
awareness (44%), of both passive and active forms. He also had 2 sensory awareness 
experiences during the golf tournament (22% of his golf samples). He had one instance of 
each of the following during golf: inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, feeling, just 
doing experience, and multiple awareness. In 5 of 9 or 56% of his inner experience 
during the golf tournament, Caleb’s inner experience was related to golf in content. In all 
but one of these instances, Caleb experienced perceptual awareness related to golf, 
looking at objects related to golf either passively or actively.
Only about half o f Caleb’s inner experiences during golf had golf-related content. 
Caleb’s golf irmer experiences were similar to that of his daily life with respect to the 
amount of perceptual awareness, irmer speech, feeling, just doing, and multiple 
awareness he had. His golf inner experiences were different from his daily life with 
respect to his decrease sensory awareness and unsymbolized thinking during golf.
Caleb’s golf irmer experience was mostly similar that o f his daily life.
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CHAPTER 9 
SAMUEL
Samuel is a 43 year-old moderately-skilled golfer with a handicap of 18. He was 
recruited by a contact of one of the researchers. He completed his first three sampling 
days by obtaining 15 samples from his daily life either at work or at home. He collected 
his daily life samples at the end of the spring. He participated in the golf competition 
sampling in the middle of the same summer and collected 9 golf samples. Samuel shot a 
92, which is 20 over par, 2 strokes higher than his handicap of 18. As a result, Samuel 
finished 7* in the golf competition.
Perceptual Awareness
In 9 of 24 samples, or 38%, Samuel experienced perceptual awareness at the moment 
o f the beep. Samuel experienced two different kinds of perceptual awareness. In some of 
Samuel’s samples, he was not doing much other than looking at something at the moment 
o f the beep. In these instances he had much less concentration on what he was looking at, 
he was just idly looking without doing much else. In other samples, he was concentrating 
on what he was looking at right at the moment of the beep. This typically served the task 
he was doing or a task he was preparing to do.
Idly Looking
In Sample 2.2, for instance, Samuel was not doing much but looking. Samuel had just 
clicked the mouse key and a blank window had come up on his computer. At the moment
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of the beep, Samuel is looking at the window that had come up, which is blank. He may 
also be waiting for something to come up in the blank window and expecting it to be 
filled, but if he is, this is a very faint, matter-of-fact experience that is much less 
prominent than his experience of just looking at the blank window. At the moment of the 
beep, this a basic visual task experienced as idly looking, along with a possible waiting 
experience.
In Sample 3.2, Samuel was also not doing much but looking. Samuel had been 
watching a TV show, and his attention became drawn to his wife's face. At the moment 
of the beep, he is seeing her face in the periphery of his vision on the right side. His 
attention is drawn to her face and the TV show has disappeared from his awareness. She 
is closer to him than he was previously aware, although this is not part o f his experience. 
This is a simple visual experience since Samuel is just looking at his wife's face using his 
peripheral vision without any other inner experience.
One of Samuel’s experiences of not doing much but looking came during the golf 
tournament. In Tournament T .l, Samuel was on the first hole addressing the ball in 
preparation for his first shot. He has set the ball on the tee and has the club in his right 
hand. He has just begun to put both hands on the club. At the moment o f the beep, 
Samuel is looking at the ball without attention to anything else and without attention to 
any particular details about the ball. He is not aware of the fact that he is preparing to hit 
the ball or thinking about anything else.
Goal-Directed Looking
In Sample 2.3, Samuel experienced the other type o f perceptual awareness, which 
was concentrating on what he was looking at as a function of the task he was doing.
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Samuel had been part o f a telephone conference call leading up to the moment of the 
beep and using his computer. At the moment of the beep, he is looking at a tab on the 
computer to bring up a particular program. He is looking at the box in the bottom right 
hand comer o f screen, and looking specifically at the choice on a list of boxes called 
“ideas.” He is seeing the box as a target to click and is focused mostly on the box. This is 
an experience of performing a skilled visual task. The voice from the conference call is in 
his awareness, but very much in the background. He is hearing the voice that is speaking, 
but is not listening at all to the details of what is being said.
Two of Samuel’s perceptual awareness experiences that involved concentrating on 
what he was looking at as a function of a task occurred during the golf tournament. In 
Tournament Sample T.2, Samuel was on the second hole. He was crouched down looking 
and reading the green to prepare for a putt. At the moment of the beep, Samuel is trying 
to visualize the path his ball will take to the hole. He is doing this at the moment by 
looking externally along a curving line. This experience has a sense of motion involved. 
He does not see the ball. This is an experience o f externally looking along a curving line 
that represents the path his ball could take to the hole. At Tournament Sample T.4,
Samuel was on the 6th hole. He was watching Mike’s putt to see which way the ball will 
break while Samuel was holding the flag. The ball was three quarters o f the way to the 
hole. At the moment o f the beep, Samuel is concentrating on the ball, watching it move to 
note its trajectory. This is a clear and simple inner experience of watching the ball to see 
where it is going to go.
All of Samuel’s perceptual awarenesses were visual. In some of these experiences, 
Samuel was not doing much other than looking at the moment of the beep. In others, he
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was concentrating more visually on the process o f doing something (or preparing to do 
something). Because the borders o f these experiences are less clear than with other forms 
o f inner experience, it is difficult to arrive at an exact number for how many times each 
o f these two different types of perceptual awareness occurred. Samuel’s not doing much 
but looking experiences did have an idle, almost passive quality to them, whereas his 
concentrating visually and doing or preparing experiences had more of an active quality 
to them.
Inner Speech
Samuel experienced inner speech in 4 o f 24 or 17% of his samples. He experienced 
one of these during his daily life samples. In Sample 3.1, Samuel was going through his 
wife’s shopping bag to find a notebook. At the moment of the beep, he is looking at a 
purple Tupperware container that had been missing that he has now found. He knows that 
it is purple, but is not caught up in the sensory aspects of the purpleness; he is more 
interested in the perceptual awareness of the Tupperware in that it is now found. Also at 
the moment of the beep, Samuel is innerly saying to himself “Oh, the purple 
Tupperware” in his own normal voice. Samuel is also aware of moving his hand by 
seeing it and feeling his hand on the Tupperware and other objects in the bag, but this is a 
less prominent part of his awareness.
Samuel experienced his other three instances o f inner speech during golf 
performance. In two of these three instances, Samuel had inner speech that was self- 
directed and negative in content. In Tournament Sample T.5, Samuel was watching the 
ball that Mike has putted. At the moment of the beep, he is berating himself for leaving a 
putt 10 feet short earlier by saying something in words. By the time o f the interview, he is
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not sure of the exact words, but they would have been something like “stupid ass” or 
“fucking idiot” or “moron.” It is not apparent to us or we think to Samuel exactly which 
words were present at the moment o f the beep; by the time of the expositional interview, 
he had forgotten which occurred exactly at the moment. This is spoken by himself to 
himself and said in his head with a scolding tone o f voice and inflection. Samuel is not 
experiencing any emotion separate from this inner speech. This is just an intense mental 
experience. Samuel also has the sense that whatever words are present are one of a 
serious of berating inner spoken words that had been ongoing leading up to the moment 
o f the beep. His inner berating is 99% prominent, and seeing the ball is about 1% o f his 
inner experience. Well before Tournament Sample T.8, Samuel had hit a bad shot 
sending it only about 8 yards. He had then felt irritated and had been berating himself 
with a series of internally spoken expletives. Then he had had stopped saying the 
expletives and had taken another shot. The result o f this shot was better, and he began 
walking to his next shot. As he was walking, he started thinking about the bad shot again. 
Now, at the moment o f the beep, Samuel is looking down at his feet and internally saying 
something like “fucking idiot” or “dumb ass” with a negative tone and inflection in his 
voice. These words are not as forceful as the previous expletives in Tournament Sample 
T.5. Samuel is not remembering the past shot, nor is he feeling irritated at the moment of 
the beep, but he is just berating himself in words at the moment of the beep. Outside the 
experience of saying internal expletives at the moment o f the beep, Samuel thinks he had 
been having an ongoing series of expletives that he has turned on and off at various 
points in time. The last two samples occurred when the expletives had been on.
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Most of Samuel’s sampled instances of inner speech were during golf performance. 
Two of his three inner speech instances during golf were self-directed berating comments 
that had being part o f ongoing series before the moment of the beep. In both of these 
instances, Samuel’s inner voice also had a negative tone, whereas his daily life inner 
speech sample had a normal tone.
Just Doing
Samuel had instances of just doing experiences in 3 of 24 or 13% of his samples. He 
experienced one of these during his daily life samples and two during golf performance. 
In Sample 1.2, Samuel was at work. He was visually scanning a list of stocks until one 
catches his eye. He was not looking for any specific stock and was not aware o f the 
scanning process. At the moment o f the beep, Samuel is still scanning. This is an 
automatic process without awareness, a skilled activity with no conscious experience. 
Samuel thinks he is prepared to be stopped if he finds the right stock. The TV is on in the 
background, but he's not listening or paying attention to it. In Sample 3.3, Samuel had 
had an inflamed sore in his mouth for which he rinses his mouth with saltwater. At the 
moment o f the beep, Samuel is swishing saltwater in his mouth. He is concentrating on 
making the water in his mouth move in a swishing motion. In addition to this, he is 
feeling a stinging sensation in the right side of his mouth that is located in his gums and 
teeth. The most prominent experience is the action of trying to make the water swish. 
Although the stinging is an intense sensation, it is secondary to the swishing effort in 
prominence.
In Tournament Sample T.3, Samuel was on his seeond shot o f the 5* hole. He had 
just hit his shot and watched where it had gone. He was leaning down to pick up his
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putter from the ground. At the moment of the beep, he is looking down and seeing his 
putter externally as well as picking up his putter. This is a simple and process o f looking 
at the putter and picking it up at the moment o f the beep. This is a clear simple inner 
experience.
Sensory Awareness
In 2 of 24 samples, or 8%, Samuel experienced sensory awareness at the moment of 
the beep. In Sample 3.3, for instance, Samuel had had a sore in his mouth for which had 
to rinse his mouth with saltwater. At the moment of the beep, Samuel is swishing 
saltwater in his mouth. He is concentrating on making the water in his mouth move in a 
swishing motion. In addition to this, he is feeling a stinging sensation in the right side of 
his mouth that is located in his gums and teeth; this is the sensory awareness portion of 
this sample. The most prominent experience is the aetion of trying to make the water 
swish, an example o f a doing experience at the moment of the beep. Although the 
stinging is an intense sensation, it is secondary to the swishing effort in prominence. In 
Sample 3.6, Samuel experienced one sensory and one perceptual awareness. At the 
moment of the beep, Samuel is washing his hands under the water to rinse the soap off. 
He is particularly interested in the temperature, noticing that it feels moderately warm. 
Also at the moment o f the beep, he is seeing the wetness and soapiness of his hands, a 
simple perceptual awareness. Samuel experienced sensory awareness twice during his 
daily life samples. In both of these, his sense o f touch was the mode through which 
Samuel experienced sensory awareness.
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Inner Experience During Golf 
Samuel played the back nine in the golf competition. He collected nine Tournament 
Samples of inner experience during golf competition. Perceptual awareness occurred in 4 
o f 9 or 44% of these samples. Samuel experienced both not doing much but looking as 
well as looking as a function of a task during golf competition. Inner speech occurred in 3 
of 9 or 33% of these samples, and 2 of these 3 were self-directed berating inner speech. 
Just doing experiences occurred in 2 of 9 or 22% of his Tournament Samples. Most of 
Samuel’s inner experiences during golf were clear, noticeably clearer than some of 
Samuel’s inner experiences collected during daily life. All o f his sampled inner 
experiences during golf included just one form of inner experience at the moment of the 
beep.
Golf-Related Content
O f the Tournament Samples collected during golf, 8 of 9 or 89% were related to golf 
in content. The only inner experience not related to golf was collected during a break 
from golfing. Examples of golf-related content include looking at the ball without 
attention to its details, externally looking along a curving line that represents the path his 
ball could take to the hole, seeing his putter externally and just picking it up, 
concentrating on the ball another golf has just hit as it moves, looking at another golfer’s 
GPS device and saying something internally like “wow, that’s cool,” watching another 
golfer address the ball and focusing visually on the place where the ball and the club 
meet, and berating himself about his golf performance with inner expletives with a 
scolding tone o f voice (two samples).
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Comparing Inner Experience During Golf and Daily Life
Samuel’s inner experiences from his golf samples were similar to his daily life 
samples with respect to just one form of inner experience; this was perceptual awareness. 
His inner experiences from his golf samples were different from his daily life samples 
with respect to three forms of inner experience; these were just doing, inner speech, and 
sensory awareness.
Samuel experienced nearly the same amount o f perceptual awareness during his golf 
samples (4 o f 9 or 44%) as he did during his daily samples (6 of 15 or 40%). Samuel had 
more just doing experiences during his golf samples (2 of 9 or 22%) than he had during 
his daily samples (1 of 15 or 7%). Samuel also had more inner speech during his golf 
samples (3 of 9 or 33%) than he had during his daily samples (1 of 15 or 7%). Samuel 
had less sensory awareness during his golf samples (0 o f 9 or 0%) than he had during his 
daily samples (2 of 15 or 13%).
Samuel’s inner experiences during golf compared with his daily life were similar with 
respect to the amount of perceptual awareness he had. His inner experiences were 
different during golf compared with his daily life with respect to just doing, inner speech, 
and sensory awareness.
Discussion
Perceptual awareness was Samuel’s most frequent inner experience in his daily 
life and golf tournament samples. Samuel experienced two kinds of perceptual awareness 
-  not doing much but looking and looking as a function of a task. The former were 
passive experiences with not much attention and interest in the visual stimuli, whereas the 
latter were active experiences with much more attention and interest in the visual stimuli
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and the task at hand. Samuel’s next most frequent inner experience was inner speech. 
Samuel experienced two inner speech instances where the content o f what he was saying 
and his tone of voice were both normal and benign. He experienced two self-berating 
inner speech experiences than were negative in content and tone o f voice. Samuel also 
had three just doing experiences, in which he was just doing a task at the moment o f the 
beep with no awareness o f thinking about it at the moment o f the beep. He had two 
sensory awareness experiences, both o f which involved his sense o f touch. Samuel’s most 
frequent inner experience during golf competition was perceptual awareness, and nearly 
all of his golf competition inner experiences were related to golf in content. Samuel’s had 
about the same amount o f perceptual awareness during golf as he had in his daily life, but 
he had more just doing and inner speech inner experiences and less sensory awareness 
during golf than in his daily life.
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CHAPTER 10 
WILL
Will is a 30 year-old moderately-skilled golfer with a handicap of 26. He was 
recruited by one o f the researchers. He completed his first two sampling days by 
obtaining 11 samples from his daily life at work. He collected his daily life samples at the 
end of the summer. He participated in the golf competition sampling in the middle of the 
fall and collected 11 golf samples. Will shot 106, 34 strokes over par, 8 strokes higher 
than his handicap o f 26. As a result, Will finished 9'̂  in the golf competition.
Feeling
Will experienced feelings in 9 of 22 or 41% of his samples. During Sample 2.3, for 
instance. Will was at work researching fantasy football leagues and feeling relaxed and 
bored. At the moment of the beep. Will is feeling mildly relaxed and bored. This is 
experienced mentally and not physically, and as one feeling o f relaxation and boredom. 
Also at the moment of the beep. Will is thinking about what to do after work; this may 
occur to him as an inner seeing, but he is not sure because the details o f this inner seeing 
are very ambiguous. Will is not sure if he is innerly seeing himself doing a chore or 
errand, himself working out, or himself watching TV, but he thinks he sees himself in the 
inner scene. It is not apparent from what perspective he is involved in the inner seeing, 
whether he is seeing himself as if  from a third person perspective or whether he sees 
objects in the inner seeing from the first person perspective. He thinks this inner seeing is
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in motion and color. He also thinks he had been having several inner seeings near the 
moment of the beep but is only seeing one at the moment of the beep. This is a fairly 
elear feeling of relaxation and boredom with an unclear inner experience that might be an 
inner seeing at the moment o f the beep. (Researching fantasy football is not in W ill’s 
conscious experience at the moment of the beep.)
In Sample 2.5, Will experienced another feeling and a simultaneous inner seeing.
Will is in his office preparing for a meeting at work. At the moment of the beep. Will is 
thinking about the best way to summarize the project. This is experienced as an inner 
seeing of the meeting in progress. Will sees people around a table in motion in some of 
the same colors that are in this meeting room in reality. He sees different people wearing 
different clothes with different hair colors; for example, he sees a woman with blonde 
hair, a woman with black hair, a man with black hair, and others. Also at the moment of 
the beep. Will is experiencing a positive feeling of being occupied. This is experienced as 
an overall feeling o f bodily contentment. Will’s inner experience at the moment o f the 
beep consists of a clear and differentiated visual and a rather clear internal emotional 
experience.
Will experienced feelings of bodily frustration, happiness and amusement, bodily 
energized satisfaction, mental excited confident optimism, intense mental satisfaction, 
mildly mental relaxation and boredom, overall bodily contentment, bodily over­
stimulation (like having too much adrenalin), and mental frustration. Five o f 9 or 56% of 
these were positive feelings (e.g., happiness, satisfaction), 3 o f 9 or 33% were negative 
feelings (e.g., frustration), and 1 of 9 or 11% was mixed (relaxation and boredom). Will 
experienced 4 of 9 or 44% of these feelings bodily, the same number mentally, and one
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was not experienced as having a location. In 7 of 9 or 78% of Will’s feeling experiences, 
co-occurring inner experiences were also present at the moment o f the beep. These 
included inner speech, inner seeing, inner hearing, unsymbolized thinking, and doing 
with awareness. O f his feelings, 4 o f 9 or 44% were experienced in his body, 5 of 9 or 
56% were experienced as mental, and 2 of 9 or 22% he was did not apprehend enough 
detail to know if  they were experienced in his body or as mental.
Inner Seeing
Will experienced inner seeing in 8 o f his 22 or 36% of his samples. During the 
previous Samples 2.3 and 2.5 described in the Feeling section. Will had an inner seeing 
with a simultaneous feeling present at the moment of the beep. In Sample 2.2, he 
experienced inner seeing with no other simultaneous inner experience. During this 
sample. Will had been working on a report at work when somebody distracted him by 
giving him a birthday card to sign for his friend Tom. At the moment of the beep. Will is 
thinking about writing something personal in the birthday card. This thought process 
involves multiple inner seeings o f Tom. In one o f these, he is seeing Tom playing golf. 
This is a clear inner seeing of Tom golfing on a green golf course on a sunny day with 
three other people. This inner seeing has bright colors and vivid details. Will thinks this 
inner seeing may be a memory o f having seen Tom golf because he knows he had seen 
this before, although this knowledge comes to him well after the beep. Also at the 
moment of the beep. Will is simultaneously experiencing an inner seeing of people in an 
office at work joking around. He is seeing people, including Tom, talking and laughing in 
more dull colors and much less vivid detail than his other co-occurring inner seeing.
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Will’s golf inner seeing is more prominent in his experience at the moment of the beep 
than the office inner seeing.
In Tournament Sample T.4, Will experienced an inner seeing with no co-occurring 
inner experience. He was on the stroke of the hole, and he previously had hit a 
poor tee shot. He had had a series o f inner seeings in which he was seeing the negative 
aspects of the course before the moment o f the beep. At the moment o f the beep. Will is 
preoccupied with an inner seeing specifically about the green of the course. He is seeing 
at the moment of the beep a slow, wet, thick, soft, green with long grass. This a elear 
inner seeing o f the grass on the green, a clear and vivid inner seeing he is seeing as if he 
is standing and looking down at the green.
Will’s inner seeings were typically detailed and differentiated experiences. In 5 o f 8 
or 63% of his inner seeings. Will apprehended the details of these inner experiences, and 
in all these instances, he made distinctions between different aspects within the inner 
seeing (e.g., color versus black and white, motion versus static), and he also made 
distinctions among co-occurring but separate inner experiences (e.g., feeling, inner 
speech). In 4 o f 8 or half o f Will’s inner seeings. Will had co-occurring inner 
experiences, 3 of which were eo-occurring feelings, and 1 o f which was co-occurring 
inner speech.
Inner Experience During Golf 
Will experienced inner speech during 7 of his 11 golf samples (64%). He had inner 
seeings in 4 o f his 11 golf samples (36%), feelings in 2 of his 11 samples (18%), and I 
instance of inner hearing (8%). He had golf-related content in his inner experience in 9 of 
11 of his inner experiences during golf competition (82%). Will’s inner experience
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during golf will be described including his inner speech, inner seeing, and feelings. This 
will be followed by a description o f his golf-related content. Finally, comparison of 
W ill’s inner experience during golf and daily life will be conducted.
Inner Speech
All o f Will’s instances of inner speech occurred during the golf competition. He 
experienced inner speech in 7 of 11 or 64% of his golf samples, and 0 o f 11 or 0% of his 
non-golf samples. During Tournament Sample T.2, for instance. Will was on the 2"‘‘ 
stroke of the 2"̂  hole. He had just taken his 2"*̂  stroke and could not take a full backswing 
because he was right next to a tree. At the moment o f the beep. Will is saying to himself 
internally “tree’s in the way.” This is said in his own normal voice. (Will thinks this 
inner spoken phrase was a way to minimize his frustration.) Also at the moment o f the 
beep, but less prominent than his inner speech. Will is feeling mental frustration, 
experienced as felt in his head. This is a negative feeling that is certainly mental, but it is 
not apparent to us or Will, we think, exactly how this feeling takes place. He may be 
experiencing the feeling as a lack o f mental clarity, a mental jumbledness, a feeling 
experienced as closer to a thought and/or somehow experienced as located in his head; 
this is a less prominent inner experience than his inner speech, so it is difficult for Will to 
determine if this menfal frustrations is experienced as a lack of mental clarity and mental 
jumbledness at the moment of the beep. Thus Will is experiencing golf-related inner 
speech and a less prominent feeling of negative mental frustration that is certainly a 
feeling, certainly negative, and possibly felt as a lack of mental clarity and mental 
jumbledness.
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In Tournament Sample T.5, Will was on the 5'*’ stroke of the 6* hole. He had just 
finished chipping onto the green from directly behind a tree. He was walking to the green 
and starting to relax, feeling less frustrated. At the moment of the beep, Will is thinking 
that there were not enough options for hitting because o f the tree. This is experienced as 
saying “not enough options for a good shot” or “not enough good options” or “not 
enough options;” he does not remember if the word “good” was part of the inner 
experience at the moment of the beep because he did not write it down right after the 
beep, but he does remember the words “not enough” and “options” were present. Will 
was not experiencing a feeling or any other inner experience in his conscious experience 
at the moment o f the beep. Will thought that he was having an ongoing dialogue in inner 
speech about this shot before the moment of the beep as well.
In Tournament Sample T.9, Will was on the 7**' stroke of the 14**’ hole. Will had just 
finished putting and was feeling fatigued physically and mentally, but also more relaxed 
and was not caring as much about the result of his swings. At the moment o f the beep. 
Will is saying to himself internally “I’m ready to quit” for the day, said in a fatigued and 
slower manner than normal. The phrase means he is happy with how much he has played, 
does not need to play any more, and he could quit right now. The thought that he could 
quit is partially separate from the inner spoken phrase at the moment of the beep, but it is 
not exactly clear how it is separate from the inner speech experience. He is not 
experiencing fatigue at the moment o f the beep as he had been before the moment.
Inner Seeing
Will’s had inner seeing in 4 of 11 or 36% o f his golf samples. In Sample T .l, for 
instance. Will was on the 4‘*’ stroke o f the hole. He was waiting to putt and feeling
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nervous, jittery, and disoriented. He was also thinking about how slow the speed o f the 
green was and how he will need to adjust to this. Will had difficulty sorting out exactly 
what was in his inner experience and what was not when the beep occurred. At the 
moment of the beep. Will is certain he is imagining the sound the putter will make when 
he hits the ball. He experiences this as innerly hearing the clicking sound the putter will 
need to make to hit the ball hard enough. Will is much less certain about other things that 
may be in his inner experience. For instance, he may also be experiencing a kinesthetic 
imagined feeling in his hands also at the moment o f the beep, but he is not sure about 
whether this is also present at the moment of the beep. Will may also be experiencing 
something related to how hard he should hit the ball, but he was very uncertain about this 
and lacked details to describe whether this was present at the moment. Will is certain 
about his inner hearing of the clicking putter, but any o f these others processes may or 
may not have been in his inner experience. To speculate. Will may be uncertain about the 
presence or absence of other inner experiences because they were less prominent than his 
inner hearing, or they may have occurred before or after the beep, leading to uncertainty 
about their relation to the moment of the beep, or both o f these options. Will had felt 
nervous, jittery, and disoriented before the moment of the beep, but none o f these feelings 
are present at the moment of the beep.
Feelings
Will experienced feelings in 2 of 11 or 18% of his golf samples, and 7 o f 11 or 64% 
of his non-golf samples. During Tournament Sample T.2 for instance, which was 
discussed in the previous Inner Speech subsection. Will experienced a negative feeling of 
mental frustration, which was less prominent than his co-occurring golf-related inner
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speech. During Tournament Sample T.3, Will experienced another negative feeling with 
co-oeeurring inner speech. Will was on the 5'^ stroke of the 2"^ hole. His group had just 
finished the 2"  ̂hole, and he was sitting in the golf cart. Will had been feeling like he had 
too much energy, and leading up to the moment of the beep, he was having an inner 
dialogue about why he had too much energy and not enough focus. At the moment of the 
beep. Will is thinking about how he feels by saying internally to himself the words “too 
much adrenalin,” a clearly spoken inner phrase. Also at the moment o f the beep. Will is 
experiencing the feeling o f the too much adrenalin and energy. This is a feeling that he 
experiences throughout his whole body, but more so in his head. Also at the moment of 
the beep, Will’s body was hot, but he is not experiencing this in his consciousness at the 
moment of the beep.
Both of W ill’s feelings during golf were negative feelings with co-occurring inner 
speech. Thus 2 of 2 or 100% of his feelings during golf were negative, whereas 5 of 7 or 
71% his feelings during his daily life were positive, and 1 of 7 or 14% was mixed. The 
content o f one of these was external, a tree being in the way, and the other was internal, 
feeling too much adrenalin and energy.
Golf-Related Content
Nine of 11 or 82% of W ill’s Tournament Samples contained golf-related content. 
Examples o f golf-related content include internally hearing the sound the putter will 
make when he hits the ball, internally saying to himself something to himself like “tree’s 
in the way” and simultaneously feeling mental frustration felt in his head, internally 
seeing a slow, wet, thick, soft, green with long grass, internally saying a phrase about 
how there were not enough options for a good shot, internally saying “disjointed” to
184
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
himself and simultaneously internally seeing the parts of his disjointed swing, internally 
seeing what his final score would be if  he shot 7 on every hole by seeing “ 18 x 7” in 
black, internally saying “better” about the green conditions, saying to himself internally 
“I'm ready to quit” for the day in a fatigued manner, and remembering the best par 5 he 
ever played by internally seeing the ball flying toward the hole from the side as if it is on 
TV.
Comparing Inner Experience During Golf and Daily Life
The most salient feature of W ill’s inner experience during golf was inner speech. He 
had seven instances of inner speech during his golf samples and none during his daily 
samples, as was noted previously in the Inner Speech section. He had inner speech in 7 of 
11 or 64% of his golf samples and none during his daily samples. Five o f 7 or 71% of his 
inner speech during golf contained golf-related content.
The most salient feature of W ill’s inner experience during daily life was feeling. Will 
had fewer feelings during golf than daily life. He had feelings in 2 o f 11 or 18% of his 
golf samples and 7 of 11 or 64% of his daily samples. One of 2 or 50% of his feelings 
during golf contained golf-related content. Both o f Will’s feelings during golf were 
negative feelings with co-occurring inner speech. Two of 2 or 100% of his feelings 
during golf were negative, whereas 5 o f 7 or 71% his feelings during his daily life were 
positive, as mentioned in the previous Feeling subsection.
One of the other salient features of W ill’s inner experience during both golf and daily 
life was inner seeing. Will experienced the same amount of inner seeing in his golf 
samples as his daily samples (36%). All four or 100% of his inner seeings during golf 
contained golf-related content. Another salient feature of his inner experience was clarity.
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As noted previously in the Clarity subsection. Will had inner experienees that were 
unclear in different ways during golf and daily life. During golf he had two unclear inner 
experiences, and during his daily life he had two unclear indeterminate inner experiences.
Discussion
Will’s golf and daily life inner experiences were typically fairly clear and detailed. 
Will’s most salient inner experience during golf was golf-related inner speech. He also 
had salient golf-related inner seeings and feelings during golf.
During the golf competition, Will experienced seven instances o f inner speech and 
inner seeing. He also experieneed two feelings and an inner hearing. Most o f his golf 
competition samples contained golf-related content. His golf samples were similar to his 
daily life with respect to the amount of inner seeing he experienced. His golf samples 
were different from his daily samples with respect to the amount of inner speech and 
feelings he experienced. His golf samples had a more inner speech and fewer feelings.
The feelings Will did have during golf were both negative feelings with co-occurring 
inner speech. In contrast, 5 o f 7 or 71% his feelings during his daily life were positive.
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CHAPTER 11 
TOM
Tom was a 19 year-old intercollegiate golfer with a handicap of two. He was 
recmited from a friend o f one of the researchers from the community. Tom participated 
in the study during the summer, and he was practicing golf regularly during this time. He 
chose to sample for his first two days during golf practice instead of other life activities 
so he could see what his inner experience was like during golf, and because it worked 
best with his summer schedule. For the purpose o f this study, we will refer to golf 
practice such as this with the term recreational golf from this point forward (More on this 
in the nomothetic Chapter 16). Tom collected 12 samples during these two days.
On the third and final sampling day, Tom chose to wear the beeper during a two- 
versus-two competition with his friends the day before a college tournament. He 
requested that he be allowed to do this instead o f competing in the golf tournament 
designed for the study because he thought he would take the task more seriously, and 
because he thought it would be a more realistic approximation of how he is in natural 
competitions. Although Tom’s team of two was in the lead for most o f the competition, 
they lost after their opponents overcame their lead on the 18"’ hole. During Tom’s golf 
competition, he shot 70, 2 strokes under par, which is 4 strokes lower than his handicap 
of 2. Tom’s individual score was the 2”" best score in this study. He collected six golf 
samples.
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Inner Seeing
In 56%, or 10 of his 18 samples, Tom had inner seeing. These experiences were 
typically very clear and differentiated. Most were golf-related in content as well. Tom’s 
inner seeing typically co-occurred along with other forms of inner experience (e.g., inner 
speech, sensory awareness).
Tom had three samples in which inner seeing co-occurred simultaneously with inner 
speech at the moment of the beep. Sample 1.6, as an example, occurred on the first 
sampling day while Tom was practicing golf. Tom had just hit a “bad” tee shot. His 
coach had previously given him a “Nine Step Rule” to deal with anger, which consists of 
allowing oneself to experience angry while walking. For nine paces, he can experience 
anger, but by the tenth he must move on. At the moment of the beep, Tom is irmerly 
seeing the number “6” in large black font with a small caption above it with the word 
“six.” Tom is also counting to six and is saying the number “6” to himself internally in 
his own normal voice at the moment of the beep.
Another example of an inner seeing with inner speech. Sample 2.6, occurred when 
Tom was finished with golf practice on the second sampling day. Tom was pulling out of 
the parking lot on his way home when he saw his friend Joe, with whom he has an 
intense, but friendly, disagreement about the quality of a restaurant, El Bravo. Tom 
believes that El Bravo has the best green salsa, but his friend does not. At the moment of 
the beep, Tom is experiencing an inner seeing of himself as if  he is sitting at the bar. He 
sees his arm and hand as if  they are viewed from his own eyes. Tom is reliving the taste 
and crunchiness of the chips and salsa along with the inner seeing of himself. Also at the 
moment of the beep, in his imagination, Tom is saying to Joe “you're a real idiot” in his
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own voice. This was a clear, detailed, and differentiated inner experience not related to 
golf, but his inner seeing and inner speech are related in content.
Tom had several inner seeings that occurred simultaneously with a related sensory 
awareness. For instance with Sample 1.3, Tom was practicing golf and was on the 
hole. His goal was to hit the ball over the water. He was taking a practice swing with his 
left hand and his eyes were shut. At the moment of the beep, Tom is innerly seeing a 
good result he had on the same hole yesterday. He is seeing a yellow flag internally and 
the white ball from a close perspective. The ball is still and just a few feet from the hole, 
and other details are known to be present but in the background such as the grass and 
trees, but these are grey in color and out of the center of his awareness. Also at the 
moment o f the beep, Tom is aware of the sensation o f nicking the grass with his golf 
club, which he feels on the tips of his fingers and from his forearm to his upper arm. So 
this is an inner seeing that occurs simultaneously with the sensory awareness o f a 
physical action.
Most o f Tom’s inner seeings were very clear and differentiated inner experiences. 
Sample 2.1, for instance, occurred early in the morning. Tom was practicing on the golf 
course and had hit his ball into a very wet muddy spot where it imbedded. Before the 
moment o f the beep, he had been thinking about how it would “suck” if, in competition, 
you did not get relief from a ball that imbeds as this one has. At the moment of the beep, 
Tom is in reality looking at the lie with awareness of it and is simultaneously having an 
inner seeing of himself hacking the ball out of the mud with a nine iron with the ball 
dribbling out about nine to fifteen yards; in this inner seeing he is wearing the same 
clothes he’s wearing in reality that day. The inner seeing of himself hacking is more
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prominent than the ball he is looking at in the mud. He has no other inner experience at 
the moment of the beep. This was a clear, detailed, and differentiated golf-related inner 
experience.
The majority of Tom’s inner seeings were experienced simultaneously with other 
forms of inner experience such as inner speech, sensory awareness, feelings, and 
unsymbolized thoughts. These usually occurred with only one other different form of 
inner experience, but at one point it occurred with two other different forms. This 
occurred in Sample 2.3 after Tom had finished practicing golf and was now lifting 
weights. He is about half of the way through his set. At the moment of the beep, Tom's 
arms are fully extended and he is staring at the smooth part of the barbell he is lifting and 
noticing the smoothness of the black shiny barbell and the way the light is hitting it to 
cause a lighter-than-black colored reflection, an example of sensory awareness. Also at 
the moment of the beep, Tom is imagining himself lifting weights with his arms fully 
extended from the perspective of a person who would be spotting for him. Also at the 
moment of the beep, Tom is saying to himself internally, “Man up!” vehemently in his 
own words as if  to mentally pump himself up. All three experiences (sensory awareness, 
inner seeing, and inner speech) were clear, detailed, and differentiated.
Tom frequently experienced clear and differentiated inner seeings. Most of these 
experiences co-occurred with other forms of inner experience including inner speech, 
sensory awareness, and unsymbolized thinking. The co-occurrence of two or three forms 
of inner experience may not be uncommon, but it was certainly evident with Tom’s 
samples. Most o f these co-occuring forms of inner experiences were related to one 
another in content. Since most o f Tom’s samples were collected during either golf
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practice or competition, most of these occurred when he was golfing. O f those that were 
collected during golf, 75% of his inner seeings were related to golf in content.
Kinesthetic Inner Seeing
A  few o f Tom’s inner seeings, 3 of 10, had kinesthetic components. As we saw before 
in Sample 2.6, for example, Tom was having an inner seeing o f himself at the restaurant 
bar and is reliving the taste and crunchiness o f the chips and salsa. Another instance of 
this occurred in Sample 2.4 after Tom had left the gym and was practicing putting on the 
putting green. He had been missing some of his putts and was scooping some balls out of 
the hole. At the moment o f the beep, Tom is thinking he may need to change putters, 
which had been in words before the moment o f the beep. At the moment o f the beep, this 
unsymbolized residual idea is in his inner experience without words. Also at the moment 
of the beep, Tom is innerly seeing himself taking off the cover of another o f his putters. 
He sees his arms taking off the red cover in motion and the insignia o f the brand on the 
cover. Also at the same moment, Tom is hearing the velcro tearing internally along with 
the related inner seeing. He also feels the resistance of the velcro as if  the putter cover is 
there and as if  he's really feeling it at the moment of the beep. So Tom had an 
unsymbolized idea of changing putters in mind, and an inner seeing of himself getting out 
the putter that has inner sensory components, both kinesthetic and auditory, that are 
relived at the moment of the beep. This is a clear, detailed, and differentiated inner 
experience that is golf-related.
Tom experienced another inner seeing with kinesthetic components during golf 
competition. Tournament Sample T .l. Tom was playing a two versus two game against 
his friends to prepare for a college match the next day. He was walking to his second shot
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on the second hole (a short par 4). He was trying to just stay in the moment, trying to 
maintain a good feeling he has had. He was also actively trying to keep a positive 
attitude. The swing he had made previously was very good, and he is trying to keep it in 
his head to duplicate it for the next shot. He had started the process of keeping it in his 
head and is doing so at the moment without effort. At the moment of the beep he is 
picturing the swing he had just made off the tee, seeing his arms go back in perfect 
position. He is seeing a previous good tee shot internally just like it is from the same view 
he had previously seen it externally. In the second seeing, he is seeing the swing and 
feeling it too in no particular place in his body, but this is a good feeling. This was a 
visual and kinesthetic re-experience used to prepare for the next shot.
Inner Speech
In 5 o f 18, or 28%, of Tom’s samples, he was experiencing inner speech. Most of 
these, 4 o f 5 or 80%, were not golf-related. All of his inner speech experiences occurred 
along with other forms o f inner experience such as inner seeing or sensory awareness. All 
of his inner speech experiences also were related to the other co-occurring forms of inner 
experience by the content of the inner experience.
Sample 1.2 is an example of an inner speech experience that is not related to golf. A 
few minutes before the beep, Tom was waiting for his 2nd shot on the fourth hole of the 
golf course when his cell phone rang. It was his doctor, who informed him that the 
growth on his leg is not cancer. At the moment of the beep, Tom is sitting in the cart 
feeling thrilled/relieved that he is healthy and saying to himself “what a relief!” internally 
in his own normal voice. The feeling o f relief and the inner spoken phrase are both clear
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aspects o f his inner experience. At the same time, Tom is sighing as he exhales. The sigh 
is not part o f his conscious experience at the moment of the beep.
Sample 1.6 was Tom’s only sample with inner speech was an emotion regulation 
strategy related to golf. Tom was practicing and had hit a bad tee shot, and was now 
walking back to his cart. At the moment of the beep, Tom is innerly seeing the number 
“6” in large black font with a small caption above it with the word “six.” Tom was 
simultaneously saying “6” to himself in his own normal voice as he counts 1-2-3-4-5-6. 
This counting is part o f a “Nine Step Rule” his coach had previously given him to help 
him deal with anger. This rule allows Tom to experience anger while walking for nine 
paces, but by the tenth pace he must leave the anger behind. At the moment o f the beep, 
Tom is also thinking that he is almost done with the nine step process; this thinking takes 
place without words or inner seeing. Tom is probably angry in his body, but this is not 
part of his conscious experience at the moment of the beep. Incidentally, Tom said that 
his anger dissipated after this.
Tom experienced fairly frequent irmer speech that co-occurred with other inner 
experiences. His inner speech was related to these other inner experiences by content, but 
his inner speech experiences were typically not golf-related.
Unsymbolized Thinking 
Five o f 18, or 28%, of Tom’s samples contained unsymbolized thinking. Most of 
these unsymbolized thoughts eo-occurred with other forms of inner experience, and most 
were also golf-related in content.
Tournament Sample T.5 occurred during two-versus-two golf competition. Tom 
experienced unsymbolized thinking o f a felt nature, like feeling like being in a specific
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situation before, without any other eo-oecurring form of inner experience. Tom was on 
the 13th hole, which is a par 5. He had just pulled out his club to hit his second shot, 
trying to reach the green in two strokes. He was looking down at his bag and staring at 
both the three-wood and five-iron while simultaneously imagining himself on this hole in 
tomorrow’s tournament. This imagining occurs without words or inner seeing, an explicit 
thought process containing the idea o f what he is going to do tomorrow, which club he'll 
use, and where he wants to be hitting his shot from. Garret’s experience is exactly like 
he's there at that moment while he's thinking about what plaee and club gives him the 
best chance.
In Tournament Sample T.6, Tom experienced an unsymbolized awareness of loss on 
multiple levels along with a feeling o f disappointment. Tom was on the 18*̂  hole. His 
buddy, who’s on the other team, was putting. Before the putt, Tom had been feeling 
confident that he’d win the match. But the buddy made the putt to win the hole and the 
match. At the moment of the beep, Tom is feeling disappointed and is simultaneously 
thinking, without words or inner seeing, that he has lost $20 and will be buying dinner. 
The disappointment was a feeling of failure in his body and mind, an emptiness feeling 
from the head down, like what he had been doing for the last couple hours just turned out 
to be erap. So at the moment of the beep, Tom is feeling disappointment and thinking 
he’s lost $20 and will he buying dinner.
Feelings
Tom experienced feelings in 4 of his 18 samples, or 22%. Three of these feelings 
occurred with other eo-occurring forms inner experiences. Three were golf-related in 
content. As we just saw, Tom experienced a fairly significant feeling o f disappointment
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associated with unsymbolized thinking about his loss during competition, even though he 
performed very well himself, two points better than his handicap in fact.
During Tournament Sample T.3, Tom was on the 7th hole, which is the most difficult 
hole on the course. He had made a birdie to put his team up by three and had just picked 
up the ball out of the hole. He was looking at the ball, staring at it for dirt, turning it 
around in his fingers. At the moment o f the beep, Tom is experiencing a confident feeling 
with the knowledge that he and his team are winning. This is experienced as more o f a 
feeling than a thought process, but he has no bodily awareness at the moment of the beep. 
This confident feeling is almost a swagger, with the knowledge he and his team are up by 
three and it’s going to be difficult for the other team to come back and win. Also at the 
moment of the beep, Tom is thinking his team will win knowing that there is only 11 
holes to go and his team is up by three, which is an understanding o f the situation without 
words or inner seeing. His confidence and swagger were noticeable by a bounce in his 
step, which he has when he’s competing, but this is not part o f his awareness at the 
moment of the beep.
Tom experienced another feeling during Sample 1.5 when he was practicing golf on 
the 1 hole. Tom had just hit a shot that feels crappy like it caught a lot of the grass and 
dirt. Before the beep, Tom has felt the crappiness and ugliness of the shot in his body. At 
the moment of the beep, Tom’s awareness o f this bodily sensation has subsided, replaced 
by a very angry feeling. The feeling seems like a mental frustration, metaphorically 
similar to building pressure or building redness that needs to be let out. Garret believes 
that he is not displaying any external or physical signs of the anger.
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Inner Experience During Golf 
Tom collected six Tournament Samples. His most frequently-oecurring inner 
experiences were unsymbolized thinking (50%), inner seeing (33%), feeling (33%), 
perceptual awareness (17%), and thought/feeling (17%), most of which were previously 
described. Two o f Tom’s Tournament Samples included mental preparation strategies 
being used at the moment of the beep. One of these strategies will be described as well as 
his a feeling experience and his golf-related content.
In Tournament Sample T.2, Tom was mentally preparing himself to execute a putt.
He was on the 4"̂  hole, a par 3. When he had played this hole the day before on a practice 
match, he had made a 10 foot birdie putt to put his team up by two. Today as he was 
getting ready to putt, he had started visually scanning a line from the hole back toward 
his ball. He has visually traced this line starting from the hole and is now about midway 
back towards the ball. At the moment o f the beep he is looking at a point o f slight 
discoloration on the grass that was the midpoint o f the line. This “spot-putting” is a visual 
and mental proeess, a visual mind scanning of the ground looking for something to spot 
and line up accordingly. He is completely concentrating his mind 100 pereent on 
scanning the line, an instance o f active perceptual awareness.
In Tournament Sample T.4, Tom experienced an emotional reaetion to a golf 
outcome. He was on the 10*'’ hole, a short par 4. He was walking up to the fairway and 
was looking at the other guy’s tee shot. Then he saw his ball up on the green when the 
beeper went off. At the moment of the beep, he is seeing the ball on green and 
thinking/feeling that he “hit the shit” out of it. This involves seeing an inner seeing of the 
blue tee box yard marker that says “Par 4” on one line and “307” on the line below. This
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inner seeing seems to be an exact copy of the marker that he had previously actually seen. 
Simultaneously he is having an inner experience that seems like both a thought and 
feeling of stunned disbelief. This feeling is mental insofar as he is aware that this distance 
is unusual -  he doesn't usually hit the ball this far at sea level. So hitting it this far seems 
to produce an experience o f disbelief, an experience that is both thought and emotion 
together with no words present at the moment o f the beep.
Golf-Related Content
Tom collected 10 of 12, or 83%, of his samples during either golf practice or 
competition. O f those that were collected during golf, 72% were related to golf in 
content. During the golf competition, 6 o f 6 or 100% of his inner experiences contained 
golf-related content. Examples o f experiences with golf-related content include internally 
seeing and feeling the swing he had just made, mentally preparing himself to execute a 
putt by looking at a spot on the grass, experiencing a confident mental feeling with the 
knowledge that he and his team are winning, innerly seeing an exact copy of the yardage 
marker that he had previously actually seen and simultaneously having a thought/feeling 
of stunned disbelief, experiencing an unsymbolized thinking of a felt nature o f himself 
being on this hole in tomorrow’s tournament exactly like he is there while thinking about 
what club gives him the best chance, and experiencing an unsymbolized awareness of 
loss on multiple levels along with a feeling of disappointment after losing.
When he was having golf-related inner experiences, the content o f Tom’s experiences 
frequently included details about his strategies to prepare himself mentally (e.g., 
memories of similar positive past golf experiences, preparing to putt by drawing a line, 
thinking about what to do on the same hole tomorrow) and details about his emotional
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reactions to golf-related outcomes (e.g., surprisingly good shots, bad shots, losing, anger 
reduction). To summarize, Tom’s golf-related inner experiences included content related 
to what he was doing at the moment, preparation for what he was going to do later, 
emotional reaction, or management of emotion.
Discussion
Tom’s inner experiences were typically very clear and differentiated inner 
experiences that were also typically task-related. He was often golfing and his inner 
experiences were often related to golf. In addition, Tom took to the sampling process 
with great ease. This was true for both the technical procedure as well as the expositional 
interview. This was a notable difference in comparison with some o f the other 
participants in this study. Tom experienced frequent inner seeing, and sometimes his 
inner seeings had a kinesthetic component. He also experienced fairly frequent inner 
speech. Most of his inner speech was not golf-related. He also experienced frequent 
unsymbolized thinking and feelings. These forms of inner experience most often co­
occurred with one another, especially inner seeing and inner speech.
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CHAPTER 12 
CHRIS
Chris is a 36 year-old highly-skilled golfer with a handicap of six. He was recruited 
by one o f the researchers through a contact in the community. He completed his first 
three daily life sampling days before the golf competition sampling. For the first two 
days, Chris obtained samples from his daily life at home. On the third day, he sampled 
while playing golf (recreational golf). He collected his daily life samples in the middle of 
the summer, and he participated in the golf competition sampling in the middle of the 
same summer. Chris shot 82, 10 strokes over par, 4 strokes higher than his handicap o f 6. 
As a result, Chris finished 8*̂  in the golf competition.
Inner Seeing
Chris experienced inner seeing in 8 of 25 or 32% of his samples. All but one of 
Chris’s inner seeings co-occurred with other forms o f inner experience present at the 
moment of the beep. In Sample 2.3, for instance, Chris had been talking to his brother 
about how Chris’s nephew is struggling in summer-school algebra. At the moment of the 
beep, Chris is experiencing an inner seeing of himself helping his nephew with his 
algebra. He sees his nephew, himself talking, a brown table, white paper, a book, and the 
kitchen in its various orange/yellow and purple colors with sunflower designs more in the 
background behind himself and his nephew. Chris and his nephew are in the center of the
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inner seeing, but his nephew is the focus of his awareness at the moment of the beep.
This was a clear and detailed inner seeing.
In Sample 3.4, Chris was playing recreational golf and driving toward the 12“’ green 
to look for his ball. He had just found his ball sitting on a hill behind the green almost in 
the “crap” after the ball had failed to cut as he had intended. At the moment of the beep, 
Chris is experiencing a small sense o f relief in his inner experience. His relief seems to 
him to be a reaction to the fact that the shot is not actually in the “crap.” Chris does not 
recall the details of how this was experienced (e.g., mentally, bodily). Also at the moment 
of the beep, Chris is saying to himself out loud “Oof, almost in the gunch, long” in a 
somewhat relieved tone. Also at the moment o f the beep, Chris is internally visualizing 
the path he had wanted the ball to take when he hit it, which looks like a solid, 
continuous, curving, three-dimensional line that starts low, then moves high, and then 
curves right. His preliminary target, the right edge of the green right next to bunker, is 
seen in the middle of his visualization. The focus of his attention is the path of the ball, a 
solid, continuous line. Chris is certain that that inner seeing was present at the moment of 
the beep, but he is uncertain about whether the following inner seeing was present at the 
exact moment of the beep. As near as he ean tell, it occurred after the moment of the 
beep, but it may have overlapped with the first inner seeing of the path he wanted the ball 
to take. In this second inner seeing, Chris saw the path the ball actually took, saw that it 
didn’t cut right as he intended.
Chris experienced an unsymbolized thought and a feeling simultaneously along with 
an inner seeing at the moment of the beep in Sample 1.3. In this sample, Chris was 
watching a movie about Truman Capote; an actor had said something about Harper Lee.
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At the moment o f the beep, Chris is making a mental association between what he had 
heard about Harper Lee and how Truman Capote is really the charaeter Duff in the book 
Lee wrote. To Kill A Mockingbird. Also at the moment of the beep, Chris is experiencing 
a mental feeling of satisfaction, a feeling of pleasure with himself at the knowledge he 
has. Also at the moment of the beep, Chris is innerly seeing a warning sign on the side of 
a road illuminated by upward-facing lights. The sign reads “Warning” in black letters, 
and continues something like “Don't be too smug, you bastard,” but although Chris 
knows the meaning of this continuation, he is not eertain exactly of the words. The sign is 
in the center of the inner seeing, and he is also seeing two sign posts, a barbed wire fence, 
sagebrush, a small road, and mountains in the background. Chris is also seeing the sign 
getting bigger as if he is in motion approaching the sign. Chris understands this inner 
seeing as being a smugness-checking experience.
Chris frequently experienced inner seeing. All but one of Chris’s inner seeings co- 
oecurred with other inner experiences at the moment of the beep. As he became more 
experienced in the sampling method, Chris’s inner seeings became clearer and more 
detailed at the moment o f the beep. His inner seeings were typically clear and detailed.
Feeling
Chris experienced feelings in 8 of 25 or 32% of his samples. All o f Chris’s feelings 
co-occurred with other forms of inner experience at the moment of the beep. In Sample
3.2, for instance, Chris experieneed both internal and external speech along with a feeling 
o f disappointment during recreational golf. He had just hit a putt toward the hole on the 
first green. The hole is about 35-40 feet away, and at the moment of the beep the ball is 
about 10 feet before the hole. At the moment of the beep, Chris has said “Oh, too hard”
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out loud. Chris is also saying “too hard” internally at the moment of the beep. Both his 
external and internal speech are spoken in a similar disappointed tone of voice. This is a 
mental process that has been spoken out loud first, and to himself second, both in the 
vicinity of the beep. Also at the moment of the beep, Chris is experiencing a small 
amount o f disappointment as he is realizing that he hit the putt too hard. Chris 
experiences this disappointment as a feeling that is closer to a mental experience than a 
bodily experience, but still not a thought. (After the beep, the putt ended up 4 feet past the 
hole.)
In Sample 1.4, Chris was online playing a game when his computer shut down, 
possibly due to lightning in the storm outside. At the moment of the beep, Chris is 
experiencing an intense feeling of anger. It is not apparent to us, or we think to Chris, 
exactly how he is experiencing this intense anger. It was difficult for Chris to articulate 
exactly how he experienced his anger at the moment of the beep. It seems to Chris that he 
could have been experiencing a feeling of hotness at the moment of the beep, but he is 
not certain that he is actually feeling it at the moment of the beep. It seems to Chris that 
he could have just as easily experienced anger as seeing red internally, although he is not 
exactly sure he was literally seeing red inside either. Chris thinks he also could have 
experienced anger as dissociating is some way from the event itself. Any and all of these 
are possible, but beyond experiencing anger, Chris is not sure exactly how he 
experienced his anger. He is certain he experienced anger somehow, but the details o f this 
experience are very ambiguous. Also at the moment of the beep, Chris is internally seeing 
his computer screen shutting down, just as he had seen it externally about 4 seconds 
before. Chris is seeing a blip on the screen moving from the left to the right hand side of
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the screen in yellow and purple colors as it shuts down. Chris thinks he may also have 
also been saying “Shit, shit, shit! Son of a bitch!” at the moment of the beep, but it is not 
apparent to us or, we think, to Chris whether this occurred at the moment of the beep or 
not; if  it did occur at the moment it is not apparent whether it was said internally or out 
loud. It is not apparent exactly how he is experiencing his intense anger feeling, we think, 
because this sample was collected on Chris’s first sampling day.
Thus, feelings were frequent inner experiences for Chris. All of his feelings co­
occurred with other inner experiences at the moment o f the beep. Chris experienced three 
feelings as mental experiences (38%); one feeling as bodily experienced (13%), and the 
details of the other four were not clear enough to determine whether they were mentally 
or bodily experieneed (50%).
Inner Speech
Chris experieneed inner speech in 7 of 25 or 28% o f his samples. All of Chris’s inner 
speech co-occurred with other forms of inner experienee present at the moment of the 
beep. All but one o f his inner speech experiences occurred during the golf competition.
All of Chris’s inner speech occurred while he was playing golf. Chris experienced his 
only instance o f inner speech outside of the golf competition while he was playing 
recreational golf on his 3"̂“ sampling day. This occurred in Sample 3.2, which was 
previously described in the Feeling section: he innerly said “too hard” while saying the 
same phrase aloud and feeling disappointed.
In Tournament Sample T.8, Chris experienced a perceptual and a sensory awareness 
along with a co-oecurring instance of inner speech. He was walking to the tee on the 13th 
hole, which is a par 3. At the moment of the beep, Chris is looking at the green and
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noticing passively that the flagstick is almost dead center on the green. Also the moment 
of the beep, Chris is taking a little practice swing, not a formal practice swing that is part 
of his routine but a shorter practice swing, and feeling a mildly painful twinge is his 
wrist. Also at the moment of the beep, Chris is saying to himself “A good swing's gonna 
hurt” in a complaining tone of his own voice.
Chris experienced inner speech in seven of his samples. All of Chris’s inner speech 
co-occurred with other inner experiences at the moment of the beep, and all occurred 
while golf competition. Chris experienced inner speech as himself speaking in his own 
voice. In two instances, one of which was described earlier (Sample 3.2), Chris 
experienced both internal and external experienced speech that were related in content.
Sensory Awareness
Chris experienced sensory awareness in 7 of 25 or 28% of his samples. For example, 
in Sample T.8 (just described), Chris was feeling a twinge of pain in his wrist. This wrist 
pain occurred in two other golf competition samples as well. In Sample T.7, for example, 
he was standing on the 12th tee and was putting his tee into the ground. At the moment of 
the beep, Chris is feeling a physieal twinge in his wrist that is bothering him. This is a 
sharp intense bodily sensation o f pain with a numb pinky finger. Also at the moment, 
Chris is saying to himself “hard tu rf’ in his own normal voice.
In Sample 2.6, Chris was eating soup he has made for dinner, the same soup his 
grandfather used to make. At the moment of the beep, Chris is experiencing the silky, 
creamy, graininess of the soup, a sensory awareness that is somehow recognized as being 
very positive. Also at the moment of the beep, Chris is making a comparison o f some 
kind between his and his grandfather’s soup, but he has no idea exactly how this inner
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experience takes shape. He knows he is making a comparison, but he just does not know 
how, an instance of unsymbolized thinking.
During Sample 3.3, Chris was playing recreational golf and standing by the 4’“ green 
where he had a little chip shot to hit. At the moment of the beep, Chris is looking at the 
bunker and is sensing the waves of heat radiating from the direction of the bunker. This 
sensation is mostly in his face and possibly a little in his legs as well, but he is not 
entirely sure if he is also feeling heat in his legs. The experienee of the heat is very 
intense, an almost overwhelming sensation of hotness coming from the direction of the 
bunker.
Chris experienced sensory awareness in seven of his samples. He experienced all of 
his sensory awareness bodily as opposed to visually. Five of 7 or 71% of these co­
occurred with other forms of inner experience. Four of his sensory awareness experiences 
occurred during golf, and three during the golf competition were painful or discomforting 
twinges in his wrist as described in Tournament Sample T.7.
Perceptual Awareness
Chris experienced perceptual awareness in 5 o f 25 or 20% of his samples. Four of 5 
or 80% of these occurred during golf competition. In Tournament Sample T.9, for 
instance, Chris experienced perceptual awareness along with a sensory awareness and 
inner speech experience. During this sample, he was on the tee o f the 13‘“ hole just after 
the other golfer had teed off. At the moment o f the beep, Chris is feeling a throbbing 
sensation in his wrist. It is not painful, but it is a noticeable throbbing experience. Also at 
the moment o f the beep, Chris is saying to himself, “It's hot. We need to stop at that water 
jug before the next tee” with an accent on the word “need.” Finally, Chris is also seeing a
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water jug on the golf course at the moment of the beep and making a mental note of it, an 
active visual perceptual process.
In Tournament Sample T.8, which was previously described in the Inner Speech 
section, Chris experienced inner speech and perceptual awareness when he is taking a 
practice swing, and is complaining to himself and saying “A good swing’s gonna hurt.” 
Also at the moment o f the beep, Chris is looking at the green and notieing passively that 
the flagstick is almost dead center in the middle of the green at the moment o f the beep, a 
less prominent passive visual perceptual process.
Chris experienced perceptual awareness in six of his samples. Five of 6 or 83% of 
these co-occurred with other forms of inner experience. He typically experienced 
perceptual awareness as active, although he had two passive perceptual awareness 
experiences. All but one of his perceptual awareness experiences occurred during golf 
competition, and of these, all but one were golf-related.
Speaking Aloud
Chris had instances of speaking aloud in 5 o f 25 or 20% of his samples. These were 
instances of speaking out loud with awareness at the moment of the beep. In Sample 3.1, 
for instance, Chris was getting ready to play recreational golf. One of the golf teaching 
pros who used to give Chris lessons, whose niekname is “the guru,” was on the course. 
Before the round, Chris had been talking to the guru. Now, Chris is driving to the C' tee 
of the golf course when the starter said “you’re a little late.” At the moment o f the beep, 
Chris is saying “well, you gotta pay homage to the guru” out loud to the starter. This is 
the beginning of the soeial transaction between Chris and the starter. Also at the moment 
of the beep, Chris is wanting to ask the starter for another towel. This is an implicit
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wanting experience that has no associated words or inner seeings at the moment o f the 
beep. Chris experiences this as merely a thing to remember to ask for, an instance of 
unsymbolized thinking.
Chris also had instances o f speaking aloud in Samples 3.2 and 3.4, which were 
previously described in the Feeling and Inner Seeing sections, respectively. In Sample
3.2, Chris says “Oh, too hard” out loud. Also in Sample 3.4, Chris is saying to himself 
out loud “Oof, almost in the gunch, long” in a somewhat relieved tone. In both instances, 
his externally spoken phrase was part o f his conscious awareness at the moment o f the 
beep. Three of 5 of his instances of speaking aloud occurred during recreational golf.
Chris was talking at the moment of the beep as part o f his experience in 5 of his 25 
samples. In all cases, Chris was aware o f himself talking. Most o f Chris’s speaking aloud 
was commentary said to himself out loud. All of his speaking aloud occurred 
simultaneously with other co-occurring forms of inner experience such as inner speech, 
feelings, inner seeings, and unsymbolized thinking.
Unsymbolized Thinking 
Chris experienced unsymbolized thinking in 5 of 25 or 20% of his samples. In 
Sample 3.1, which was previously described in the Speaking Aloud section. Chris was 
experiencing an unsymbolized implicit wanting experience that has no associated words 
or inner seeings at the moment of the beep. In Tournament Sample T.2, Chris also 
experienced unsymbolized thinking. He was on the 1st hole, just walking back to the cart. 
He did not hit the last shot very well but got a good result anyway. At the moment of the 
beep, Chris is thinking about how he got lucky with the last shot. If expressed in words.
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the thought would be something like “got lucky with that second one,” although no words 
are in his inner experience at the moment of the beep.
Chris experienced four instances o f unsymbolized thinking. Three of 4 or 75% of his 
unsymbolized thinking co-occurred with other simultaneous forms of inner experience 
(e.g., feeling, inner seeing).
Inner Experience During Golf 
Chris collected 11 Tournament Samples. His most frequently-occurring inner 
experiences were inner speech (60%), perceptual awareness (50%), sensory awareness 
(40%), inner seeings (30%), and feeling (20%), many of which were previously 
described. He also experienced one instance each o f inner hearing, just doing, and 
speaking aloud. Four of Chris’s Tournament Samples included mental preparation 
strategies being used at the moment of the beep. These strategies will be described as 
well as his golf-related eontent.
Mental Preparation Strategies
The beeper captured four mental preparation strategies Chris was using at the moment 
of the beep, accounting for 36% of his golf competition samples. These inner experiences 
consisted of several forms of inner experiences with content that served the purpose of 
mental preparation for a golf related task.
In Tournament Sample T.3, Chris was on the 2"“ stroke of the 2"“ hole, over the ball, 
and he was just getting ready to hit the shot. He was going through a mental checklist in 
which he was thinking that he had 280 yards to the hole, and if he hits a 2 iron, it would 
leave him 60 to 80 yards to go, and it will cut a little from left to right, so he wants to 
start it from the left side of the course. At the moment of the beep, he is going through his
208
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
pre-shot mental instructions, saying to himself internally “start it left edge, and it should 
work right” in his own normal inner voice. Also at the moment of the beep, Chris is 
externally looking at where he wants the ball to land, which is the left edge o f the green.
In Tournament Sample T.IO, for instanee, Chris had gone through a list of things in 
his pre-shot routine, and he was stepping in to take his shot on the 16’“ hole. He had just 
gotten ready to swing. At the moment o f the beep, Chris is feeling confident that he has 
the right club. This confidence is experienced as a bodily feeling of well being, o f feeliiig 
comfortable, although it is not apparent if  this feeling has a spécifié or general location. 
Chris is also aware of the eomfort feeling somehow at the moment of the beep, but he is 
not sure how he is aware o f the feeling. Also at the moment o f the beep, Chris is saying 
“good pass” out loud, slightly more intense than normal, which means make a good full 
swing.
Golf-Related Content
Chris’s experiences had golf-related content in 9 of 11 or 82% of his Tournament 
Samples. Examples of experiences with golf-related content include internal and external 
speech about golf; thinking he got a lucky result without words or inner seeings; looking 
at the hole with focus and imaging his clubs; taking a practice swing, feeling a painful 
twinge in his wrist, looking passively at the hole, and saying internally that a good swing 
will hurt; cleaning a golf ball, feeling relieved he is done golfing, and feel the sensation 
o f heat outside; and the aforementioned mental preparation strategies.
Comparing Inner Experience During Golf and Daily Life
Chris’s inner experiences from his golf samples were similar to his daily life samples 
with respect to three forms of inner experience; these forms were inner hearing, inner
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seeing, and sensory awareness. His inner experiences from his golf samples were 
different from his daily life samples with respect to five forms o f inner experience; these 
were unsymbolized thinking, speaking aloud, feeling, perceptual awareness, and inner 
speech.
Recreational golf was eonsidered part of Chris’s daily life inner experience for the 
purpose of this idiographic chapter; it will be taken out of golf and daily life analyses so 
the settings are consistent across participants in the nomothetic results Chapter 16.
Chris experienced a similar amount of inner hearing during his golf samples (1 of 11 
or 9%) as he did during his daily samples (1 o f 14 or 7%). He also had a similar amount 
of inner seeing during golf (3 of 11 or 27%) as he did during his daily samples (5 of 14 or 
36%). Chris had a similar amount o f sensory awareness during golf (4 o f 11 or 36%) as 
he did during his daily samples as well (3 of 14 or 21%).
Chris experienced less unsymbolized thinking and less speaking aloud during his golf 
samples (1 o f 11 or 9% for each of these two) than he had during his daily samples (4 of 
14 or 29% for each o f these two). Chris also had less feeling during his golf samples (2 of 
11 or 18%) than he had during his daily samples (6 of 14 or 43%). Chris had a more 
perceptual awareness during his golf samples (4 of 11 or 36%) than he had during his 
daily samples (1 o f 14 or 7%). He had even more inner speech during his golf samples (6 
o f 11 or 55%) than during his daily samples (1 of 14 or 7%), and the one instance inner 
speech he had during his daily samples was actually when he was golfing on the third 
daily life sampling day. Thus all of Chris’s inner speech occurred during golf, one during 
practice and the rest during competition.
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Chris’s inner experiences during golf compared with his daily life were similar with 
respect to the amount of inner hearing, inner seeing, and sensory awareness he had. His 
inner experiences were different during golf compared with his daily life with respect to 
the amount of unsymbolized thinking, speaking aloud, feeling, perceptual awareness, and 
inner speech he had. Chris experienced a decrease in unsymbolized thinking, speaking 
aloud, and feeling during golf. Chris experienced a notable increase in perceptual 
awareness and inner speech during golf. Comparing Chris’s golf and daily life 
experiences, it is apparent that he had a lower number o f similar forms of inner 
experience compared to the number of different forms of inner experience. Thus Chris’s 
golf and daily life inner experienees were mostly different.
Discussion
Chris’s two most frequent inner experiences were inner seeing and feelings. Almost 
all of both co-occurred with other inner experiences at the moment o f the beep. His inner 
seeings varied in their degree of elarity and level of detail. Most of his feelings were 
mental experiences, and only a few were felt in his body. Chris’s next most frequent 
inner experiences were inner speech and sensory awareness. Almost all o f both co­
occurred with other inner experiences at the moment of the beep. All but one o f his inner 
speech occurred during the golf competition, and he also experienced simultaneous 
internal and external speech twice. He experienced all o f his sensory awareness bodily as 
opposed to visually. Most o f his sensory awareness occurred during golf, and several 
during golf competition were twinges in his wrist.
211
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chris typically experienced perceptual awareness as active experiences, and all but 
one of these occurred during golf competition; of these, most were golf-related. Most of 
Chris’s speaking aloud was said to himself out loud just same as if  said internally.
Chris typically experienced unsymbolized thinking as a mental inner experience without 
the presence of related words or inner seeings. The majority of his perceptual awareness, 
speaking aloud, and unsymbolized thinking co-occurred with other inner experiences.
Chris’s inner experiences typically clear in form and content. His most frequently- 
occurring inner experiences during golf competition were inner speech, perceptual 
awareness, sensory awareness, inner seeings, and feelings, many of co-oceurred with one 
another. Four of Chris’s Tournament Samples included mental preparation strategies 
being used at the moment of the beep.
Most of Chris’s golf samples had golf-related content. Chris’s inner experiences 
during golf eompared with his daily life were similar with respect to the amount o f inner 
hearing, inner seeing, and sensory awareness he had and different with respect to the 
amount of unsymbolized thinking, speaking aloud, feeling, perceptual awareness, and 
inner speech he had. He had a decrease in unsymbolized thinking, speaking aloud, and 
feeling during golf, and a notable increase in perceptual awareness and inner speech 
during golf. Chris’s golf and daily life inner experiences were mostly different.
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CHAPTER 13 
MIKE
Mike is a 50 year-old highly-skilled golfer with a handicap of 7. He was recruited by 
one o f the researchers through a contact in the community. All of the samples that were 
used to describe Mike’s inner experience were collected within 24 hours o f the interview, 
but Mike collected several samples from two days before as well that were not used.
On his first sampling day, Mike arrived with five samples obtained from two days 
earlier and four samples obtained during golf within 24 hours. Only the samples from 
within 24 hours were discussed, and the samples he had obtained from two days earlier 
were not discussed. He completed his second sampling day by obtaining samples from 
his daily life at home. He experienced difficulty with work that resulted in having to 
reschedule his second day interview for later than originally planned. So that he would be 
experienced with sampling before the golf tournament, we discussed three samples 
during his second day that had been collected two days earlier (Samples 2.1-2.3) and the 
only two samples colleeted within 24 hours (Samples 2.4-2.5). Samples 2.1-2.3 were 
thrown out, and only his two samples collected within 24 hours (Samples 2.4-2.5) will be 
discussed. Mike participated in recreational golf in 4 of 6 of his daily samples.
To summarize, we used 4 of Mike’s samples from day one, 2 samples from day two, 
and the 10 samples collected from the golf tournament. This yielded a total o f 16
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samples. In the golf competition, Mike shot 74, 2 strokes over par, which is 5 strokes 
lower than his handicap of 7. As a result, Mike won the golf competition.
Unsymholized Thinking
Mike experienced unsymbolized thinking in 4 of 16 or 25% of his samples. In Sample 
2.5, for instance, Mike was listening to Howard Stem on the car radio while driving. The 
context o f the show involves a character who is a “midget.” At the moment o f the beep, 
Mike is experiencing a thought about what kind of people go on this show, as if  he is 
asking himself this question, although no words are present at the moment of the beep.
He is not certain about the nature o f the thought, whether it is a mental wondering or 
questioning or something else, but Mike is confident that the thought was pres7ent at the 
moment o f the beep with no inner seeings or words present. This is a fairly unambiguous 
instance o f unsymbolized thinking in which Mike is thinking about what kind of people 
go on the Howard Stem show. At first, Mike thought the cars on the road must have been 
in his awareness because he was driving, but when we discussed how sometimes what we 
see while driving is in our awareness and other times not, Mike became much less certain 
about this.
In Sample 1.2, Mike experienced a clear sensory awareness with a co-occurring 
unsymbolized thought. Mike was playing golf on the 3rd hole, about 115 yards away 
from the hole using his 8 iron. He was in the action o f his swinging his club when the 
wind came up and was blowing in his direction. The beeper catches him almost at the top 
of his swing. At the moment of the beep, Mike is looking at the back part of the ball and 
sensing the wind on his left side o f his face. This is a clear sensory awareness. Also at the 
moment o f the beep, Mike is wondering whether he has enough club to hit the ball where
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he had intended. This wondering is a somewhat clear mental process that occurs without 
words. This was a mostly clear visual, sensory, and mental golf-related experience. 
Although Mike was experiencing a distracting thought about the wind, he hit a great shot, 
only 5 feet away from the hole.
Mike’s descriptions of his unsymbolized thinking were different than some of the 
other participants. Whether Mike experienced unsymbolized thinking as wondering, 
anticipating, hoping, wishing, or understanding, as others did, was never quite apparent. 
He may have had difficulty describing his unsymbolized thinking or he may have had 
different unsymbolized thinking than other participants. Either way, his unsymbolized 
thoughts were less differentiated and more difficult to describe. Others were more certain 
about how they experienced their unsymbolized thinking than Mike, and had more 
differentiated unsymbolized thoughts that were easier to describe.
Perceptual Awareness
Mike experienced perceptual awareness in 3 of 16 or 19% of his samples. Mike 
experienced perceptual awareness during Tournament Sample T.IO when he was getting 
ready to make a shot and was looking down the fairway of the last hole. At the moment 
of the beep, Mike is planning where he is going to hit the ball. This is experienced as 
actively looking down the right side of the fairway, an external visual experience. There 
are two carts out there, but Mike is looking past them, focused on the fairway as part of 
the planning where to hit the ball. It is not apparent whether or not his decision to hit the 
ball down the right side is present at or after the moment of the beep. There is an active 
focusing process occurring at the moment of the beep, but his focus is broad and without
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much specific detail. It is also not apparent whether or not Mike is experiencing a thought 
in addition to this perceptual awareness at the moment of the beep.
Mike’s perceptual awareness experiences were typically clear experiences. Two of 
these three perceptual awarenesses were elearly active. Mike’s perceptual awarenesses 
were typically somewhat clear external visual awareness either without much detail or 
with more detail and activeness.
Unclear Indeterminate Inner Experience
Mike had experiences for which there was not sufficient information to identify the 
form of his inner experience in 3 of 16 or 19% of his samples. In Sample 2.4, for 
instance, Mike was sitting with his 3-month-old niece “Jill,” who is looking up at him 
and smiling. At the moment of the beep, Mike is somehow reacting to Jill’s smile. It is 
not apparent to us, or, we think, to Mike, exactly how that reaction takes place. Perhaps it 
is a thought, which if represented in words might be something like “What a beautiful 
smile!” although such words do not actually appear to be present. Perhaps it is a feeling, a 
warmth towards Jill, but that warmth is certainly not apprehended in his body nor is it 
experienced mentally, either. It is also not apparent to us, and possibly not to Mike either, 
exactly when that reaction takes place. It remained ambiguous whether Mike’s moved 
experience is present at the moment of the beep or after. It seems apparent that the beep 
oceurs somewhere in the temporal vicinity of Jill’s smile, and that Mike is moved by it 
somehow, but beyond that little can definitively be said. Thus Sample 2.4 contained 
temporal ambiguity, and it was not possible to determine the form of Mike’s inner 
experience.
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Another instance of indeterminate inner experience occurred during Tournament 
Sample T.5. Before the beep, Mike had hit a shot from the sand trap to about 15 feet past 
the hole on the 18’“, and it had stopped about a second or two ago. At the moment of the 
beep, Mike’s eyes are aimed at the ball without apparent awareness of the ball, and he is 
having some kind of inner experience related about how bad the shot was. The content of 
his thought, that is, how bad it is, is unambiguously in his inner experienee at the moment 
o f the beep, but Mike is not sure about the form, if any, through which this inner 
experience takes place. He thinks it may take the form of words spoken internally with a 
negative intonation and the same meaning as “bad shot.” He thinks also may take the 
form of a feeling of some kind, but if  there was one, Mike was not aware of it at the 
moment o f the beep or thereafter. Once again, it seems apparent that the beep oecurs 
during Mike’s inner experience of the bad shot, but not much beyond that can definitively 
be said. Mike was sure about the content o f his inner experience, but he was not sure 
about the form of this inner experience.
Mike’s unclear indeterminate inner experiences consisted of instances in which he 
was unable to provide clear or sufficient details that eould highlight the form, if any, that 
his inner experience took at the moment of the beep. The fact that we could not determine 
the form of his inner experienee may have been due to the lack of clarity in his inner 
experience, his difficulty in describing it, our difficulty in helping him describe it, his 
inexperience with the method, some of these, or all o f these possibilities. Mike did more 
clearly experience the content o f these inner experiences. For instance, as was previously 
described, he experienced a moved reaction to his niece and a negative experience about 
his bad shot.
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Other Inner Experiences 
Mike experienced an equal number o f inner speech, feeling, sensory awareness, and 
speaking aloud experiences. Each of these occurred in 2 of 16 or 13% of Mike’s samples.
One of Mike’s two instances of inner speech occurred in Tournament Sample 
T.7. In this sample, Mike had just hit his shot. He was watching the ball traveling in the 
air. At the moment of the beep, Mike was saying to himself internally “fairway, fairway, 
fairway” in his own voice. He said “fairway” more than once, and probably three times, 
but he does not remember whether it was said two or three times. There is no other inner 
experience present at the moment of the beep.
One of Mike’s two feelings occurred in Sample 1.4; the other occurred in Sample 1.3, 
which was previously described. During Sample 1.4, Mike was playing golf on the 11th 
hole. He had just made a 40 foot putt and won some money. At the moment of the beep, 
he had made the putt and was walking halfway to the hole to pick up his ball. He is 
experiencing a surprised, elated feeling at making the putt and winning money. This is a 
happy and relieved feeling of being very, very pleased both mentally (mostly) and bodily 
(slightly). He is experiencing this as a happy feeling mostly in his head, with a hint of 
bodily experience, but he does not remember where in his body he is experiencing it. It is 
not apparent to us, or, we think, to Mike, but he may also be re-experiencing an inner 
seeing in motion of the shot he made going into the hole. He does not remember whether 
this possible experience occurred, and its details are unclear.
One of Mike’s two instances of sensory awareness occurred in Tournament Sample 
T.8; the other occurred in Sample 1.2, which was previously described. In Tournament 
Sample T.8, Mike was on the 3rd hole getting ready to hit his first shot. He is waiting one
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of the other golfers to hit. At the moment of the beep, Mike is experiencing a diffuse 
intense heat experience. The experience o f feeling the heat is the most prominent aspect 
of his awareness present at the moment o f the beep. Also at the moment o f the beep,
Mike was reaching out for his glass of ice with awareness. This is a physical process of 
reaching for the glass of ice with focus of some kind, but it is not clear how this 
awareness comes to him, whether it is visual or tactile or something else, so this is an 
unclear doing experience. Also at the moment of the beep, Mike his thinking about the 
heat somehow. It is not apparent to us, or we think to Mike, how this takes place. He may 
be saying to himself, “God it’s hot,” or he may be having some unsymbolized thought 
without words, but the form of this inner experience could not be determined. The 
experience o f feeling the heat is the most prominent aspect of his awareness present at the 
moment of the beep. It is not apparent to us or Mike whether reaching for the ice is more 
prominent than his diffuse heat experience at the moment of the beep.
One of Mike’s two speaking aloud experiences occurred in Tournament Sample T.4. 
Mike is on the E' stroke of the 18‘*' hole. He was walking up to the tee getting ready to hit 
a three wood off o f the tee. He had been playing faster than he would have liked. The 
beep went off as he was walking up to the tee. At the moment of the beep, Mike is saying 
a phrase out loud to himself quietly. It is loud enough for him but not others to hear. He is 
not clear about the exact words or their order, but he is saying something like “Nice and 
slow, nice and slow tempo” or “Nice and slow tempo, tempo, rhythm” at the moment of 
the beep. This externally spoken phrase is Mike's process of preparing for his next shot. 
The phrase is part of his awareness at the moment o f the beep, but this is not a very clear 
experience. It is not apparent to us whether or not Mike has any inner experience at the
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moment of the beep, but Mike does not recall having any inner experience outside of just 
saying this phrase out loud to himself to prepare for his shot.
Inner Experience During Golf Competition 
Mike played the back nine in the golf competition. During the competition, Mike 
experienced perceptual awareness during three of his ten samples (30%), and he had three 
indeterminate inner experiences as well (30%). Mike experienced both unsymbolized 
thinking and speaking aloud in 2 o f his 10 samples (20%). He had one instance of 
sensory awareness, inner speech, inner seeing, and experienced doing (10%). Most of 
these inner experiences were unclear at least to some extent. He had golf-related content 
in his inner experience in 9 of 10 of his inner experiences during golf competition (90%). 
Mike’s golf-related content will be briefly discussed, followed by a description of part of 
Mike’s mental preparation routine engages in that involves “tempo,” and a comparison of 
Mike’s inner experience during golf and daily life will be conducted.
Golf-Related Content
O f Mike’s 10 collected Tournament Samples, 9 or 90% contained golf-related 
content. Examples of golf-related content experiences watching another golfer and 
simultaneously irmerly seeing o f his own previous shot, experiencing an indeterminate 
thought about the badness of his shot, actively focusing visually on his ball with 
simultaneous unsymbolized thinking that he hit it way too long, saying a phrase out loud 
to himself to maintain a nice and slow tempo, an indeterminate inner experience about a 
previous “bad” shot, unsymbolized thinking about going to a golf meeting, saying to 
himself “fairway” internally and repeatedly after hitting a shot, feeling an internal diffuse 
heat sensation while simultaneously reaching for a glass of ice and experiencing an
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indeterminate thought, and planning where to hit the ball by actively looking down the 
fairway.
Mike had two inner experiences while he was golfing in which he was engaged in 
what he described as his typical mental preparation routine. The first o f these actually 
occurred during his first sampling day, whereas the second occurred during the golf 
competition. As part of his routine, he focuses on his tempo. Mike’s spoken “Tempo” is 
apparently part o f his typical warm-up routine. He often says “Tempo” like a metronome 
during his practiee swings to cue himself to swing nice and smooth and to stay behind the 
ball.
In Sample 1.1 for instance, Mike was on the driving range hitting balls to warm up 
before beginning his round. He is addressing the ball with his 8 iron, the last club he uses 
in his warm-up routine. The beep catches Mike in his backswing with the club at about 
waist height saying the word “Tempo” to himself rhythmically in his own voice. He does 
not remember if it is the same as his normal external voice or not. Also at the moment of 
the beep, Mike is actively focused on the ball, paying attention to the center o f the ball by 
looking at it. Also at the moment of the beep, Mike is monitoring his swing in the sense 
that he would notice if he did something wrong in his swing so that he could fix it. 
However, this process is outside of his awareness at the moment. It is a fact o f the 
universe that he is monitoring his swing, but he is not aware of that monitoring. The 
details of this inner experience are not very clear. Mike had difficulty separately what 
was actually in his inner experience at the moment o f the beep from how he thinks his 
preparation routine occurs generally, which is common for the first few sampling beeps.
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Mike’s other instance of speaking “Tempo” to himself occurred in Sample T.4, which 
was previously described, Mike is saying something like “Nice and slow, nice and slow 
tempo” or “Niee and slow tempo, tempo, rhythm” at the moment of the beep out loud to 
himself quietly. The externally spoken phrase is part of preparation for his shot.
Mike’s mental preparation routine apparently often involves the iimer experience of 
“Tempo.” We captured two instances of this inner experience, one of which was internal 
speech whereas the other was external. Had we captured more, we might have been better 
able to determine whether or to what extent the form and content of this inner experience 
may vary.
Comparing Inner Experience During Golf and Daily Life 
Two-thirds of Mike’s usable daily life samples were collected while golfing. 
Recreational golf was considered part of his daily life inner experience for the purpose of 
this idiographic chapter; it will be taken out of golf and daily life analyses so the settings 
are consistent across participants in the nomothetic results Chapter 16.
Mike’s inner experiences from his daily samples were mostly similar in form to those 
collected during the golf tournament. For instance, Mike experienced a similar amount of 
perceptual awareness during his daily samples (1 o f 6 or 17%) as he did during the golf 
tournament samples (2 of 10 or 20%). He also experienced a similar amount of unclear 
indeterminate inner experience during his daily samples (1 of 6 or 17%) as he did during 
the golf tournament samples (2 of 10 or 20%). He experienced a similar amount of both 
inner speech and sensory awareness during his daily samples (1 of 6 or 17% for both) as 
he did during the golf tournament samples (1 of 10 or 10% for both). Mike had a fairly
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similar amount o f unsymbolized thinking during his daily samples (2 of 6 or 33%) as he 
did during the golf tournament samples as well (2 o f 10 or 20%).
The only remarkable differences in Mike’s daily samples and his golf tournament 
samples were found in the number of feeling and speaking aloud experiences he had. 
Mike had feelings in 2 of 6 or 33% of in his daily samples and none in the golf 
tournament samples. He also had no speaking aloud in his daily samples and 2 o f 10 or 
20% in the golf tournament samples.
Mike was golfing during two-thirds o f his daily samples and, of course, during all of 
his golf tournament samples. The similarities between Mike’s daily samples and his golf 
tournament samples were much more remarkable than the differences.
Discussion
Mike’s inner experiences were about average in clarity when compared to some of 
the other participants. A few of our participants’ experiences were frequently mueh 
clearer, and a few were frequently much less clear. When it occurred, Mike’s lack of 
clarity manifested itself as indeterminate irmer experiences in which the form of his inner 
experience was unclear. When Mike had unclear indeterminate inner experiences, he did 
more clearly experience the content of his inner experiences, however. Despite some 
unclear indeterminate inner experiences, the majority of Mike’s inner experiences were 
clearer. For instance, his perceptual awareness experiences were clearer albeit often not 
richly detailed.
During the golf competition, Mike experienced two perceptual awareness and two 
indeterminate inner experiences. He also had a couple instances of unsymbolized 
thinking and speaking aloud. He had just one instance of sensory awareness, inner
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speech, inner seeing, and doing experience. Almost all of his golf competition samples 
contained golf-related content. Mike’s mental preparation routine apparently involves the 
inner experience of “Tempo,” and we captured two instances of this inner experience. 
One of these involved internal speech whereas the other involved external speech. Mike 
was golfing during most of his daily samples and during all of his golf tournament 
samples, and the similarities in the form of his inner experiences during his daily samples 
and his golf tournament samples were much more noticeable than the differences.
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CHAPTER 14 
RYAN
Ryan is a 48 year-old highly-skilled golfer with a handicap of 4. He was recruited by 
one of the researchers through a contact in the community. He completed his first three 
sampling days by obtaining 18 samples from his daily life. He collected his daily life 
samples in the middle of the summer, and he participated in the golf competition 
sampling in the middle o f the same summer, collecting 13 samples. Ryan shot 88, 16 over 
par, 12 strokes higher than his handicap of 4. As a result, Ryan finished 10* or last in the 
golf competition.
Clarity
Ryan had more difficulty describing the form of his inner experience than did most 
other study participants. Ryan became increasingly able to describe his inner experience 
more easily and consistently as he gained sampling experience, but even at the end of 
sampling still had some difficulties. It was usually easier for him to identify the content 
of his inner experience than the form or features of it, although the content was difficult 
on occasion as well. When it was difficult to describe the content of his inner experience, 
Ryan was unable to provide many precise details about any aspect of his inner 
experiences.
Ryan had considerable difficulty apprehending or “zeroing in on” the moment o f the 
beep. When asked what was present in his inner experience at the moment of the beep, he
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often described content from well before or after the moment of the beep, making it 
diffieult to determine what was present at the moment of the beep. That is frequent 
among many subjects on their first sampling day; this persisted to some degree 
throughout Ryan’s sampling. Thus Ryan had difficulty both describing in his inner 
experience as well as difficulty apprehending when his inner experience occurred in 
relation to the moment of the beep.
With practice, Ryan improved somewhat in his ability to describe the form of his 
inner experience, and he also somewhat improved in his ability to describe content. 
Ryan’s relative unclarity cannot be ascribed to lack o f effort or interest in the sampling 
process. He seemed interested throughout; he attended all scheduled sampling sessions 
without canceling any; he attempted to answer all interview questions and was 
comfortable saying why he thought it was difficult to describe his inner experience; he 
kept track o f the exact time when each beep went off; all are indicators o f a conscientious 
approach to the task. As an example o f his interest in the sampling, Ryan was curious 
enough to ask what we had learned about his inner experience twice during different 
sampling interviews.
He often described the same inner experience in different ways. When asked to 
elaborate, he could do so somewhat more consistently as he gained sampling experience, 
but inconsistencies still remained. He frequently used subjunctifiers and often seemed to 
change his mind about what was present at the moment of the beep. By the golf 
tournament, Ryan had gradually improved in his ability to describe the form and content 
of his inner experiences, however it remained difficult for him to apprehend and describe
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his inner experience in relation to the moment of the beep throughout all of his sampling 
days.
All five of Ryan’s samples from the first sampling day were so unclear that the form 
could not be determined. It was not apparent whether this was due merely to difficulty 
acquiring the sampling method, whether Ryan’s inner experience was unclear, or both. 
Whatever the reason, these inner experiences where described in a manner much more 
unclear than most of the other participants. On the second sampling day, Ryan had three 
unclear inner experiences out of six. On the third sampling day, Ryan had one unclear 
inner experience and two unclear indeterminate inner experiences out of six. During the 
golf tournament, Ryan had no indeterminate inner experiences and clearer inner 
experiences with respect to form and content for all of his samples compared to his daily 
life; however some ambiguity about the timing of his inner experience in relation to the 
moment of the beep remained.
In Sample 3.3, Ryan had an unclear just doing experience. Before the moment of the 
beep, Ryan was replacing the grip on his putter. He was cutting some lead tape to put on 
the putter and trying not to cut himself. At the moment of the beep, Ryan is just cutting 
the tape and being careful not to cut himself. He is also looking at his putter, but he is not 
aware o f the putter; he is absorbed in the doing of his cutting behavior. It was very 
difficult for Ryan to decide whether or not an inner seeing was present at the moment of 
the beep or not. At first he thought there was an inner seeing o f his putter at the moment 
of the beep, but the more we asked Ryan to describe it, the more uncertain he became. 
Later, he came to think an inner seeing may have been present before the beep rather than 
at the moment o f the beep, but he was never entirely sure. So Ryan came to think no
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inner seeing was present at the moment o f the beep and that he was just cutting the tape 
and being careful at the moment of the beep. This is a just doing experience with 
ambiguity about the timing of the moment o f the beep as well as the possible presence or 
absence of another form of inner experience, an inner seeing, at the moment o f the beep.
In Sample 3.2, Ryan had an unclear indeterminate inner experience. Ryan was in his 
garage, putting his golf clubs in his car, and looking at the interior of his car. At the 
moment of the beep, Ryan is aware o f the spots on the carpet of his car. These spots are 
in his awareness somehow. It is not apparent to us, or we think to Ryan, exactly how this 
inner experience takes shape. Ryan advanced several possibilities: perhaps he was having 
an inner seeing of what the carpet will look like when it’s clean, but if  so, he does not 
remember the details. Perhaps he was thinking about having the outside of the car 
cleaned in words, but if so, he cannot remember the exact words. Perhaps there were 
several inner experiences present at the moment of the beep. Perhaps he was just 
noticing the spots on the carpet visually. This is a very unclear inner experience for which 
Ryan cannot provide any or many details, probably because no or not many details were 
there. Ambiguity about the form of this inner experience was present as Ryan was never 
able to apprehend and describe its form, nor could we. Ambiguity about the general 
nature o f the content of this inner experience (e.g., the spots) was not present; however, 
Ryan was never able to apprehend and describe much about the specific details (e.g., 
what his experience of the spots was like), and so of course, nor could we. He knows the 
beep catches him somehow involved in the noticing of the spots on the carpet, but the 
form and specific content of this experience were unclear.
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Despite the lower clarity o f some of Ryan’s experience, as he became more 
experienced in the sampling method, fewer o f his inner experiences were unclear, 
especially with respect to the form and content of his inner experiences. These clearer 
inner experiences included perceptual awareness, sensory awareness, feeling, and inner 
speech.
Perceptual Awareness 
Ryan experienced perceptual awareness in 8 or 31 or 26% of his samples. In Sample 
2.1, Ryan was working on the golf course and taking a break. He had seen a shady place 
under a tree and decided that was where he would go. At the moment o f the beep, Ryan is 
looking at the shade under the tree where he had wanted to go with visual awareness. 
Ryan does not know whether or not he is thinking about going to this spot at the moment 
o f the beep as part o f what he is looking at or whether he had already thought about going 
and now is just looking at the shady place, but he is certain that he is looking at the shady 
place with conscious awareness at the moment of the beep. Ryan is looking with 
awareness at the shady place, but he is simply uncertain about whether he is also thinking 
about going there at the moment of the beep.
In Sample 3.7, Ryan had a clear passive perceptual awareness. Ryan was backing out 
o f the garage in his ear and looking at the white garage door. At the moment of the beep, 
Ryan is just looking at the garage door go down without being particularly absorbed in 
what he is looking at. He is just looking at the garage door go down, a passive visual 
experience. This was different from some of Ryan’s previous inner experiences in that he 
eould easily tell that this was the only inner experience present at the moment of the beep 
and that there was no other irmer experience present at the moment of the beep. He was
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not thinking about where he is going, about golf later that day, or anything else; he was 
just noticing the garage door at the moment of the beep.
Both of the perceptual awarenesses Ryan experienced during his daily life samples 
were basic visual experiences in his conscious awareness. The remaining six of Ryan’s 
perceptual awarenesses came during golf competition, which will be described in the 
Inner Experience During Golf section.
Sensory Awareness
Ryan experienced sensory awareness in 6 of 31 or 19% of his samples. In Sample 3.6, 
Ryan had a sensory awareness in which he was absorbed with the clearness of his vision. 
The use of the term clear in this sample refers to the clarity of his actual visual sensory 
process at the moment of the beep rather than how the term has been used until this point 
to refer to the clarity o f his inner experience. In Sample 3.6, Ryan was wearing the wrong 
glasses and was seeing how unclear they make his vision. Leading up to the moment of 
the beep, Ryan put on the eorrect pair o f glasses. At the moment o f the beep, Ryan is 
particularly noticing how clear his vision is with the correct glasses. His being absorbed 
in the clarity o f his vision is an unambiguous external visual inner experienee. At first, 
Ryan was not sure if another inner experience was present at the moment of the beep, but 
he eventually decided that that occurred after the beep. After the beep, Ryan was thinking 
that he has to put a tag on his glasses so he can tell which is the correct pair.
Unlike many of his other daily life samples, in Sample 3.6, Ryan was experiencing a 
visual sensory awareness that was clear with respect to the form and content of his inner 
experience as well as the timing moment of the beep. Parallel to this, the content o f this 
inner experience was the clarity of his vision, and Ryan was particularly interested in this
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clarity as if, we speculate, it was somehow novel, perhaps different than his previous 
inner experiences. Whatever the reason he is interested in this clarity, which will 
probably never be known. Sample 3.6 marks a critical point in Ryan’s sampling because 
his inner experience was much clearer for the first time and remained clear in all of in his 
subsequent samples. In fact in the next sample he collected. Sample 3.7, which was 
previously described in the Perceptual Awareness Section, Ryan had a clear passive 
perceptual awareness o f his garage door; he could easily tell that this was the only inner 
experience present at the moment of the beep. As we will see, this clarity continued from 
Ryan’s first Tournament Sample T .l, which will be described in the Perceptual 
Awareness subsection of the Inner Experience During Golf section to follow. His clarity 
continued throughout the rest of his golf samples.
All five o f Ryan’s sensory awareness experiences involved being absorbed in external 
visual sensations, and Sample 3.6 marked a turning point in the clarity of Ryan’s 
momentary inner experience.
Feeling
Ryan experienced feelings in 4 of 3 1 or 13% of his samples. Three of these were very 
similar in content and intensity: Ryan was “fuming” at the moment of the beep. In two of 
these three experiences, which will be described next, Ryan was fuming at his employees. 
In the third, which will be described later, he was fuming at himself.
Fuming
In Sample 2.4, Ryan was driving and looking for a couple of his employees that had 
not been able to find the site of their job even though they had told Ryan they knew 
where it was. At the moment of the beep, Ryan is fuming, a feeling without any clear
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details. He does not know if he was experiencing this feeling mentally or bodily, but he 
his sure is he fuming at his employees and this fuming is an extremely intense feeling at 
the moment of the beep. Ryan is also looking at the Circle K at the moment o f the beep, 
but he does not know whether this is in his irmer experience. Ryan has a sense that there 
are several other things going on inside him at the moment o f the beep, but because he is 
driving, looking for his employees, and fuming, all in the vicinity o f the moment of the 
beep, it was too difficult for Ryan to remember exactly whether anything else was in his 
irmer experience at or near the moment of the beep.
In Sample 2.5, Ryan was driving and looking for his lost employees still. At the 
moment of the beep, Ryan is fuming at his employees, which he experiences as the same 
feeling as the feeling in Sample 2.4, a fuming feeling without any clear details that is 
extremely intense. Ryan has a sense that there are several other things going on inside at 
the moment of the beep, but again because he is driving, looking for his employees, and 
fuming, all in the vicinity of the moment of the beep, it is too difficult for Ryan to 
remember the details of his inner experienee. O f all of these things going on in the 
vicinity of the moment of the beep, Ryan thinks the extremely intense fuming feeling 
may have destroyed his apprehension of additional details about this irmer experience.
Ryan was fuming intensely at his employees in both the previous samples. He had a 
sense that there are several other things going on inside near and possibly at the moment 
o f the beep, but in neither case was Ryan able to remember the details of what else may 
have been going on, nor could he exactly tell when the beep may have occurred in 
relation to these difficult-to-apprehend and difficult-to-describe other inner experiences. 
This diffieulty may have been due to the fact he was engaged in driving and having
232
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
intense fuming experiences that could have overwhelmed the other inner experiences. 
Ryan’s other two feelings occurred during the golf tournament. In Tournament Sample 
T.8, which will be described later in the Inner Experience During Golf section, Mike was 
also fuming, this time at himself about his poor golf performance, but he did apprehend 
as simultaneous speaking out loud experience in this instance.
Inner Speech
Ryan was speaking to himself in an inner voice in 4 of 31 or 13% of his samples. 
Three of Ryan’s four inner speaking experiences occurred during the golf tournament. 
One inner speaking. Sample 3.1, occurred during everyday life, but that inner speaking 
was experienced as being secondary to a sensory awareness. Thus in none of Ryan’s 18 
daily samples was inner speech the prominent aspect of his experience.
In Sample 3.1, Ryan experienced a sensory awareness with a secondary, not 
confidently apprehended experience o f inner speaking. Ryan was watching a news 
program about sex offending and looking at the suit the newsperson is wearing. At the 
moment of the beep, Ryan is noticing the suit the newsperson is wearing. Ryan is 
particularly aware o f the plaid pattern of the brown suit, which has thin lines. Ryan also 
has a sense of words being present in his own voice, but he cannot describe the exact 
words. When asked to describe the exact words, he gave at least three versions of what he 
might have been saying, the last of which was something like “He's worn this suit 
before.” Ryan was fairly certain he was saying something internally, but he did not 
remember exactly what. Also, Ryan was watching TV but he is paying less attention to 
story, so it is doubtful the story is in his inner experience. More attention is devoted 
toward the suit and the words that he might have been saying, but we never approached a
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very solid understanding of his inner speech experience with much certainty about its 
precise content. Ryan is sure that he was no longer aware about the content of the story, 
however. Ryan’s other three instance of inner speech occurred during the golf tournament 
was will be described in the Inner Experience During Golf section.
Inner Experience During Golf 
Ryan played the back nine in the golf eompetition. Ryan collected 13 Tournament 
Samples. His most frequently-occurring inner experiences were perceptual awareness 
(46%), inner speeeh (23%), sensory awareness (23%), and feeling (15%). Ryan’s 
Tournament Samples will be described, followed by his golf-related content. Finally, a 
comparison will be made between Ryan’s inner experience in his golf samples and his 
daily samples.
Perceptual Awareness
Ryan had instances of perceptual awareness in 6 o f 13 or 46% of his Tournament 
Samples. Ryan had four instances of active pereeptual awareness that involved aetively 
looking and judging golf shots. In Tournament Sample T.l for instance, Ryan was on the 
first hole about 75 yards away from the green. He had just taken a shot, the ball is in the 
air, and he knew it was a good shot. The beep goes off when the ball is in the air about 20 
feet from the hole. At the moment of the beep, he is watching the ball come down and 
knowing it is a good shot. This is an experience of externally seeing the ball in the air and 
evaluating and recognizing it is as a good shot, which is a positive experience. This is an 
active perceptual experience of watching the ball and knowing it is a good shot. After the 
beep, the ball landed within 5 feet of the hole.
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Tournament Sample T.l was the second sample collected after Ryan’s inner 
experience became clearer in Sample 3.6, which was previously-described in the Sensory 
Awareness section. It included a clear perceptual awareness inner experience, unlike 
many o f the previously-described daily life inner experiences.
Inner Speech
Ryan had instances of inner speech in 3 o f 13 or 23% of his Tournament Samples. In 
Tournament Sample T.9, Ryan experieneed inner speech not-related to golf in content. 
Before the moment of the beep, Ryan was driving the golf cart and looking at the houses 
around the golf course, and he was looking at the brownness o f the house, a sensory 
awareness experience of being captivated by the brownness, and he was somehow 
thinking about how horrible the house looks. At the moment o f the beep, he is looking at 
the landscaping in the back yard of a particular house and thinking about how horrible it 
looks. This occurs to Ryan as saying to himself inside “Look at that piece of shit!”
Ryan’s other two instances of inner speech had golf-related content. For instance in 
Tournament Sample T.3, Ryan was in conversation with another golfer and saying 
“bullshit” internally to himself about the unfair point system o f another golf tournament, 
and in Tournament Sample G.I2, he was internally saying “H e’s got a long putt,” or 
“He’s got to hit this ball,” or something to that effect; he forgot the exact words.
Feeling
Ryan had feelings in 2 of 13 or 15% of his Tournament Samples. Both of these were 
negative feelings directed at his poor golf performance.
Fuming. In Tournament Sample T.8, Ryan experienced a fuming feeling similar to his 
fuming experiences that were previously described in the Feeling section (Samples 2.4
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and 2.5); however this time, Ryan apprehended a co-occurring speaking aloud 
experience. In Sample T.8, before the beep, Ryan had hit a tee shot and was frustrated 
because he could see his ball out of bounds. At the moment of the beep, Ryan is fuming 
at hitting a bad shot. This is a feeling experience, but Ryan does not know if  he is 
experiencing this mentally or bodily, he just knows he is fuming. This feeling occurs at 
the same time he is speaking out loud. He is saying a series of expletives out loud such as 
“you fucking idiot” or “motherfucker” or “how could you hit the ball over there?!” After 
the beep, Ryan realized this was actually not his ball, and he became relieved 
Sensory A wareness
Both of Ryan’s sensory awarenesses were non-golf-related distracting experiences. In 
Tournament Sample T.4, for instance, Ryan was on the 18th hole after he hit a good shot. 
He had been playing terribly and decided not to ride in the golf cart before the moment of 
the beep. As he was walking, the waterfall on the 18th hole caught his eye, and he before 
the beep he was thinking about walking through the waterfall on this hot day, thinking 
about how refreshing it would be, although he did not want to get his socks wet. At the 
moment of the beep, Ryan is looking at the waterfall with admiration. He is noticing how 
colorful the waterfall stones are and how neat the shape of the flowing water looks as it is 
coming down. He is absorbed in the sensory aspects of the waterfall.
Golf-Related Content
Ryan had golf-related content in 9 of 13 or 69% of his Tournament Samples. 
Examples o f golf-related content include seeing his ball in the air and recognizing it is as 
a good shot, actively looking at an opponent’s ball and knowing that it is short (two inner 
experiences), watching an opponent’s ball travel and judging it to be too slow, saying an
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expletive to himself internally in reference to an upcoming golf tournament’s unfair point 
system in the midst of conversation about golf, fuming at having hit a bad shot while 
saying a series of expletives out loud, looking at his ball and recognizing it to be his, 
saying to himself that his opponent has a long shot, and feeling pissed at himself about 
his poor golf performance
Comparing Inner Experience During Golf and Daily Life
Ryan’s inner experience during golf was clearer than his inner experience during 
daily life. The onset of Ryan’s clarity was punctuated by his clear sensory awareness 
experience in Sample 3.6, and it continued in sample 3.7; Ryan had no unclear 
indeterminate inner experiences during his golf samples whatsoever (0 of 13 or 0%), 
whereas during his daily samples he had much more (7 of 17 or 41%). Thus Ryan’s inner 
experience was clearer during golf.
The increase in the clarity of Ryan’s inner experience may be due to intrinsic or 
extrinsic reasons. The intrinsic explanation is that Ryan’s inner experience became 
clearer much later and less gradually than for most of the other study participants. It 
could be that Ryan’s inner experience was fundamentally and inherently less clear prior 
to Sample 3.6. Ryan’s inner experience cleared up dramatically at or around this point. 
This spurt in clarity coincided with his gradually increasing experience with the sampling 
method, but unlike his gradually increasing experience, his clarity jumped forward faster. 
The disparate increases in his rate of technical prowess and clarity may mean that Ryan’s 
inner experience was fundamentally and inherently less clear before Sample 3.6 and more 
clear after for intrinsic rather than technical reasons. The extrinsic explanation is that 
Ryan’s inner experience became clearer during golf because something about golf made
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his inner experience more clear. This explanation is supported by the observation that all 
o f his inner experience during golf was much clearer than most of his inner experience 
during his daily life. This explanation also argues that his Sample 3.6 and Sample 3.7 
clarity was, at least in part, a random occurrence. That is, random fluctuations in clarity 
may have been occurring, and these samples captured two of them.
We believe that both of these explanations are probably true; that is, Ryan’s daily life 
inner experience was often unclear intrinsically and not for technical reasons, and 
something about the extrinsic activity of golf made his inner experience more 
intrinsically clearer.
Discussion
Ryan’s inner experience during his daily life was less clear than most of the other 
participants. Ryan specifically emphasized that describing his inner experiences was 
difficult because so many things were going on in his inner experience just before, 
during, and after the moment of the beep. Another possibility is that we lacked the ability 
to help Ryan get to a more definitive understanding of his inner experience. Our 
understanding is that either Ryan’s inner experiences were often complicated, 
overlapping, asynchronous, and therefore difficult to describe especially when it came to 
apprehending his inner experience as well as the timing of the moment of the beep, or we 
could not assist Ryan very well, or both; any of these options may have been the case, 
and some may have applied to some samples more than others. We believe it is most 
likely that the majority of Ryan’s daily life instances o f unclarity were of the fundamental 
inherent type. This is to say that we believe Ryan’s inner experience prior to Sample 3.6 
was often complicated, overlapping, asynchronous, and therefore difficult to describe
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rather than due to any lack of technical prowess in using the sampling method. One 
reason for this is that his clarity came all at once, whereas his technical prowess increased 
gradually, in our observation. Furthermore, Ryan approached the sampling task very 
conscientiously, so it seemed unlikely that his difficulty describing his inner experience 
came about as a result of the technical lack of effort or inattention to what he was doing. 
To the contrary, he often would describe exactly where he was, what he was doing, and 
even sometimes what time it was when the beep occurred, but when he looked to describe 
his inner experience, nothing but ambiguity and difficulty in described it was often 
observed during the many of the daily life interviews. We also believe that Ryan’s inner 
experience during golf may generally be fundamentally and inherently more clear, as it 
was when he collected his golf samples.
Whatever the reason(s), Ryan’s inner experience was described with less ease and 
clarity, sometimes with respect to the form of his inner experience, on a few occasions 
with respect to the content, but mostly with respect to the timing of the moment o f the 
beep. His first clear sensory awareness experience at the end of the third sampling day 
marked a turning point in the clarity o f his inner experience that continued throughout the 
golf tournament as Ryan became better able to describe the form and content of his inner 
experiences. It remained difficult for him to apprehend and describe his inner experienee 
in relation to the moment of the beep throughout all of his sampling days, somewhat less 
so during golf, however.
Why might Ryan’s inner experience have been so unclear for so many of his daily life 
samples, only to become clearer during golf? It seems to us that several possible 
explanations could account for this. The first possibility is that the golf situation brings
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out clarity in Ryan’s inner experience. The second is that it just took Ryan longer to do 
the task for no apparent reason. The third is that he did have an epiphany, suddenly 
“getting” the sampling method and acquiring technical prowess coincidental with golf. 
The forth is that Ryan could have been sampling during a problematic time in his daily 
life. If this were the case, perhaps his life is stressful, golf is an escape from stress, and 
with less stress, his inner experience was clearer.
Ryan’s most salient daily life inner experiences were perceptual awareness, sensory 
awareness, feelings, and inner speech. His salient golf inner experiences were the same 
four forms of inner experience. The content of his inner experiences were somewhat less 
frequently-related to golf than most of the other participants in this study. In fact, two of 
his inner experiences during golf were distracted sensory awareness experiences. The 
main differenee between Ryan’s inner experiences during golf compared with his daily 
life was the dramatic increase in clarity o f his inner experience during golf.
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CHAPTER 15 
AARON
Aaron is a 54 year-old highly-skilled golfer with a handicap of two. He was reeruited 
by one of the researchers through a contact in the community. He completed his first 
three sampling days by obtaining samples from his daily life. He collected his 15 daily 
life samples in the middle of the summer. He participated in the golf competition 
sampling in the middle of the same summer and eollected 6 golf samples. Aaron shot 71,
1 stroke under par, 3. strokes lower than his handicap of 2. As a result, Aaron finished in a 
tie for 3'̂ ‘* in the golf competition.
Aaron had an unusually difficult time learning to use the beeper. On the first 
scheduled sampling day, Aaron tried to collect several samples in the beeper’s “chirp” 
mode, most likely because he had failed to press the button that resets the beeper to send 
it back into the random sampling mode. The beeper goes into “chirp” mode when a 
random beep goes off and the user fails to press the reset button. When the beeper goes 
into “chirp” mode, a battery saving feature, it beeps every 10 seconds to remind the 
participant/researcher to either reset or turn off the device. Although the task of resetting 
the device was demonstrated during our initial meeting, and he correctly practiced it in 
the researcher’s presence, he still had difficulty that affected his beeps collected on the 
first day. The beeps collected this first day are considered spoiled because he responded
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to the “chirp” every 10 seconds instead of the random beep. Aaron was given a different 
beeper in case the original one was broken, but after it was tested, it appeared normal.
During the second attempt at sampling for the first day, Aaron called the researcher 
with the same difficulty -  the beeper had once again gone into “chirp” mode. After 
reminding him to press the reset button, Aaron made another attempt at collecting beeps. 
He was told to call with any difficulties he might have. After what seemed to Aaron to be 
an hour o f waiting for a beep, Aaron called expressing concern that he was not using the 
device correctly because he had not yet heard a beep. After being told he to turn off the 
beeper and turn it on again, he eventually started collecting beeps and interviewed at the 
sampling lab the next day.
During the first successful sampling day, Aaron had a difficult time describing his 
inner experience at the moment of the beep. Inner experiences before and after the 
moment o f the beep, as well as his own general ideas about himself, intruded on his 
discussion of what was in his inner experience at the moment of the beep. It is difficult to 
determine whether he had difficulty with the sampling task, both with initially using the 
beeper and describing momentary inner experience, and clearly defined inner experience, 
or whether he had some sort of inner experience that made the sampling task difficult 
such as unclearly defined inner experience.
Unclear Indeterminate Inner Experiences 
Aaron had inner experiences that were so unclear that the form of his inner 
experience could not be determined in 6 o f 21 or 29% of his samples. Even by his third 
sampling day, the sampling task had not become easier for him; that is quite different 
from most other DES subjects. In Sample 3.1, for instance, Aaron was on the phone with
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his hair dresser to make an appointment. He was in the process o f leaving a message 
about his appointment on the answering machine. At the moment of the beep, Aaron is 
having some kind of inner experience that serves the purpose o f getting ready to make his 
appointment. It is not apparent to us, or we think to Aaron, exactly how this is 
experienced at the moment o f the beep. Aaron may be anticipating without words or 
inner seeing of the person’s response when they pick up the phone. Aaron may also have 
some appointment times in mind at the moment of the beep, but this is also very 
ambiguous. It seems that Aaron is anticipating the person’s response in some way, and he 
may even have some times in mind somehow (e.g., an inner seeing of his schedule), or 
these may in fact be the same inner experience, but this is a very unclear inner experience 
in both form and content. For this reason, beyond the possibility that Aaron is 
anticipating a response and/or perhaps having some times in mind, not much can 
definitively be said. Aaron was also not very certain about when the beep occurred.
In Sample 3.2, Aaron was reading an article about Muhammad All’s daughter, Laila. 
At the moment of the beep Aaron is reading about one of Laila’s professors, Nate 
Bynum, who is helping Laila get into the movies. Aaron is having some kind o f inner 
experience related to what he is reading, but it is very difficult for us to ascertain the 
characteristics of this experience. Our best understanding is that Aaron’s experience was 
unclear to him, resulting in his difficulty in telling it to us. It is possible that he is just 
passively reading. It is possible that Aaron is experiencing the words he is reading 
somehow internally. Both of these seem equally possible ways in which Aaron’s inner 
experience may have occurred. In addition to this being a very unclear inner experience, 
Aaron was also not very confident about when the beep occurred.
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In Sample T.3, Aaron experienced an instance of unclear inner experience with two 
instances of perceptual awarenesses, one of which was clear. He was on his 4''’ stroke of 
the 17* hole, a par 5. It is not entirely apparent where the beep occurs in this inner 
experience, but just before the beep or perhaps even at the moment of the beep, Aaron is 
setting up to hit the ball, looking at the spot where he will hit it, and thinking about where 
to hit it. He is looking externally at the spot where he plans to hit the ball to see the line 
from where the ball will go, which he thinks is left to right, although Aaron is not sure 
whether left to right is in his awareness or not. This is a clear perceptual awareness with 
ambiguity about the moment o f the beep. Also near the moment of the beep, he is 
deciding where and how to hit the ball. This is experienced as an unclear thought process 
about a number of factors (e.g., there’s a hill, a backdrop, should he hit it high or low?). 
The details of this inner experience and exactly how it occurred are very ambiguous as is 
the timing o f the beep. Also at some point as he is mentally preparing to hit the ball, he 
sees the “cart girl,” Angie, pull up. It is not apparent when the beep occurred exactly, 
whether it was just before or just after the moment of the beep, but Aaron is seeing and 
recognizing Angie driving up the green and getting distracted from golf. Aaron’s 
momentary experience contained a clear perceptual awareness experience with ambiguity 
about the timing of the beep, an unclear indeterminate thought process, and a perceptual 
awareness o f being distracted also with ambiguity about the time o f the beep.
Aaron had several inner experiences in which the form and content were unclear. 
These inner experiences also often lacked specific details. In most of these instances, it 
was also difficult for Aaron to identify the timing of the beep in relation to his inner 
experience. He did have fewer unclear indeterminate inner experiences during the golf
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competition. During his daily life samples, 5 o f 15 or 33% of his inner experiences were 
unclear and indeterminate, whereas during golf competition, 1 of 6 or 17% were unclear 
and indeterminate. Aaron also had slightly fewer difficulties identifying the moment of 
the beep in relation to his inner experience during the golf competition. Despite the slight 
decrease in unclear indeterminate inner experience during golf, several of his Tournament 
Samples still contained unclear inner experiences o f some of the following forms.
Inner Seeing
Aaron experienced inner seeing in 4 o f 21 or 19% of his samples. In Sample 2.2, for 
instance, Aaron was talking to his friend Tom on the phone; Tom had just asked how 
Aaron’s other friend John is doing after recovering from a surgery. At the moment of the 
beep, Aaron is saying “H e’s doing real well” externally to his friend on the phone. At the 
same time, Aaron is internally seeing of John in the motion o f golfing, seeing a scene that 
had taken place a few days earlier. Aaron does not know whether the inner seeing is in 
color or black and white and cannot say much about the details of this inner seeing.
In Sample 3.5, Aaron was climbing his staircase, getting ready for dinner, and he was 
half way to the stairs. At the moment of the beep, Aaron is thinking about the color of the 
shirt he will choose to wear. He is internally seeing of the edge of his blue colored shirt 
hanging in his closet, and he is noting specifically the blueness of the shirt. He is not 
aware of details beyond the blueness of the shirt as viewed from its edge. This is a fairly 
clear inner seeing that Aaron is experiencing at the moment of the beep without many 
details. Aaron is not having any inner experience related to walking up the stairs. Aaron 
was also very confident about when the beep occurred in relation to his inner experience.
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Aaron experienced his clearest inner seeing in his daily life samples when he had a 
golf-related inner seeing during a phone conversation in Sample 3.3. Aaron was on the 
phone with a friend who was in Boston, where Aaron will be playing golf in the next few 
days. His friend had been joking that someone was playing mind games with them by 
putting them on a course in a tournament in which they all have to walk up hills in 90 
degree heat and hum idity.. At the moment o f the beep, Aaron is internally imagining 
himself struggling to climb up a par 4 hill to get to his ball. He sees himself walk as if  a 
camera is at the ball looking back down the fairway at him. He is seeing himself in 
motion walking up the hill, and sees the green grass and trees. This is a clear and detailed 
inner seeing experienced at the moment of the beep. Aaron experienced this as a very 
clear and memorable inner experience, one about which he had little or no doubt. At the 
moment o f this beep, Aaron may also be somehow anticipating what it will be like to be 
at this golf course in a manner that goes beyond inner seeing, such as thinking about it in 
a different way or feeling what it may be like to be there, but the details o f this possible 
inner experience are so ambiguous that not much about it can be said with certainty; it is 
also possible that this may just be part of the inner seeing at the moment of the beep, an 
additional metaphor to describe it, or an inner experience that occurred after the moment 
of the beep. (Incidentally, when Aaron was asked a few weeks later how well this inner 
seeing matched how the golf course turned out to be, he said it was scary how close the 
course in general and two holes in particular were to this inner seeing.)
Aaron experienced all o f his inner seeing during his daily life; none were captured 
during golf performance. His inner seeings varied in detail and clarity, from having 
sparse detail and not much clarity to being clear and detailed.
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Speaking Aloud
Aaron was speaking aloud with no other inner experience in 4 of 21 or 19% of his 
samples. In Tournament Sample T .l, Aaron was on his 2"̂  stroke of the 11* hole, a par 5. 
Aaron was in the process of telling another golfer he is entitled to relief. At the moment 
o f the beep, Aaron is saying the word “entitled” out loud. There was nothing else in his 
awareness at the moment o f the beep. Aaron is also looking at the other golfer, but he is 
paying attention to what he is saying rather than the golfer he is looking at.
In Tournament Sample T.5, Aaron had just finished the 8* hole and was checking out 
another player’s score. At the moment of the beep, Aaron was saying “Samuel, what did 
you make?” out loud. Aaron’s awareness of his own score has come and gone before the 
moment of the beep, and at the moment of the beep his inner experience is only that of 
asking the other golfer about his score out loud. There is no other inner experience 
present at the moment of the beep.
Aaron’s two other instances of speaking aloud occurred along with co-occuring forms 
of inner experience (i.e., inner seeing). Aaron’s speaking aloud inner experiences were 
clear inner experiences; the words he was saying at the moment o f the beep were clear in 
3 of 4 of his speaking aloud experiences.
Just Doing
Aaron had instances o f just doing in 2 of 21 or 10% of his samples. In Sample 2.5, for 
instance Aaron was getting ready to go to the store and putting his key in the car door. At 
the moment of the beep, Aaron is just in the process o f putting his key in the car to go to 
the store with no other inner experience. This is just a process o f putting the key in the 
car with no other inner experience at the moment of the beep.
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In Sample 3.6, Aaron was getting ready to leave for dinner and was putting 
moisturizer on and seeing himself in the mirror. At the moment o f the beep, Aaron is 
looking at his skin for spots of dryness. This is experienced as a visual process of 
directing himself to where to put the moisturizer, a process that involves no thinking, just 
an activity he is doing. It is not exactly apparent to us or we think to Aaron, but it seems 
that he was not aware of what he was looking at; instead, this is an activity he is doing 
without a mental or perceptual process. There is no other inner experience present at the 
moment o f the beep.
Aaron’s just doing experiences were activities he was doing without thought. One of 
his just doing experiences was quite clear, whereas the other was somewhat unclear.
Inner Speech
Aaron experienced inner speech in 2 of 21 or 10% of his samples. In Sample 2.6, 
Aaron was internally speaking about an item on a grocery list and listening to the radio. 
Before the moment of the beep, Aaron was listening to sports on his car radio while he is 
driving to the store. At the moment o f the beep, he is driving his car and reciting 
internally about the items on his grocery list. The words may be “ice cream” (or “hot 
dogs”) said in his own internal voice. This is a clear instance of inner speech, but he is 
unsure about its specific content (e.g., “ice cream,” “hot dogs”). Its general content is 
grocery list-related. He is also tracking the sports program on the radio by listening, but 
this is much less prominent than what he is saying to himself. Driving is automatic and 
not a part o f his itmer experience at the moment of the beep.
In Tournament Sample T.2, Aaron was on the 6* hole, a par 3; he has addressed the 
ball and is lining up to take a putt. At the moment o f the beep, Aaron is saying to himself
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internally, “This is left to right” in his own words. Aaron is quite confident about this. 
Also at the moment of the beep, Aaron is seeing the line where he will hit the ball. This is 
an experience o f looking externally with focus and perceiving a brown spot on the green. 
[Incidentally, this is the approach that Aaron typically takes to putting, finding a spot on 
the green between the ball and the hole (spot putting).
Both of Aaron’s inner speech experiences co-occurred with other forms of inner 
experience (i.e., just listening, perceptual awareness). His inner speech varied in detail 
and clarity, from having sparse detail and not much clarity to being clear and detailed.
Inner Experience During Golf 
Aaron played the back nine in the golf competition. He collected six Tournament 
Samples. His most frequently-occurring inner experiences were speaking aloud (50%), 
perceptual awareness (33%), and inner speech (17%) many of which were previously 
described. In 5 o f 6 or 83% of his samples, Aaron is either externally or innerly talking.
Two of Aaron’s Tournament Samples included mental preparation strategies present 
at the moment o f the beep. These strategies will be described first, followed by 
descriptions of his external and inner speech and finally his golf-related content.
Mental Preparation Strategies
The beeper captured two mental preparation strategies Aaron was using at the 
moment of the beep, accounting for 33% of his golf competition samples. Both included 
perceptual awareness.
In Tournament Sample T.2, described above in the Inner Speech section, Aaron was 
lining up to make a putt saying to himself internally, “This is left to right,” and seeing a 
brown spot on the green where he will aim the ball. In Tournament Sample T.3, described
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above in the Unclear Indeterminate Inner Experiences section, Aaron is preparing to hit 
the ball and looking externally at the spot where he will hit the ball. Also near the 
moment o f the beep, he is thinking about a number o f factors to decide how to hit ball in 
some manner, but the details of this are not clear. Aaron at some point is also seeing and 
recognizing Angie driving up the green and getting distracted from golf, a clear 
perceptual awareness with ambiguity about the timing of the moment o f the beep.
Both o f Aaron’s mental preparations strategies contained perceptual awareness, but 
they differed in Aaron’s apprehension of the moment of the beep. One was clear, and the 
other was unclear with respect to the timing o f the beep.
External Talking and Inner Speech
In 5 o f 6 or 83% of Aaron’s Tournament Samples, he was either talking out loud with 
no other inner experience or experiencing inner speech. For instance Aaron was speaking 
aloud, as we saw previously in Tournament Sample T .l, when he was saying the word 
“entitled” out loud to inform another golfer he was entitled relief. Also in Tournament 
Sample T.5, he was asking Samuel “what did you make?” out loud. Aaron experienced 
inner speech in Tournament Sample T.2 (also previously described) when he was 
preparing for his put. This occurred by saying to himself internally “this is left to right” in 
his own words.
Golf-Related Content
All o f Aaron’s Tournament Samples were inner experiences with golf-related content. 
Examples o f golf-related content include talking out loud about golf to another golfer 
with no other inner experience, asking another golfing question about golf with no other 
inner experience, talking out loud in a quite tone of voice to make a joke to another golfer
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about how his handicap should be lower than he has claimed, talking to himself internally 
about the distance o f the hole in his own voice, and the two aforementioned mental 
preparation strategies.
Comparing Inner Experience During Golf and Daily Life
Aaron experienced fewer inner seeings during the golf tournament than during his 
daily samples. None of his golf samples contained inner seeing, whereas during his daily 
life, Aaron had inner seeing in 4 of 15 or 27% of his samples. Aaron experienced more 
perceptual awareness during golf than during his daily life. During golf, Aaron had 
perceptual awareness in 2 of 6 or 33% of his samples, whereas during his daily life, none 
of his samples contained perceptual awareness. The clarity of Aaron’s inner experiences 
was greater during golf than during daily life. During golf, he had 1 of 6 or 17% unclear 
indeterminate inner experience (and even there it was possible to determine that the form 
of inner experience was inner speech), whereas during his daily life, Aaron had unclear 
indeterminate inner experiences in 5 o f 15 or 33% in his samples.
Discussion
Aaron had difficulty learning to use the beeper. After a couple unsuccessful attempts, 
he caught on. In the first sampling day, he had difficultly describing his experience at the 
moment of the beep; inner experiences before and after the moment of the beep, as well 
as his own general ideas about himself, tended to intrude upon momentary experience.
Aaron also had several unclear indeterminate inner experiences, the form of which 
could not be determined due lack of clarity; these were often unclear in both form and 
content and often lacked specific details. It was also often difficult for Aaron to identify 
moment of the beep precisely. Although he did have slightly fewer unclear indeterminate
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inner experiences during the golf competition, several of his Tournament Samples still 
contained unclear inner experiences.
Aaron’s lack of clarity may have been the result of: 1) difficulties with the sampling 
method that obscured otherwise clear inner experiences, 2) difficulties with the sampling 
and actual unclear inner experiences, or 3) difficulties with the sampling because o f  
unclear inner experiences. We think either o f the latter possibilities were most likely the 
case, that Aaron had difficulties with the sampling and/or because o f  unclear inner 
experience. One reason for this is that, despite increased practice with the sampling 
method, Aaron still had instances of unclear indeterminate inner experiences and unclear 
inner experiences throughout his daily life and golf samples. So as the method became 
apparently easier, the relative lack of clarity remained.
All of Aaron’s inner seeing occurred during his daily life samples; none were found 
during golf. His inner seeings varied in detail and clarity, from sparse detail without 
much clarity to being clear and detailed. Aaron’s speaking aloud experiences were 
typically clear. His just doing experiences were varied in clarity. Both of Aaron’s inner 
speech experiences co-occurred with other forms o f inner experience. His inner speech 
varied in both detail and clarity, from having sparse detail without much clarity to being 
clear and detailed.
During golf, Aaron’s most frequently-occurring inner experiences were speaking 
aloud and perceptual awareness. Both o f the mental preparations strategies Aaron 
collected contained perceptual awareness and they varied greatly in clarity. One was 
quite clear, and the other was unclear in form, content, and the timing of the beep. Aaron 
had several external talking and inner speech experiences during golf as well. All of
252
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Aaron’s Tournament Samples had golf-related content. Aaron experienced less inner 
seeing during golf than during his daily life, more perceptual awareness during golf than 
during his daily life, and less unclear indeterminate inner experiences during golf than his 
daily life.
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CHAPTER 16
NOMOTHETIC RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
This study presents two kinds of results. The previous section (Chapters 5 through 15) 
presented the first kind of results, idiographic descriptions of the salient characteristics of 
inner experiences within each individual participant, one participant at a time. The 
current section (Chapter 16) presents the second kind of results, nomothetic results across 
participants taken together, one characteristic o f inner experience at a time. There are 
three ways that we will discuss these nomothetic results: (I) across-all-participant 
descriptions o f experience during golf; (2) discriminating between during golf and daily 
life experience; and (3) discriminating between the two separate skill groups.
Table 1 presents the participants’ most frequent characteristics during golf and daily 
life. These results are presented in descending order starting with the most frequently- 
occurring characteristics o f inner experience during golf. Because participants can and 
did experience more than one co-occurring inner experience, the percentages of 
participants’ characteristics will not add up to 100 percent. To calculate these 
percentages, the numerator was the number of samples in which the particular type of 
inner experience occurred, and the denominator was the total number of samples 
collected by the setting in which they were collected. For example, John had 2 samples in 
which perceptual awareness occurred during his 12 daily samples, for a 17% frequency.
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TABLE 1; PERCENTAGES OF INNER EXPERIENCE
DURING GOLF AND DAILY LIFE
Moderate Handicap Group Low Handicap Group All
Category Setting Ca Jo Br Sa Wi Avg Mi To Aa Ch Ry Avg Avg
Golf-Related Content Golf 56 75 14 89 82 67 90 100 100 82 69 85 76
Dailv 0 8 0 0 9 5 0 0 7 10 6 6 5
Perceptual Awareness Golf 44 42 0 44 0 21 20 17 33 36 46 33 27
Dailv 33 17 10 33 0 25 0 0 0 10 11 6 17
Inner Speech Golf 11 17 14 33 64 29 10 0 17 55 23 24 27
Dailv 13 17 10 7 0 10 0 100 7 0 6 9 9
Mental Preparation Golf 11 8 0 11 0 6 20 33 33 36 0 22 14
Dailv na na na na na na na na na na na na na
Unsymbolized Thinking Golf 11 25 14 0 0 15 20 50 0 9 0 13 14
Dailv 27 25 30 7 9 19 50 0 7 30 6 13 16
Inner Seeing Golf 0 17 0 0 36 15 10 33 0 27 0 13 14
Dailv 0 25 20 0 27 16 0 100 27 30 6 21 18
Feeling Golf 11 17 0 0 18 13 0 33 0 18 15 15 14
Dailv 7 33 20 7 64 24 0 0 0 40 11 15 20
Sensory Awareness Golf 22 8 0 0 0 6 23 0 0 36 23 15 11
Dailv 47 17 10 13 9 21 0 50 0 20 17 11 16
Speaking Aloud Golf 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 50 9 8 15 7
Dailv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 10 0 6 3
No Inner Experience Golf 0 0 57 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Dailv 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Category Setting Ca Jo Br Sa Wi Avg Mi To Aa Ch Ry Avg Avg
Jo=John, Br=Brad, Ca=Caleb, Sa=Samuel, Wi=Will; To=Tom, Ch=Chris, Mi=Mike, Ry=Ryan, Aa=Aaron.
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TABLE 1 ; PERCENTAGES OF INNER EXPERIENCE
DURING GOLF AND DAILY LIFE (CONTINUED)
Moderate Handieap Group Low Handicap Group All
Category Setting Ca Jo Br Sa Wi Avg Mi To Aa Ch Ry Avg Avg
Unclear Indeterminate Golf 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 4 2
Dailv 0 0 0 0 18 3 50 0 33 0 11 15 8
Unclear Golf 4 0 0 0 18 6 0 0 17 0 0 2 4
Dailv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 0
Inner Hearing Golf 0 0 14 0 9 4 0 0 0 9 0 2 3
Dailv 0 0 0 0 9 2 0 0 0 7 0 2 2
Thought/Feeling Golf 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 2 1
Dailv 7 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Multiple Awareness Golf 11 8 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Dailv 7 0 20 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Inner Spoken Expletives Golf 0 0 0 22 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Dailv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of samples Golf 12 7 9 9 11 48 6 11 10 13 6 46 94
Dailv 12 10 15 15 11 63 2 10 2 18 15 47 110
Handicap - 16 13 15 18 26 17.6 7 2 2 6 4 4.2 10.9
Net Golf Score - -3 -2 0 +2 8 + 1.0 -5 -4 -3 +4 +12 +0.8 +0.9
Tournament Rank - 3.5 5 6 7 9 - 1 2 3.5 8 10 - -
Category Setting Ca Jo Br Sa Wi Avg Mi To Aa Ch Ry Avg Avg
Jo=John, Br=Brad, Ca=Caleb, Sa=SamueI, Wi=WilI; To=Tom, Ch=Chris, Mi=Mike, Ry=Ryan, Aa=Aaron.
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Table 1 contains an exhaustive list of all categories of inner experience captured during 
the golf tournament to display all inner experiences that occurred. For comparison, the 
frequencies of these same categories are also presented during daily life. The nomothetic 
descriptions that follow focus on a shorter list of the most salient nomothetic 
characteristics experienced by our study participants with an emphasis on inner 
experience the during golf tournament.
All 10 of our participants sampled during golf competition and during daily life, a 
heterogeneous set of daily activités including work and leisure. Thus the simplest and 
most useful way of characterizing participants’ activities for nomothetic analysis 
considers golf samples and daily life samples separately. It should be noted that three of 
our 10 participants, Tom, Mike, and Chris, played golf during their daily life samples.
We call this recreational golf to distinguish it from the tournament golf samples. Tom 
engaged in recreational golf in 10 of 12 or 83% of his daily samples, Mike did so in 4 of 
6 or 66% of his daily samples, and Chris did so in 4 of 14 or 29% of his daily samples. 
Because only these three participants engaged in recreational golf during some of their 
daily life samples, and because recreational golf was a hybrid activity (similar to the 
tournament golf but also similar to the daily life activities), these recreational golf 
samples were excluded from the analysis o f nomothetic results. This left a total of 2, 2, 
and 10 daily life samples for Tom, Mike, and Chris, respectively (see Table 1). The other 
seven participants did not engage in recreational golf.
It should also be noted that this study was an exploratory qualitative study with a 
small number o f participants in each group, making tests of statistical significance futile.
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Thus observations from this study such this are worth mentioning as potentially 
interesting, potentially preliminary trends that might be examined by future research. 
Golf-Related Content
The most salient characteristic o f our participant group as a whole during was golf- 
related content. Golf-related content included thoughts/awarenesses about the golf course 
and its conditions, the characteristics of the hole they were on (e.g., tee box, grass, green, 
hole), other groups golfers on the course (e.g., if  they are out o f range to begin addressing 
a shot), the characteristics o f their own or others’ golf equipment (e.g., clubs, ball, tee, 
bag), the characteristics of their own or others’ performance (e.g., swing, result o f a shot), 
and mental preparation strategies (e.g., internal planning ahead for performance).
Across all participants. The most salient characteristic of our participant group as a 
whole was golf-related content. There were 71 instances of golf-related content out of 94 
total samples during the tournament (76%). All of our study participants had inner 
experiences related to golf in content during the golf tournament (see Table 1). In fact, 
this was the only salient characteristic that all o f our participants experienced during the 
golf tournament. Golf-related content was salient both across our study participants and 
between the two participant groups as well.
Across our participants, the overall average frequency of golf-related content during 
the tournament was 76%, the highest frequency of all categories. Thus golf-related 
content was present in most o f our participants’ tournament samples most of the time.
The exception to this was Brad, who experienced golf-related content in only 1 o f 7 or 
14% of his tournament samples. This was at least in part because 4 of 6 or 67% of his 
non-golf-content tournament samples were instances o f no inner experience at the
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moment of the beep. With the exception o f Brad’s anomalous relative lack of golf-related 
content, the remaining participants’ golf-related content ranged in frequency from a low 
of 56% in the case of Caleb to a high of 100% in the cases of both Tom and Aaron.
Between go lf and daily life. Not surprisingly, our participants experienced more golf- 
related content during golf than daily life. There were 71 instances of golf-related content 
out of 94 total samples during the tournament (76%) but only 6 instances of golf-related 
content out o f 110 total samples during daily life (5%).
More instances of golf-related content were found when our participants were golfing 
than when they were not. Thus the content of our participants was very consistent the 
behavior of our participants, with the exception of Brad’s anomalous lack o f golf-related 
content and no inner experience during golf. This is consistent with findings of Hurlburt, 
Koch, and Heavey (2002) that demonstrated the connection between observable behavior 
and inner experience. Their study found that participants with high rates of external 
speech had significantly less inner speech than a normal comparison group. The present 
study shows that golfers experience more golf-related content when they are golfing than 
when they are not.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. Between our two participant skill 
groups, the lower handicap group had a slightly higher mean frequency of golf-related 
content (85% of the tournament samples) than did the moderate handicap group mean of 
67%. The moderate handicap group mean was skewed by Brad’s anomalous relative lack 
of golf-related content, but dropping his result from consideration, the golf-related 
frequency from the remaining four participants becomes 76%, still slightly lower than the 
low handicap group.
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Low handicapper Ryan had the lowest frequency of golf-related content in the low 
handicap group. He experienced golf-related content in 69% of his samples compared 
with his group’s mean of 85%. He also performed very poorly on tournament day, 
shooting 12 points above his handicap and finishing last in the golf tournament. His golf 
tournament gross score of 88 is comparable to the average gross score of the moderate 
handicap group of 91, and he experienced a similar frequency of golf-related content. The 
first, second, and third placed performers, Mike, Tom, and Aaron, had high frequencies 
of golf-related content at 82%, 100%, and 100%, respectively. Also, three o f Ryan’s 
tournament samples were experienced as being distracted. These included being absorbed 
in the sensory aspects of a waterfall on the course, being absorbed in the blueness of 
another golfer’s shirt, and looking at a shady spot under a tree on the golf course. Ryan 
was well aware of being distracted during the golf tournament and said he thought this 
was why he performed poorly during our golf tournament in particular and during his 
other past poor performances in general. We cannot be certain whether there was a 
relationship between Ryan’s distracted inner experiences and his performance in 
particular or in general beyond our observation that he was distracted on a day that he did 
not shoot well; however, the aforementioned observations may point toward a positive 
relationship between golf-related content and the quality of golf performance.
A qualitative difference in the inner experience of golf-related content was observed 
between our two participant skill groups. The golf-related content o f our low handicap 
participants tended to be more elaborate and sophisticated than that of the moderate 
handicap participants. For instance, the low handicap participants had more mental 
preparation strategies and more detailed golf-related content experiences than did the
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moderate handicap participants. As an example, low handicapper Mike’s golf-related 
content included three mental preparation strategies. In Tournament Sample T.4, for 
instance, Mike was mentally preparing himself for his next shot by saying a phrase aloud 
to himself to maintain a nice and slow tempo as part of his conscious experience. Also in 
Tournament Sample T.IO, Mike was mentally preparing for his next shot. In this sample, 
he was planning where to hit the ball by actively looking down the fairway. In contrast, 
moderate handicapper Samuel had golf-related content experiences that included looking 
actively or passively at golf-related stimuli such as the characteristics o f his own and 
opponent’s golf equipment. In Tournament Sample T.4, for instance, Samuel was 
concentrating on the ball by actively watching it move to note its trajectory. In 
Tournament Sample T .l, however, Samuel was passively looking at the ball with 
attention to the ball itself and without attention to anything else.
Summary and Discussion. All of our study participants, with the exception of Brad, 
thought, felt, and otherwise had frequent experiences about golf during the golf 
tournament. Golf-related content was the most salient characteristic o f our participant 
group as a whole during golf. All of the study participants had inner experiences related 
to golf during the golf tournament. Our participants experienced golf-related content 
about the golf course and its conditions, the characteristics of the hole they were on, other 
groups of golfers on the course, the characteristics of their own and their opponents’ golf 
equipment, their own performance and their opponents’ performances, and mental 
preparation strategies. Golf-related content was the only salient characteristic that all of 
our participants experienced during golf.
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Between golf and daily life, the content of our participants was very consistent with 
the behavior o f our participants, with the exception of Brad’s anomalous lack of golf- 
related content and no inner experience during golf. The congruence between inner 
content and behavior is consistent with findings of Hurlburt, Koch, and Heavey (2002) 
that demonstrated the connection between observable behavior and inner experience. In 
the field o f sport psychology, interventions that enhance performance recommend 
athletes direct the specific content of their inner experiences toward the performance task 
(Suinn, 1996; Suinn, 1997). Our findings suggest that golfers can direct their awareness 
toward golf content frequently.
Between the participant groups, a slightly different frequency o f golf-related content 
between the groups was observed that bears further study. Low handicappers had slightly 
more golf-related content and more elaborate and sophisticated golf-related content, such 
as mental preparation strategies, compared to the moderate handicap participants.
Mental Preparation Strategies
Mental preparation strategies (a subset of golf content) are inner experiences with 
future-oriented golf-related content that serves the purpose of preparing for a golf 
performance task. There were 13 instances of mental preparation out o f 94 total samples 
during the tournament (14%). Mental preparation strategies were experienced by seven of 
our ten study participants including four of the five low handicap participants and three of 
the five moderate handicap participants. Mental preparation strategies were a salient 
characteristic across our study participants and between the participant groups as well.
Across all participants. Mental preparation strategies were experienced across our 
study participants during the golf tournament. Low-handicappers Mike, Tom, Aaron, and
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Chris as well as moderate-handicappers Caleb, John, and Samuel ail experienced mental 
preparation strategies during the golf tournament. The mental preparation strategies used 
by all of these study participants were typically very clear and differentiated golf-related 
inner experiences that obviously served the purpose of preparing for a subsequent golf- 
related task such as hitting the next shot. The most common mental preparation strategy 
occurred during preparation for putting, when three of our participants experienced 
perceptual awareness by externally looking to find a line along which to make their putt. 
This mental preparation strategy, which Tom called “spot-putting,” was found in 3 of 13 
or 23% of the mental preparation strategies across the study participants. The remaining 
mental preparation strategies were idiosyncratically experienced and contained perceptual 
awareness, inner speech, inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness, 
feeling, and speaking aloud. The most common form of inner experience that occurred 
during mental preparation strategies was perceptual awareness, which occurred in 7 o f 13 
or 54% of mental preparation samples. For comparison, the mean frequency o f perceptual 
awareness during golf across all study participants was only about half of this at 27%. 
Mental preparation strategies occurred before upcoming shots in a variety of settings; 
they were experienced while sitting in the cart before a tee shot, standing on the course 
before a tee shot, walking up to address a tee shot, standing on the fairway, walking on 
the fairway, and while lining up to make a putt after having addressed the ball.
Between golf and daily life. Because our participants were engaged in a 
heterogeneous variety o f mostly non-golf-related tasks during their daily life samples, 
because the main purpose of the current study was to examine inner experience during 
golf performance, and because mental preparation strategies are defined as being sport-
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specific, we did not analyze daily life samples for the presence o f mental preparation 
strategies. Thus Table 1 shows “na” for not available during daily life samples. This is 
not to say that our participants did not have inner experiences related to what they were 
doing at the moment of the beep during daily life, such as Caleb’s Sample 3.4 when he 
was experiencing sensory awareness and more prominent perceptual awareness for the 
purpose of making a chicken salad sandwich, but rather task-related mental preparation 
strategies during daily life samples were not considered relevant because they were not 
sport-specific, such as making a chicken salad sandwich.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. Both across and between the participant 
groups, mental preparation strategies were experienced fairly idiosyncratically aside from 
the most common mental preparation content, spot-putting, and the most common form, 
perceptual awareness. There were no apparent qualitative differences in the way mental 
preparation strategies were experienced across or between the participant groups.
Although mental preparation strategies were experienced by both participant groups, 
three low handicappers experienced two mental preparation strategies, and one 
experienced four, whereas the moderate handicappers experienced at most one mental 
preparation strategy. The low handicap group mean frequency for mental preparation 
strategies was 22%, compared with the moderate handicap group mean frequency of 6%. 
There were more than three times as many mental preparation strategies in the low- 
handicap group (10) than the moderate-handicap group (3). The low handicappers who 
used these strategies never displayed less than two; moderate handicappers never 
displayed more than one mental preparation strategy. In the low handicap group, Tom,
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Aaron, and Mike each experienced two mental preparation strategies that were captured 
during the golf tournament. Chris experienced four mental preparation strategies.
Two samples illustrate low handicap participants’ mental preparation strategies 
during golf. Mike was speaking aloud the words “nice and slow tempo” to slow his 
rhythm down for the next shot (Sample T.4), and Tom was preparing himself to execute a 
putt by externally and visually scarming a line from the hole back toward his ball (Sample 
T.2). In the moderate handicap group, John, Caleb, and Samuel each experienced one 
mental preparation strategy that was captured during the golf tournament. These 
participants, respectively, experienced mental preparation strategies that included innerly 
and kinesthetically seeing his body position at the top o f a backswing, deciding in 
unsymbolized thinking whether to make a safer or more risky shot, and trying to visualize 
the path the ball will take to the hole by externally looking along a curving line (see 
Samples T .l 1, T.9, and T.2, respectively).
A relationship between mental preparation strategies and golf performance was also 
observed. The best three performers in the low handicap group in terms of both their 
gross and net scores each experienced two mental preparation strategies during the golf 
tournament. The best two performers in the moderate handicap group, again using both 
raw score and rank, each experienced one mental preparation strategy during the golf 
tournament. The worst performers in each of the two skill groups. Will and Ryan, had no 
mental preparation strategies during the golf tournament. This suggests a possible 
positive relationship between mental preparation strategies and quality of golf 
performance may exist; however, because neither 1) an a priori reliable operational 
definition for mental preparation strategies was specified, nor 2) an a priori prediction
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regarding the relationship between mental preparation strategies and golf performance 
was specified, it was beyond the scope o f this study to examine the mental preparation 
strategies statistically. Future research using DES may examine this relationship if  these 
conditions are met and these conditions can be properly bracketed as potential 
presuppositions to avoid becoming demand characteristics.
Summary and Discussion. Mental preparation strategies were experienced by seven of 
ten of our study participants and were a salient characteristic both across our study 
participants and between the participant groups. These mental preparation strategies were 
typically very clear and differentiated golf-related inner experiences that prepared the 
participants for subsequent shots. Spot-putting was the most common mental preparation 
strategy during golf in 3 of 13 or 23% of samples, and perceptual awareness was the most 
common form found in 7 of 13 or 54% of the mental preparation strategies across the 
study participants; however, a variety o f other forms of inner experience including inner 
speech, inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness, feeling, and speaking 
aloud were also involved. Most of the mental preparation strategies were 
idiosyncratically experienced and occurred in a variety o f settings including putting, 
driving, on the fairway, and in the golf cart. The preliminary signs of a possible positive 
relationship between mental preparation strategies and the quality o f golf performance 
were evident, but establishing this relationship more definitively was beyond the scope of 
the current study.
The possible positive relationship between mental preparation strategies and quality 
of golf performance we observed is very consistent with findings in the sport psychology 
literature. For instance, Thomas and Over (1994) surveyed 165 men (aged 20-74 yrs)
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with golf handicaps ranging from 5 to 27 and found that golfers with lower handicaps 
reported greater mental preparation than did those with higher handicaps. McCaffrey and 
Orlick (1989) individually interviewed 14 top professional golfers and 9 golf course 
teaching professionals and found mental preparation was one of the common factors 
described as being important for quality golf performance. Similar findings have been 
reported with interventions that teach mental preparation pre-shot routines and show 
improved performance (Cohn, Rotella, & Lloyd, 1990). Cohn (1990) reviewed the 
efficacy of cognitive-behavioral performance preparation interventions and stated that 
“research on such strategies shows that athletes can learn to develop consistent, highly 
systematic preparatory routines and also that routines benefit performance, but the 
findings of the effects o f routines on performance have been erratic” (p. 306). Cohn 
attributes this to time frames being too far removed to determine whether improvements 
were the result of interventions or physical practice (or both).
Consistent with past methodological suggestions for improving knowledge about the 
nature o f inner experience during performance (Greenspan & Feltz, 1989; Flardy et al, 
1996; Meyers et al, 1996), and to overcome problems of retrospective self-report as 
discussed by Cohn (1990) and others (Hackfort & Schwenkmezger, 1989; Ptacek, Smith, 
Espe, & Rafferty, 1994; Raglin & Hanin, 2000), the current study explored momentary 
inner experience during sport performance in a naturalistic context. To date, this is the 
first study to directly access and describe the actual golf-related mental preparation 
strategies used during golf performance itself, and this was done in a naturalistic setting 
during a golf tournament rather than retrospectively via self-report questionnaire or 
interview.
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Perceptual Awareness
Perceptual awareness is a process of focusing on objects o f the environment for their 
objective or instrumental qualities, often for the purpose of a task. The two categories we 
have discussed above (golf-related and preparation strategies) are characteristics of the 
content of experience. By contrast, perceptual awareness is characteristic of the form of 
inner experience. Perceptual awareness is a form of inner experience that is often visual, 
as the seeing of an object as part of conscious experience for its objective, instrumental 
qualities. Perceptual awareness was coded only when it was unambiguously one of the 
most prominent inner experiences present at the moment of the beep to distinguish it 
from instances in which a participant’s eyes may have been open at the moment of the 
beep and they later remembered what they saw.
Perceptual awareness was the second most frequent salient characteristic of inner 
experience during the golf tournament (golf-related content was the most frequent), and it 
was a salient characteristic of inner experience across our study participants. There were 
25 instances of perceptual awareness out of 94 total samples during the tournament 
(27%).
Across all participants. Perceptual awareness was a salient nomothetic characteristic 
across our study participants. Across our study participants, 8 of 10 or 80% experienced 
perceptual awareness during golf (see Table 1), and 7 o f these 8 or 88% had more than 
one instance of perceptual awareness during golf. It was also the most frequent form, as 
opposed to content, of inner experience for four participants during golf. Perceptual 
awareness was typically golf-related and was involved in 7 o f 13 or 54% of the mental 
preparation strategies collected during the golf tournament.
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Qualitatively, the experience o f perceptual awareness among our study participants 
was idiosyncratic. This was particularly noticeable as our participants’ amount of focus 
on visual stimuli in their conscious experience varied. Some perceptual awareness 
experiences were passive, idle looking experiences in the midst of doing a task. These 
experiences had less focus, but visual stimuli were still unambiguously experienced 
consciously. Other perceptual awarenesses were active and focused goal-directed looking 
experiences. These experiences had more focus on visual stimuli, and were also 
unambiguously experienced consciously. Still others were not unambiguously passive or 
active experiences. Because the definitional borders of these experiences are less solid 
than with other forms of inner experience, it is difficult to arrive at an exact number for 
how many times each of these two different types of perceptual awareness occurred. For 
the same reason, it is difficult to know if  perceptual awareness has dichotomous 
activeness-passiveness poles, whether activeness-passiveness is more continuous, 
whether it manifests itself in other qualitative ways, or whether activeness-passiveness 
may generalize to other groups o f participants.
Thus perceptual awareness was a salient inner experience that was typically golf- 
related and involved in most of the mental preparation strategies. It that was 
idiosyncratically experienced and varied in the activeness and passiveness of visual 
focus.
Between golf and daily life. Perceptual awareness was somewhat more frequent 
during golf than during daily life across our participants, present in 25 of 94 or 27% of 
tournament samples and on 19 o f 110 or 17% of daily life samples. Perceptual awareness 
was more frequent in 6 of 10 or 60% of our participants during golf than during daily life.
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Only one of our participants experienced a lower frequency of perceptual awareness 
during golf performance and three experienced a similar amount of perceptual awareness 
during golf and daily samples.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. The difference between perceptual 
awareness during golf and daily life was larger for the low handicap group, 33% 
compared to 6%, than the same difference for the moderate handicap group, 21% 
compared to 25%. Three moderate handicappers experienced more frequent perceptual 
awareness during golf than daily life, whereas all five low handicappers experienced this 
difference. W ill’s anomalous lack of perceptual awareness during golf brought down the 
average moderate handicap frequency during golf and daily life. We think skill group 
difference in perceptual awareness during golf and daily life may be an interesting 
rudimentary quantitative observation and possibly a preliminary, tentative trend.
Summary and Discussion. During the golf tournament, our participants’ perceptual 
awareness experiences were typically clear external visual experiences during which 
visual stimuli were part of their conscious experience. Perceptual awareness was the 
second most frequent salient characteristic and the most frequent form of inner 
experience our participants experienced during the golf tournament. Perceptual awareness 
was experienced idiosyncratically by our study participants. Some perceptual awareness 
experiences were passive, idly looking experiences in the midst of doing a task. Others 
were active and focused goal-directed looking experiences. Still others were not 
unambiguously passive or active inner experiences. Most of our participants had a higher 
frequency of perceptual awareness during their golf than during their daily life samples, 
although individual differences were present. Most of their perceptual awareness was
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related to golf in content. As discussed in the previous mental preparation subsection of 
this chapter, perceptual awareness was often involved in mental preparation strategies 
during our participants’ golf samples. The difference between perceptual awareness 
during golf and daily life was larger for the low handicap group.
Perceptual Awareness versus No Inner Experience
Perceptual awareness is a form of inner experience that, in the current study, we 
observed occurring visually. To better explain the borders of perceptual awareness, we 
will digress from salient nomothetic characteristics for a moment to consider no inner 
experience, a salient idiographic characteristic for Brad. Once examined, instances of no 
inner experience will be compared to the nomothetically-salient phenomenon of 
perceptual awareness.
Because our participants’ eyes were open, we presume, during most of their samples 
and they could remember objects in their visual field did not necessarily mean our 
participants were experiencing perceptual awareness. In fact, one o f our participants had 
instances of no inner experience at the moment of the beep but remembered objects in the 
visual field being present. Brad had four instances o f no inner experience present at the 
moment of the beep during golf. Instances of no inner experience will be described to 
better distinguish between perceptual awareness of visual objects in conscious experience 
versus objects being available in the visual field but unambiguously not in one’s 
awareness.
Perceptual awareness does not simply occur whenever objects are present in the 
visual field. Brad’s instances of no inner experience during golf despite objects being 
present in the visual field demonstrate this. In Tournament Sample T.2, for instance. Brad
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was on the 5th stroke of the 5th hole, and he was standing on one side of the green with 
the beeper in his pocket. At the moment of the beep, he was looking across the green, his 
eyes aimed at fellow golfer John standing on the far side of the green; however, neither 
John nor the green itself were in his awareness; in fact, nothing seemed to be in his 
awareness at the moment of the beep. Brad does not think he ever would have been aware 
of what he was looking at if not for the beep. In this sample. Brad unambiguously had no 
inner experience present at the moment of the beep but remembered what his eyes were 
aimed at most likely because o f the beep. In Tournament Sample T.5, Brad had no inner 
experience with a sense of even less awareness. Brad was sitting in the cart having just 
finished the 10th hole. At the moment of the beep. Brad’s eyes were aimed at the beeper 
and there was nothing in his awareness. This experience was similar to the other 
instances of no inner experience just described, but this time there seems to be even less 
awareness. He knows his eyes were open, but he somehow has even less awareness. Brad 
had another instance o f no inner experience that was closest to the threshold o f an 
experience in conscious awareness in Tournament Sample T.l. In this sample. Brad was 
on the third hole and had just pulled his cart up to the tee box. He was turning the volume 
dial of the beeper when the beeper went off. At the moment of the beep. Brad’s eyes are 
aimed at the dial, and he is turning the dial of the beeper with his finger. He has no visual 
awareness o f looking at the dial and no tactile awareness of feeling the dial as he turns it. 
Brad thinks this experience is akin to driving with no awareness. Nothing is present in his 
inner experience at the moment of the beep, but of Brad’s instances of no inner 
experience, he thinks this experience is the closest to his visual awareness threshold.
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To summarize, Brad’s instances of no inner experience varied on how close to his 
threshold of visual awareness, but they were unambiguous instances o f no inner 
experience despite the presence of visual stimuli present that were remembered after the 
beep. Thus objects were available to our participants visually and through their other 
senses throughout their golf and daily life experiences. Our observations show that these 
objects were not always part of their inner experience at the moment o f the beep. In the 
case o f perceptual awareness, clear visual awareness was evident. At the other extreme. 
Brad’s instance of no inner experience show that it is possible to have no visual 
awareness, or any experience, at the moment of the beep.
Summary and Discussion. Perceptual awareness is a process o f focusing on objects of 
the environment for their objective or instrumental qualities, often for the purpose o f a 
task. As a category of inner experience, perceptual awareness does not simply occur 
when objects are present in the visual field; in fact Brad’s instances o f no irmer 
experience during golf despite objects being visually present demonstrates this as do 
instances of other forms of inner experience during golf without perceptual awareness. 
Brad’s instances of no inner experience also varied in how close they were to his 
threshold of having visual objects in his inner experience, illustrating Monson and 
Hurlburt’s (1993) conceptualization o f the imprecise, vague, yet continuous borders of 
inner experience. Thus Brad and other participants were presented with visual stimuli 
during golf and daily life, yet the presence or absence of perceptual awareness was 
demarcated by the presence or absence of prominently-experienced visual stimuli at the 
moment of the beep, respectively.
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Perceptual awareness was the most frequent form of inner experience during golf 
performance observed by the current study. Because perceptual awareness is a relatively 
novel phenomenon to the study of inner experience during golf performance, this 
phenomenon has not been precisely observed and described by the field of sport 
psychology. The notion that it is necessary to focus attention externally during 
performance, which is similar to perceptual awareness, has been described in theory by 
Nideffer (1986); in practice by Rotella (1995) who said “when great players are playing 
well, [they] simply [pick] out a target, envision the kind of shot..., and hit it” (p. 44); and 
in research such as that of Poolton, Maxwell, Masters, and Raab (2006). Poolton and 
colleagues recently found that attentional focus has an influence on learning to putt. 
Groups learned to putt under different conditions either 1) being instrueted to focus on 
the movement of the putter (external focus) or 2) on their hands (internal focus). The 
external group’s performance remained robust, whereas the internal group’s performance 
dropped significantly. It is important to note that exactly how attention was to be focused 
on one’s hands was not specified in precise phenomenological terms, nor was any direct 
exploration of how inner experience occurred after instructions conducted, which is quite 
common in sport psychology studies. Was attention to be focused by using perceptual 
awareness, sensory awareness, inner speech, or some other means? Questions such as this 
may best be answered by momentary explorations of inner experience such as the current 
study.
Despite the notion that attentional focus is important in golf, precisely how attention 
is focused during golf has been relatively unknown until now. The current study 
demonstrates that perceptual awareness is one of the ways that attention is focused on
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performance during golf. As the most frequent category of inner experience during golf 
performance, perceptual awareness appeared to play an important role in golf 
performance. It is important to note, however, that perceptual awareness is a much more 
specific form of inner experience than the attention construct that is described in the sport 
psychology literature. Attention is merely one o f the components of perceptual awareness 
(and other forms of inner experience). DES demonstrates more precisely one of the ways 
that attention can be focused, in the case of perceptual awareness, as a process of 
focusing attention on objects of the environment for their objective or instrumental 
qualities, often for the purpose of a task.
Inner Speech
Inner speech is the experience of speaking words in one’s own voice without the 
external sound actually being produced. The experience is typically very similar to how 
one might speak aloud. There were 25 instances o f inner speech out of 94 total samples 
during the tournament (27%). Inner speech was a salient characteristic across our 
participants during golf, and it was also a salient characteristic between golf and daily life 
settings.
Across all participants. Inner speech was a salient nomothetic characteristic during 
golf performance across our study participants. Nine of our ten study participants 
experienced at least one instance of inner speech during the golf tournament. During golf 
the qualitative experience of inner speech across participants was typically self-directed 
and typically contained golf-related content (76%). Samuel experienced inner speech as 
self-directed, self-berating, inner spoken expletives twice (see Samples T.5 and T.8).
John experienced inner speech during golf by telling himself to smoke a cigar to regulate
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his emotions. Will experienced inner speech during golf by telling himself he had “too 
much adrenalin” (see Sample T.3). Inner speech was involved in 3 of 13 or 23% of the 
mental preparation strategies collected during the golf tournament (see Chris’ Samples 
T.IO and T.3 and Aaron’s Sample T.2). Thus inner speech was typically golf-related in 
content, and it involved mental preparation for golf, emotion regulation, reactions to golf 
performance including analysis o f personal technique and performance as well as inner 
spoken expletives, statements about the golf course conditions, and statements about golf 
equipment.
Between golf and daily life. Inner speech was a salient characteristic that was more 
frequent during golf than during daily life. Inner speech occurred at three times the rate 
during the golf tournament (27%) as during daily life (9%).
There were noticeable individual differences in inner speech frequencies between golf 
and daily life. Five of our participants experienced a higher frequency of irmer speech 
during golf performance than they did during daily life. In contrast, three o f our 
participants experienced a similar frequency of inner speech during the golf tournament 
than during daily life. Tom experienced a lower frequency of irmer speech during the golf 
tournament than during daily life.
Despite individual differences, inner speech was a salient nomothetic characteristic 
that was more frequent during golf than during daily life. Thus inner speech appears to 
play a role in golf performance.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. The difference between inner speech 
during golf and daily life was similar for the low handicap group, 29% compared to 10%, 
as the comparable difference for the moderate handicap group, 24% compared to 9%.
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Two moderate handicappers experienced much more frequent inner speech during golf 
than daily life, whereas all two low handicappers experienced this same difference. Thus 
it appeared there was no skill group difference in inner speech during golf and daily life.
Summary and Discussion. Inner speech was a salient nomothetic characteristic across 
participants especially during golf and also during daily life. The settings in which it 
occurred most frequently were individually different, but nine of our participants 
experienced inner speech during golf. When it was experienced during golf, inner speech 
was typically self-directed, related to golf in content, and it also was involved in 3 of 13 
or 23% of the mental preparation strategies collected during the golf tournament. It was 
also involved in emotion regulation, reactions to golf performance, and statements about 
the golf course conditions and golf equipment. Inner speech was more frequent during 
golf than daily life for five o f our participants.
The phenomenon we call inner speech is referred to by the sport psychology literature 
as self-talk. In the previous review of the sport psychology literature, it was observed that 
this term has been defined broadly and narrowly, but from our perspective and that of 
others (e.g.. Hardy et al., 1996), it has also been defined quite imprecisely. In fact, self- 
talk has been used to describe statements said aloud (Van Raalte, Brewer, Rivera, & 
Petipas, 1994), said internally (Williams et al., 1993), and even statements delivered by 
others such as coaches that athletes may somehow process internally (Gould, et al., 1989; 
Weinberg & Jackson, 1990).
The narrow definition of self-talk, as talking to oneself in one’s own voice without 
external sound being produced, is similar to our definition of inner speech. A broader 
definition used in the sport psychology literature could include both inner speech and
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what we have called speaking aloud, which will be discussed later in this chapter. The 
overall mean frequency of inner speech during the golf tournament was 27%, and as we 
will see, the overall mean frequency of speaking aloud during the golf tournament was 
7%. Inner speech appeared to play a role in golf performance because it was involved in 
3 of 13 or 23% of the mental preparation strategies observed in this study and more 
frequent during golf than daily life, so it is not surprising that it has been given a 
considerable amount of attention in the sport psychology literature, particularly with self- 
talk interventions.
Our results suggest, however, that the pervasiveness of self-talk during sport 
performance has been overstated by at least some researchers, perhaps by the influence of 
“the widely held prejudice that all thinking is in words” (Hurlburt, 1997, p. 947). This 
prejudice is exemplified by Williams and Leffingwell (2002) who said, “broadly defined, 
self-talk occurs whenever an individual thinks, whether that individual is making 
statements internally or externally” (p. 81; see also Williams & Leffingwell, 1996) as 
well as Bunker and Williams (1980), who stated, “anytime you think about something, 
you are in a sense talking to yourself’ (p. 236; see also Bunker, Williams, & Zinsser, 
1993). However, our results indicate that that is decidedly not true: in 77% of our golf 
tournament samples, self talk as inner speech was unambiguously not occurring.
This study therefore strongly supports Hardy and colleagues’ (1996) call for better 
specification o f “precisely what constitutes self-talk” (p. 37) because “past researchers 
have been too ‘loose’ in their operationalization of self-talk” (p. 37-38). This suggests 
that the phenomena of inner speech and speaking aloud are not very well understood. We 
propose that the difference between what we call irmer speech and speaking aloud might
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prove to be useful as could any attempt to reduce the prejudice that all thinking occurs in 
words, which is unambiguously incorrect. Our results suggest that some inner experience 
occurs in inner speech, and as we will shortly see, possibly less occurs by speaking aloud. 
We believe that the imprecise observation and specification of inner experience during 
sport performance is not restricted to self-talk. Our results illustrate the need for better 
observation and specification of the actual phenomena of inner experience during sport 
performance in general as well.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking is the experience of a mental event without the experience of 
words, inner seeings, or any other symbol of inner experience. There were 13 instances of 
unsymbolized thinking out of 94 total samples during the tournament (14%).
Across all participants. Unsymbolized thinking was a salient characteristic across our 
study participants. Unsymbolized thinking was present in 31 of 204 or 15% of the total 
combined golf and daily life samples collected. Unsymbolized thinking was also a salient 
characteristic for six of our participants including Caleb, John, Brad, Mike, Tom, and 
Chris.
Golf and Daily Life. Unsymbolized thinking was a salient characteristic across our 
study participants in both golf and daily life. Across both our participant groups 
combined, unsymbolized thinking was present similarly in both golf (14%) and daily life 
(16%) samples. The frequency of unsymbolized thinking did not differ by golf and daily 
life sampling settings in a consistent manner. Golf and daily life frequencies were highly 
individually different. Five of our participants had similar amounts o f unsymbolized
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thinking during golf and daily life, four had less during golf than daily life, and one had 
more during golf than daily life.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. The frequency of unsymbolized 
thinking was similar in both the low and moderate handicap groups. During golf, the low 
handicappers experienced unsymbolized thinking in 6 of 46 or 13% o f their tournament 
samples compared to the moderate handicappers’ 7 o f 48 or 15%. During daily life, the 
low handicappers experienced unsymbolized thinking in 6 of 47 or 13% of their samples 
compared to the moderate handicappers’ 12 of 63 or 19%.
Summary and Discussion. Unsymbolized thinking was a salient characteristic across 
our study participants in both golf and daily life. The frequency of unsymbolized thinking 
was similar in both of these settings, by both participant groups, in quantitatively and 
qualitatively similar ways.
Within the existing sport psychology literature, no known discussion regarding the 
presence of or the possible function of unsymbolized thinking or anything very similar 
was found. We observed the presence of unsymbolized thinking during golf performance. 
The presence of phenomena such as perceptual awareness and unsymbolized thinking 
during golf performance suggests that inner experience during golf performance, and 
perhaps performance during other sports, may consist of a broader range of inner 
experiences than what has been described by the sport psychology literature.
Inner Seeing (aka Images)
Inner seeing is seeing something internally that is known not to necessarily be 
externally present. There were 13 instances o f inner seeing out of 94 total samples during 
the tournament (14%).
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Across all participants. Seven of our ten participants experienced inner seeing at 
some point during the study. Inner seeing was a characteristic across our study 
participants in both golf and daily life. Five of our ten participants experienced inner 
seeing during golf, and six experienced inner seeing during daily life. O f the five that 
experienced it during golf, inner seeing was a salient idiographic characteristic for all of 
these participants except one. Inner seeing was involved in 4 of 13 or 31% of the mental 
preparation strategies experienced during our participants’ golf samples.
Between golf and daily life. Inner seeing was a characteristic across our study 
participants in both golf and daily life. Across both our participant groups combined, 
inner seeing was present similarly in both golf (14%) and daily life (18%) samples. The 
frequency of inner seeing did not differ by golf and daily life sampling settings in a 
consistent manner. Golf and daily life frequencies were highly individually variable. Six 
o f our participants had similar amounts of inner seeing during golf and daily life, and four 
had less during golf than daily life.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. In the low handicap group, a similar 
mean frequency of inner seeing was observed in the low handicap group during golf 
performance (13%) and during daily life (21%). In the moderate handicap group, a 
similar mean frequency o f inner seeing was observed during golf performance (13%) and 
daily life (16%). Among the low handicap participants, three experienced inner seeing 
during golf. Among the moderate handicap participants, two experienced inner seeing 
during golf. Thus a similar frequency was observed between the groups, and a similar 
number of participants from each group experienced inner seeing during golf.
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Summary and Discussion. Inner seeing was a salient characteristic across our study 
participants. It was similar in frequency in both golf and daily life. Inner seeing was 
similar in frequency in both groups during golf and daily life. Inner seeing played a role 
in mental preparation strategies. It was involved in 4 of 13 or 31% of the mental 
preparation strategies experienced during golf.
The phenomenon we call inner seeing is referred to by the sport psychology literature 
as imagery. In the previous review of the sport psychology literature, it was noted that 
imagery is one of the most studied internal processes in sport psychology and the most 
frequently used mental rehearsal strategy (Meyers et al., 1996). Much like inner speech, it 
has been both broadly and narrowly defined. It has been broadly defined as using all of 
the human senses to re-create or create an experience in the mind (Vealey & Greenleaf, 
2001) and has been perhaps more narrowly defined as “symbolic sensory experiences that 
may occur in any sensory mode” (Hardy et al., 1996, p. 28). Our definition of inner 
seeing as seeing something internally that is known not to necessarily be externally 
present is closer to the narrow definition. Imagery use by athletes has been reported to be 
as high as 99% retrospectively (Orlick & Partington, 1988). In this, the first study to 
directly observe inner seeing directly during performance, the observed frequency of 
inner speech was noticeable but much more modest than this. Inner seeing was not 
occurring in 86% of our collected golf samples. Like inner speech, inner seeing was 
definitely noticeable during golf performance, but its importance in relation to golf 
performance, or at least its prevalence, may be somewhat overstated by the sport 
psychology literature. It was involved in about one third of the mental preparation 
strategies observed, however, so it may have a role in mental preparation.
282
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Feeling
A feeling is an emotional experience that includes such experiences as anger, guilt, 
sadness, and so on. There were 13 instances of feeling experiences out of 94 total 
samples during the tournament (14%).
Across all participants. Across our participants during golf, feelings were typically 
golf-related and typically negative. Eight of 11 feelings or 73% were negative-golf- 
related during golf. There did not, however, seem to be a meaningful relationship 
between overall golf performance and negative-golf-related feelings. Tom had feelings in 
2 of 6 or 33% of his golf samples including a confident feeling that he was winning and 
but also a feeling of disappointment at losing to the other team. Thus Tom had mixed 
feelings and played well. Chris had only positive feelings during golf and played poorly. 
Ryan had only negative feelings and played poorly, and both Mike and Aaron had no 
feelings during golf and played well.
Between golf and daily life. Feelings were salient during both golf and daily life. 
Feelings were equally frequent during golf and daily life for the low handicap group. 
Feelings were less frequent during golf than during daily life for the moderate handicap 
group. In the low handicap group, a similar mean frequency of feeling was observed in 
the low handicap group during golf performance (15%) than during daily life (15%). In 
the moderate handicap group, a lower frequency o f feeling was observed during golf 
performance (13%) and daily life (24%).
Five participants, four of whom were in the moderate handicap group, had less 
frequent feelings during golf than daily life. One o f these participants. Will, experienced 
less frequent but more negative feelings during golf than daily life, but his feelings were
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salient during both golf and daily life. For example during daily life, Will experienced 
feelings of happiness and amusement, bodily energized satisfaction, intense mental 
satisfaction, overall bodily contentment, and mental excited confident optimism. During 
golf. Will experienced mental frustration felt in his head and the feeling of the too much 
adrenalin and energy throughout his whole body and head. Will finished ninth in the golf 
tournament.
Like Will, Chris experienced less frequent feelings during golf than daily life; 
however, unlike Will, Chris had two positive feelings during golf that included a bodily 
feeling o f well being and confidence and an overall feeling of relief and relaxation. Like 
Will again, however, Chris finished poorly at eighth place in the golf tournament. Similar 
in performance to both Will and Chris, our last place finisher, Ryan, had two negative 
feelings during golf performance. These included a fuming feeling at what he thought 
was his bad shot (which turned out not to be) and a pissed feeling at himself about his 
poor performance. Our first and second place finishers, Mike and Aaron, had no feelings 
during golf. Thus feelings did not appear to be related to performance, and individual 
differences in the frequency and experience of feelings were evident.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. In the low handicap group, the mean 
frequency of feeling during golf performance was 15%. In the moderate handicap group, 
the mean frequency of feeling during golf performance was 24%. Among the low 
handicap participants, two experienced feelings during golf. Among the moderate 
handicap participants, all five experienced feelings during golf. Thus less frequent feeling 
was observed in the low handicap group than the moderate handicap group during golf.
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and fewer participants in the low handicap group experienced feelings than the moderate 
handicap group during golf.
Summary’ and Discussion. Across our participants during golf, feelings were typically 
golf-related and typically negative. Feelings were salient during both golf and daily life. 
Feelings were equally frequent during golf and daily life for the low handicap group but 
less frequent during golf than during daily life for the moderate handicap group. Feelings 
did not appear to be related to performance, and individual differences in the frequency 
and experience of feelings were evident.
As previously noted in the sport psychology literature review, the majority o f sport 
psychology research on emotion has been directed at the relationship among anxiety, 
arousal and performance, although stress and coping research has grown considerably in 
the last decade (Giacobbi et ah, 2004). Will appeared to be over-aroused when he 
experienced a feeling of too much adrenalin and energy throughout his whole body and 
head, but other than that, the feelings we found were heterogeneous and individually 
different (e.g., frustration, satisfaction, confidence, fuming). Much less attention has been 
devoted in the sport psychology literature to the feelings we found in the current study, 
which were most frequently negative during golf and somewhat less prevalent during golf 
than daily life. One exception to this was Ruiz and Hanin’s (2004) indirect evidence that 
idiosyncratic and context-specific feelings such as happiness, pride, relief, anger, anxiety, 
fright, sadness, and shame may be involved in sport performance.
Sensory Awareness
Sensory awareness is a bodily (e.g., hotness, coldness, itchiness) or external (e.g., 
brightness, shininess, blueness) sensory experience that is, in and of itself, a major theme
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of an inner experience. There were 10 instances of sensory awareness out of 94 total 
samples during the tournament (14%).
Across all participants. Sensory awareness was a salient characteristic across our 
study participants in daily life. Sensory awareness occurred at least once in nine of our 
ten participants’ daily samples. Across our participants, sensory awareness was a salient 
characteristic for five of our participants during daily life, a similar number of 
participants from the moderate (N = 2) and low (N = 3) handicap groups. There were 18 
instances of sensory awareness out of 110 total samples during daily life (16%).
Between golf and daily life; Between low and moderate handicap groups. Within our 
low handicap group, sensory awareness occurred about equally in golf (11%) and daily 
life (16%). Within our moderate handicap group, sensory awareness occurred at a low 
frequency during golf (6%) but much higher during daily life (21%). Sensory awareness 
during golf was often not related to golf in content and did not seem to play an important 
role in golf performance.
Sensory awareness was salient for two of the low handicap group participants during 
golf performance, Chris and Ryan, and one of the moderate handicap participants, Caleb. 
These and all other participants’ sensory awarenesses were characterized by a lack of 
golf-related content in during golf. In 7 of 9 or 78% of the tournament samples, our 
participants experienced sensory awareness that was not related to golf in content. 
Instead, the content o f these experiences consisted of internal and external not golf- 
related sensory awareness. Instances of internal sensory awarenesses included Caleb’s 
sensation of weakness from the heat, Chris’ sensation of a painful twinge in his wrist and 
later a throbbing sensation in his wrist, and Mike’s sensing the hotness of the weather.
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Two of the three instances o f external sensory awareness were experienced by Ryan as 
distracted experiences. One of these was Tournament Sample T.4, when he was looking 
at the waterfall with admiration and noticing how colorful the waterfall stones are and 
how neat the shape of the flowing water looks as it is coming down after playing terribly. 
The other occurred during Tournament Sample T.6 when Ryan was absorbed in the 
blueness of Mike’s shirt as Mike was playing. Sensory awareness also occurred during 
none of our participants mental preparation strategies during the golf tournament.
Because sensory awareness was typically not related to golf in content and was not 
involved in mental preparation strategies during the golf tournament, sensory awareness 
did not seem to play an important role in golf performance for our participants. For Ryan, 
our last place finisher, external sensory awareness seemed to take his attention away from 
golf performance.
Summary and Discussion. The phenomenon we call sensory awareness has not been 
described specifically or extensively in the sport psychology literature, but like perceptual 
awareness and unsymbolized thinking, the current study observed and described it as a 
salient nomothetic characteristic during golf performance. It could be argued that arousal 
and anxiety, if  experienced as momentary bodily inner experience would be sensory 
awareness; however, the specific phenomenon we have observed and described in this 
and other past DES studies (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002) as sensory awareness has been 
largely neglected by the field of sport psychology.
Speaking Aloud
Speaking aloud is the act of producing external speech. There were 7 instances of 
speaking aloud out of 94 total samples during the tournament (7%).
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Across all participants. Speaking aloud was not a salient characteristic across all 
participants because it was only experienced by the low handicap group participants.
Between golf and daily life. Speaking aloud was a salient characteristic for the low 
handicap group during golf but not during daily life. Four of the five low handicappers 
experienced speaking aloud during golf, but only two experienced speaking aloud during 
daily life. For the low handicap group, speaking aloud was more frequent during golf 
(15%) than daily life (6%) samples.
Most o f this golf and daily life frequency difference was accounted for by Mike, 
Ryan, and Aaron. Just before the tournament, it came to our attention that these three 
participants all happened to know one another. They were, at various points throughout 
the tournament, talking to each other about golf. In fact all of the seven instances of 
speaking aloud during golf were golf-related in content, whereas none of the three 
instances o f speaking aloud during daily were golf-related in content. More discussion of 
this will follow.
Between low and moderate handicap groups. Speaking aloud was a salient 
characteristic that was different between the two study groups during golf. None of the 
moderate handicap group participants experienced speaking aloud during golf or daily 
life.
Mike, Aaron, Chris, and Ryan were the low handicap group participants that 
experienced speaking aloud during golf performance. All instances of speaking aloud 
were golf-related in content. Mike, Aaron, and Ryan were all participants that knew one 
another and competed in the same group of four participants, and all experienced more 
instances o f speaking aloud during golf than daily life. Speaking aloud was particularly
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salient for Mike and Aaron. Mike experienced speaking aloud as part of his mental 
preparation during Tournament Sample T.4 when he was saying “Nine and slow tempo” 
out loud. He also experienced speaking aloud in Tournament Sample T.9 when he was 
saying “Damn, I hit it in the left trap” to one of the other golfers. Aaron experienced 
speaking aloud in half of his tournament samples. In all three of these instances, he was 
speaking aloud to other golfers rather than himself as Mike was once. Aaron specifically 
commented on how much talking to one another occurred during the golf tournament. 
Aaron pointed to the friendly yet competitive camaraderie among these three participants. 
Because 4 o f 7 or 57% of the speaking aloud instances across these participants were 
speaking aloud to other golfers among this group of three, we speculate that these 
speaking aloud instances could be explained by the friendly-competitive camaraderie 
among these three participants. The remaining 3 of 7 or 43% instances of speaking aloud 
were phrases said to the participant themselves.
Summary and Discussion. As noted in the previous discussion of inner speech in this 
chapter, the phenomenon we call speaking aloud falls under the broad definition o f self­
talk in the eyes of many sport psychology researchers as statements said aloud (Van 
Raalte, Brewer, Rivera, & Petipas, 1994). Although we advocate a narrower and more 
specific definition distinguishing inner speech from speaking aloud and other forms and 
contents o f inner experience that emerge from direct observations of momentary inner 
experience, speaking aloud has been observed and described, albeit retrospectively, by 
other researchers under the broad definition of self-talk.
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Individual Differences
To this point, this chapter has shown several nomothetic similarities and differences 
in inner experience during golf performance and daily life across participants and 
between participant groups. Another important aspect o f inner experience that has also 
been briefly described throughout this chapter, particularly in the feeling subsection, but 
deserves independent attention is the idiosyncratic nature of inner experience. As Table 1 
illustrates, of the 16 categories of inner experience during golf and daily life, only 1 
category was experienced by all 10 of our study participants -  golf-related content. Golf- 
related content is an extremely broad category; in fact, considering mental preparation 
strategies, a more specific content category, we notice that 7 participants experienced this 
category whereas 3 did not. In fact further attention to the categories o f inner experience 
during golf and daily life demonstrates that for 15 of the 16 categories or 94%, at least 
one and typically more participant(s) did not experience any of each o f the 15 categories 
either during golf or daily life and sometimes both (see zeros). This illustrates that, 
although patterns were found among the inner experience of our study participants, the 
range of inner experiences observed in this study were actually quite individually 
different. Thus the idiosyncratic nature o f inner experience is also evident.
Nomothetic Results Summary
The current study sought to explore inner experience during golf performance to 
address the very basic question, what is inner experience during golf performance? Our 
results suggest that inner experience during golf performance may consist o f golf-related 
content and mental preparation strategies as well as perceptual awareness and inner 
speech most prominently. Second to this, unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness.
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feeling, and speaking aloud may also be involved. In addition, it was apparent that, 
although these categories of inner experience were observed to be nomothetically salient, 
inner experience during golf performance as well as daily life was found to be quite 
individually different.
The current study allowed us to explore the differences between golf and daily life 
inner experiences. Across our study participants, perceptual awareness and inner speech 
were more salient during golf than daily life. Feelings were slightly less salient during 
golf than daily life. Between our participant groups, inner seeing was less salient during 
golf than daily life for the low handicap group but equally salient for the moderate 
handicap group in golf and daily life. Sensory awareness was less salient during golf than 
daily life for the moderate handicap group but equally salient for the low handicap group 
in golf and daily life. These differences show that inner experience may vary during 
different activities such as golf and daily life. In addition, inner experience may vary 
between different golf skill groups during different activities.
The current study also allowed us to address another very basic question, that is, what 
is the relationship between inner experience and the quality o f golf performance? Our 
results suggest that the salient characteristics that showed greatest possible signs of 
between-group differences during golf performance were golf-related content and mental 
preparation strategies. This raises the question for future study about whether golf-related 
content, particularly mental preparation strategies, are positively-related to quality o f golf 
performance. Future studies may further examine the role of perceptual awareness and 
inner speech in golf performance.
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Discussion
Somehow or another I knew you guys were going to ask me ‘Exactly what were you 
thinking about?’ And that’s kind of a strange thing because, unless I would have had that 
beep, I probably couldn’t tell you.... I would have never ever ever been able to tell you
what I was thinking about.
-Mike
Sport performance is widely believed to depend on inner phenomena that occur 
during performance. Empirical investigations in sport performance have generally 
avoided the direct and immediate assessment of inner phenomena in favor of casual and 
indirect retrospective report measures. The reliance on retrospective self-reports obtained 
long after performance may be problematic because to compete and simultaneously to 
recall internal processes is a demanding combination. In this regard, much of the 
knowledge of irmer experience during sport has been generated on the nineteenth hole, so 
to speak.
By contrast, this study directly and promptly assessed the inner phenomena of 10 
experienced golfers during golf performance using DES. As the previous eleven chapters 
have shown, collaborating with an athlete and prompting him or her to directly assess 
inner experience in a timely fashion during golf performance generates rich, detailed, and 
faithful accounts of inner experience. As Mike’s unsolicited statement above attests, 
directly sampling inner experience between the first and eighteenth holes captures 
phenomena that would likely be highly degraded if not completely lost forever.
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The main findings of the current study suggest inner experience during golf 
performance consists o f golf-related content, mental preparation strategies, perceptual 
awareness, and inner speech as well as unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness, 
feeling, and speaking aloud; and it was apparent that inner experience during golf 
performance as well as daily life was quite individually different. The current study 
assets, limitations, and potential future directions will now be discussed.
Study Assets
As our toumament-winner Mike’s statement at the beginning of this chapter attests, 
teaching athletes directly to observe and describe inner experience and subsequently 
prompting them to do so during performance generates rich, detailed, faithful, useful, and 
probably more accurate accounts of inner experience that are less susceptible to the 
memory problems associated with retrospective self-report. We cannot help but wonder 
what it is that Mike would be doing if  he were asked to recall his inner experience during 
golf performance retrospectively. Even with carefully-worded, non-leading questions, 
what would he say? How would he recall? Most importantly, how accurate would his 
accounting be? Now consider what he would likely say if we asked questions that 
presumed the prejudice that all thinking occurs in words such as “what were you saying 
to yourself during golf?” or questions that presumed that imagery is all-important in golf 
such as “what were you imagining during golf?” Would he not be lead to tell us what he 
was saying and seeing whether or not he was saying or seeing anything at all? The 
leading nature of these questions would be difficult for him to resist. Perhaps he would, 
but how often and for how long? And even if he would, would other research 
participants?
293
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DES provides high fidelity descriptions of the phenomena of inner experience. It is a 
method of directly assessing inner experience that encourages active collaboration with 
its participants to obtain faithful accounts of untainted inner experience in naturalistic 
settings. When the goal is obtaining reports that are faithful to the actual phenomena o f 
inner experience in sport, this study suggests that DES can be used during sport 
performance to generate descriptions that illuminate the actual phenomena of inner 
experience.
The strengths of the method and the current study are its portability, its ability to 
capture inner experience in naturalistic settings, and the ability to observe and describe 
inner experiential phenomena accurately and faithfully. It also provides high fidelity 
descriptions that richly illustrate the processes of inner experience both idiographically 
and nomothetically. As discussed by Hurlburt and Akter (2006), DES collects randomly- 
selected, time-specific, manifest, ongoing, contemporaneous, personal inner experiences. 
Randomly-selected moments ensure that inner experiences are most representative o f the 
person’s actual inner experiences, and it also helps DES researchers better bracket 
presuppositions. Time specificity allows the participant-researcher collaborative team to 
examine actual specific slices of time grounded in the actual inner experiences present at 
the moment of the beep as opposed to generalities that may be speculated about with 
respect to the participant. Thus time specificity leads to inner experiential specificity, and 
after enough samples and enough participants, better specificity about inner experiences, 
in this case better accounts of inner experience during golf performance. DES also 
examines manifest, directly-observable phenomena rather than unconscious processes, 
making the method able to capture obviously-apparent momentary inner experience more
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clearly. By capturing ongoing inner experiences, DES seeks to reduce the reactivity of 
the method by focusing away from the participants reaction to the beep that may occur 
after the beep in favor of the momentary inner experience present in the sliver o f time 
was define as “the moment of the beep.” This of course further enhances time and 
personal inner experiential specificity. The strength of collecting contemporaneous 
reports enables DES to overcome many of the pitfalls of retrospective self-report such as 
memory problems. Finally, the personal nature of samples obtained by DES in this and 
other DES studies allow us to capture phenomena as they are actually experienced by our 
participants rather than abstracting about personal inner phenomena. Thus the samples we 
obtained best illustrate the actual experienced momentary phenomena of our 10 
participants during naturalistic golf and daily life settings. (See Hurlburt & Akter, 2006.) 
Study Limitations
Because of the intensive, iterative nature of successively zeroing in on the details of 
inner experience in the expositional interviews, it is essential that a priori presuppositions 
are bracketed (Hurlburt, 1990; Hurlburt, 1993; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006; Hurlburt, 
Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006) to prevent leading the participants to provide skewed 
descriptions of their inner experience. One of the practical consequences o f this is having 
few, and in some cases, no hypotheses regarding the results o f a DES study. DES follows 
a bottom-up approach to generating knowledge about inner experience. It begins with 
moment-by-moment, person-by-person idiographic descriptions of inner experience.
With increasing numbers o f participants, descriptions of inner experience may lead to 
nomothetic trends, which may in turn generate general knowledge about the inner 
experiential tendencies of groups of individuals. Using the DES method, making
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predictions is appropriate when predictions are induced by the observations of 
exploratory DES studies such as the current one. Thus predictions are more appropriate in 
secondary DES studies or replications, and in these studies, these predictions are 
bracketed as much as possible.
Because this is the first DES study to examine inner experience during golf 
performance, we had no predictions regarding what we would find. One of the limitations 
of the current study is that we could not appropriately conduct quantitative analyses to 
compare inner experiences between the two study groups without having made a priori 
predictions. Hurlburt and Akhter (2007) suggest that “those who describe phenomena 
[be] firewalled away from those who theorize about the significance of those 
phenomena.” Although the current study observed and described idiographically and 
nomothetically salient phenomena during golf performance, the practical significance of 
these phenomena have still to be determined. Thus the current study is limited as basic 
research; however, future studies may better determine the practical significance of these 
and/or other new phenomena still undiscovered.
In a study such as this that observes inner experience and behavior, it would be 
tempting to view the mere co-occurrences of various inner experience and behaviors and 
infer causation. This was not the purpose of this study. A myriad o f other variables could 
account for the co-occurrences that were found in this study. We did not randomly select 
participants, did not randomly assign them to experimental condition, and had less 
control over study conditions than a controlled experiment would. Thus one of the other 
limitations of this study is that we cannot infer causation. Instead our tasks were to 
demonstrate that DES can be used to explore and describe inner experience during golf
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performance, to identity potentially interesting phenomena, and to point out noticeable 
patterns among phenomena, if  any.
Despite not being able to infer causation, this study demonstrates that DES can be 
used to explore and describe inner experience during golf performance. Nomothetic 
results indicate that inner experience during golf performance may consist of golf-related 
content and mental preparation strategies as well as perceptual awareness and inner 
speech most prominently. Second to this, unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness, 
feeling, and speaking aloud may also be involved. In addition, it was apparent that, 
although these categories of inner experience were observed with some degree of 
observed consistency, inner experience during golf performance as well as daily life was 
found to be quite individually different.
There were 16 categories of inner experience identified among the current study 
participant samples during golf. There are undoubtedly more ways o f having inner 
experience during performance as well. Predictions would also have been inappropriate 
because, without an empirical basis, that is, one based on previous DES observations, we 
would have no appropriate way of knowing which of 16 or more categories o f inner 
experience would be important in formulating predictions. With the limited number of 
participants in our study, the ability to test our predictions would have also been limited. 
Also, with 16 or more categories of inner experience, our Type I error would have also 
been high. More importantly, predictions may have led us away from new or different 
manifestations of inner experience, such as perceptual awareness, golf-related content, or 
mental preparation strategies. Thus sensible reasons exist for having had no predictions in 
this, the first study to examine inner experience during sport performance. The
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unfortunate byproduct of this is that we cannot with much definitiveness make statements 
about what it takes to be successful in golf.
Another limitation of the current study is its uncontrolled nature. This study explored 
inner experience during golf and daily life, but participants collected their samples in a 
variety of heterogeneous settings during daily life and during a variety of settings on the 
golf course including in the golf cart, standing on the fairway, getting ready to drive the 
ball, getting ready to putt the ball, talking to other golfers, watching other golfers, and so 
on. Although inner experience was related to behavior in the case of golf-related content 
being higher during golf than daily life, consistent with Hurlburt and colleagues (2002), 
the uncontrolled nature of these settings may have limited our knowledge about the 
precise nature of golf-related behavior and inner experiences during golf performance.
Another limitation of the current study is the limited generalizability o f its findings. 
This is the first DES study o f inner experience during sport performance. As such, 
whether our findings generalize to other golfers in other situations has yet to be 
examined. For instance, even though all DES studies since 1990 have found 
unsymbolized thinking in their participants’ samples Hurlburt states that “it must be 
acknowledged that all DES studies have been performed by Hurlburt and his colleagues, 
so as yet there may be some limitations on the generalizability o f their conclusions” 
(Hurlburt & Akhter, 2007).
As basic research the current study is limited in its scope and by its inability to make 
predictions that could be analyzed appropriately by quantitative statistics. As an 
exploratory study it also limited by its uncontrolled nature, its generalizability, and its 
inability to better determine the practical significance of the phenomena it uncovered
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during golf performance. What it does suggest at least tentatively is that golf-related 
content, mental preparation strategies, perceptual awareness, and inner speech as well as 
unsymoblized thinking, inner seeing, sensory awareness, feeling, and speaking aloud 
were involved in inner experience during golf performance.
Future Directions
As a result of the findings o f this study, future DES studies have more solid 
grounding to test predictions about inner experiential phenomena. One set o f predictions 
that may be examined by future DES studies could be whether inner experiential 
phenomena are related to the quality of golf performance. We feel that golf-related 
content, mental preparation strategies, perceptual awareness, and inner speech are worth 
examining because these were the most salient characteristics during golf performance, 
although others should certainly be tested as well. O f these phenomena, mental 
preparation strategies seemed to show some signs of possibly being positively related to 
quality of performance; however, before moving forward too quickly we must consider 
that this was only one study with a limited number of participants. Thus it would be most 
appropriate to replicate this study using DES while both bracketing presuppositions in 
general and bracketing presuppositions specific to any predictions that are made. Future 
DES studies may examine inner experience during golf performance under more 
controlled conditions, controlling for factors such as the type of task a golfer is 
conducting, and using more participants as well. After this, future DES studies may also 
study different performance tasks, extending research to other sports.
It is our position that DES studies, and perhaps those of other similar methods with 
similar techniques and goals, will best enhance the depth, breadth, and quality of
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knowledge about inner experience during sport performance. We believe sport 
performance knowledge will most likely be advanced from the bottom-up, that is first 
idiographically, moment-by-moment, participant-by-participant, and second 
nomothetically, at the level of study-by-study. If more convenient correlates o f inner 
experience are eventually found, more convenient research could be conducted on the 
same phenomena of inner experience examined in this study with larger groups of 
participants, exponentially increasing knowledge about the relationship between inner 
experience and sport performance, the subject matter o f sport psychology. In this 
endeavor, DES may play an essential role.
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